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Abstract
The topic of this thesis is axiological uncertainty – the question of how you
should evaluate your options if you are uncertain about which axiology is
true. As an answer, I defend Expected Value Maximisation (EVM), the
view that one option is better than another if and only if it has the greater
expected value across axiologies. More precisely, I explore the axiomatic
foundations of this view. I employ results from state-dependent utility theory,
extend them in various ways and interpret them accordingly, and thus provide
axiomatisations of EVM as a theory of axiological uncertainty.
Chapter 1 defends the importance of the problem of axiological uncer-
tainty. Chapter 2 introduces the most basic theorem of this thesis, the
Expected Value Theorem. This theorem says that EVM is true if the bet-
terness relation under axiological uncertainty satisfies the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms and a Pareto condition. I argue that, given certain
simplifications and modulo the problem of intertheoretic comparisons, this
theorem presents a powerful means to formulate and defend EVM. Chapter
3 then examines the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. I argue that
intertheoretic comparisons are generally possible, but that some plausible
axiologies may not be comparable in a precise way. The Expected Value
Theorem presupposes that all axiologies are comparable in a precise way. So
this motivates extending the Expected Value Theorem to make it cover less
than fully comparable axiologies. Chapter 4 then examines the concept of
a probability distribution over axiologies. In the Expected Value Theorem,
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this concept figures as a primitive. I argue that we need an account of what
it means, and outline and defend an explication for it. Chapter 5 starts to
bring together the upshots from the previous three chapters. It extends the
Expected Value Theorem by allowing for less than fully comparable axiolo-
gies and by dropping the presupposition of probabilities as given primitives.
Chapter 6 provides formal appendices.
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Chapter 1
The Problem of Axiological
Uncertainty
1.1 The Basic Question
Introduction
Our lives are rife with uncertainty, and yet we constantly have to act. So
uncertainty is the condition of almost any decision we make.
Part of this uncertainty concerns non-normative questions. When ordering
a dinner at a restaurant, we are often uncertain about what exactly we will
get; in starting a new job, we rarely know precisely how that will turn out;
and in trying to alleviate climate change, we will not be certain about the
efficacy and ramifications of different ecological measures. Indeed, we can
rarely predict the long- or even the short-term effects of our actions. For
practical philosophy, this raises the question about what you ought to do if
you are non-normatively uncertain.
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But often, we are also uncertain about purely normative questions. In re-
sponse to climate change, for example, we may not be certain about whether
we morally ought to be impartial in weighing the relevant different interests,
or whether we ought to give more weight to currently living people over fu-
ture generations, or to people we know over distant strangers, or to human
beings over animals. More generally, we often do not know what the correct
norms of morality, or rationality, or any other system of norms, are. Such
uncertainty will often occur along with non-normative uncertainty, but it
could even obtain if we were non-normatively certain. It raises the question
about what you ought to do if you are normatively uncertain.
This thesis is about this latter, normative kind of uncertainty. More pre-
cisely, it is about a particular kind of normative uncertainty: uncertainty
about moral value – about which options are morally better than which. I
shall call this axiological uncertainty, since the part of morality that deals
with moral value is called axiology. So my core question is about what you
ought to do if you are axiologically uncertain. Or more precisely still, it is
about which options are morally better than which if you are axiologically
uncertain.
Axiological uncertainty is only a very specific form of normative uncer-
tainty. Not only are there, plausibly, normative facts other than those of
morality; but even morality itself may be broader than axiology. Perhaps
morality also features facts about what we ought to do, and indeed facts
that have nothing to do with moral value – obligations of fairness or justice,
say. For reasons that will emerge, I take my narrower question to be some-
what less difficult than the more general questions of moral or normative
2
uncertainty. So I shall ignore uncertainty about all these other normative
facts, and focus on axiological uncertainty only.
The Meaning of the Question
Some terminology will be helpful. I said that my core question is which
options are morally better than which if you are axiologically uncertain. In
one sense, there seems to be a trivial and indisputable answer to this question:
an option is better than another, it seems, if and only if it is better according
to the true axiology.
However, this is not the answer I am concerned with. To see that there
might be a different one, consider first a case of ordinary non-normative
uncertainty:
Example 1. Blue is suffering from a mild form of pain. Red has a pill
that he could give him, but Red is very uncertain about whether the pill
is a pain reliever or a lethal form of poison.
Suppose that, as a matter of fact, the pill is a pain reliever. Is it then better
to give this pill to Blue, or better not to give it?
Cases like this have caused an extensive debate with respect to the deontic
concept ‘ought’ – about whether there are two distinct concepts of ‘ought’
(‘subjective’ and ‘objective’) or just a single one, about which one it would
be, or which of the two is ultimately more basic or important.1 I shall not
go into the details of that debate. It seems undeniable to me that something
1Cf. e.g. Hudson (1989), Jackson (1991), Howard-Synder (1997), Wiland (2005), Feld-
man (2006), Zimmerman (2008), Bykvist (2009b), Broome (2013, ch.3), Kolodny and
MacFarlane (ms).
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has to be said, and can be said, both in favour of giving and in favour of
not giving the pill. On the one hand, we can evaluate Red’s options on the
basis of their actual outcomes, without taking his uncertainty into account.
When we do that, we will say that giving the pill is better. After all, Red
will thereby simply relieve Blue’s pain, and nothing else will happen. On
the other hand, we can evaluate Red’s options on the basis of the prospects
that they represent, taking his uncertainty into account. When we do that,
we will say that not giving the pill is better. After all, Red will otherwise
risk Blue’s death for the sake of a mild pain. We may be interested in either
of these judgments, and both uses of ‘good’ seem familiar. I shall remain
neutral about which of them is ultimately more important, or more in line
with our common concept of goodness (or ‘ought’).
A parallel example can be given concerning axiological uncertainty:
Example 2. Red has a pill, with which he can either relieve Blue of a mild
pain, or relieve a non-human animal of a significantly greater pain, but
not both. Red is very uncertain about the moral value of animal welfare
– uncertain, that is, between a speciesist and a non-speciesist axiology.
Suppose that according to the speciesist axiology it would be better to benefit
Blue, and according to the non-speciesist axiology it would be better to
benefit the animal. Furthermore, suppose for the sake of argument that the
speciesist view is right.
Then again, we can evaluate Red’s options on the basis of their actual
value, without taking his uncertainty into account. When we do that, we
will say that it is better to benefit Blue. After all, this is what the true
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axiology says. However, we can again evaluate Red’s options on the basis of
the prospects that they represent, now taking his axiological uncertainty into
account. And if we do that, it at least remains an open question which act is
better, under Red’s state of uncertainty. By benefiting Blue he after all risks
performing an act that is comparatively bad. Judgments of this kind are
perhaps less familiar from our ordinary practice, but they are no less distinct
than in the non-normative case.
I am concerned with judgments of this latter kind. To distinguish them
conceptually, I will use the concept ‘uncertainty-relative value’, or ‘u-value’
to denote the goodness we refer to by taking your axiological uncertainty
into account. I will use the simple terms ‘value’, ‘goodness ’ or ‘betterness ’ to
denote the goodness we refer to without taking into account your axiological
uncertainty. In Example 2, I shall thus say that it is better to benefit Blue,
but (so far) an open question which of the two options is u-better. And this
is the core question of my thesis: which options are u-better than which, if
you are uncertain about which options are better than which? This question
has no trivial and indisputable answer.
The Importance of the Question
Axiological uncertainty is a very important phenomenon. Normative value
theory is difficult, and hence many – if not all – of our most momentous
decisions are decisions under axiological uncertainty. Let me illustrate this
with a few examples.
Take questions of population ethics. For instance: can a sufficiently large
5
population of people with lives barely worth living be better than a smaller
population with people living wonderful lives? Some people find it very plau-
sible that this is the case,2 while others find it almost impossible to believe,3
and there are arguments for both sides. More basically: can it even be good
to bring people into existence? Most people have a strong intuition that it
can normally not, but that intuition faces serious objections.4 Or relatedly:
to what extent are the values of populations involving different numbers of
people even comparable? While some have argued that there is only some
vagueness in how they compare,5 others claimed that such populations are
never comparable,6 and still others defended a middle ground between these
views.7 Population ethics is notoriously difficult. In fact, there are numerous
impossibility theorems showing that a number of intuitively plausible prin-
ciples of population ethics are incompatible.8 We should be far from certain
about any answers in that field.
However, each of these questions is key to evaluating our potential re-
sponses to the largest challenges for humanity – such as global poverty, cli-
mate change, or (other) catastrophic risks like plagues and pandemics, arti-
ficial intelligence or terrorism and war. In all of these cases, among else, the
number and identity of future people is at stake, and so they raise population-
ethical questions. For the same reason, and closer to home, the above ques-
tions are of primary importance when we decide on any policy of public
2Cf. e.g. Huemer (2008).
3Cf. e.g. Temkin (2012) and Parfit (1984).
4Cf. Broome (2004, ch.10).
5Cf. Broome (2004, ch.12).
6This was suggested to me by Ralf Bader in conversation.
7Cf. e.g. Parfit (ms).
8Cf. e.g. Arrhenius (forthcoming).
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health, security or migration, say. And they also matter greatly for very per-
sonal decisions each of us faces – such as whether or not we use our resources
to save or improve the lives of other people, thereby perhaps allowing them to
have enormous chains of children, grand children, great grand children, and
so on.9 From the largest decisions of humanity to the most personal ques-
tions of how we conduct our lives, our decisions plausibly or potentially affect
the population, and thus involve vexed population-axiological questions, and
axiological uncertainty.
Moreover, in all these examples, there is no way to avoid making a decision
under axiological uncertainty. We cannot somehow wait until we acquired
axiological certainty or knowledge. Or more precisely, even to ‘wait’ and
do moral philosophy to acquire moral certainty or knowledge would be a
decision. So this only raises the question whether that would be the u-best
thing to do.10
But population ethics is just one example. Consider the question of what
is good for a being. Very plausibly, this question is relevant to assessing the
moral value of options. But we are by no means certain about it. For exam-
ple, would it be bad for sentient beings to have extensive pleasure artificially
stimulated in their brains, to have wonderful lives simulated in experience
machines, or to undergo serious enhancements through drugs or genetic engi-
neering? While to some such scenarios sound horrific,11 others have decidedly
embraced them.12 And these questions are expectably of great practical im-
9For the practical importance of population ethics, cf. particularly Broome (2004, ch.1)
and Beckstead (2013, ch.1).
10Cf. MacAskill (2014, ch.6) for a discussion of this question.
11Cf. e.g. Nozick (1974, 42ff.).
12Cf. e.g. Ng (1997, 1849ff.) and Crisp (2006).
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portance, as pleasure stimulations and enhancements will plausibly become
a serious possibility in the future. Or take questions about goodness in time:
does the wellbeing of future beings have the same value as that of currently
existing ones, or should we discount the value of wellbeing over time? There
seem to be very good arguments against discounting,13 but not discounting
future lives has implications that contradict common sense morality radi-
cally.14 This issue too is extremely important, as very many of our actions
potentially have ramifications and ripple effects until a very distant future.
Finally, consider questions about the moral value of animal welfare again.
For example, is it bad that animals suffer in the wild, are being eaten by
predators or die from starvation and diseases? Again, our common sense
practice seems to disregard almost all of this suffering. But there are very
good arguments that such suffering is bad, indeed very bad, given the astro-
nomical number of wild animals.15 Examples can be multiplied with ease.
Decision making under axiological uncertainty is unavoidably very common.
So at least prima facie, it is very important that we reflect on how to
evaluate options in the face of axiological uncertainty. I say ‘prima facie’,
because even granting that axiological uncertainty affects our most momen-
tous decisions, one might raise several objections against the importance of
u-value. And it is in fact not altogether easy to say why exactly it is im-
portant to reflect about u-value. I shall discuss some of these objections in
section 1.3. But before I turn to them, let me outline in more detail what I
shall do in this thesis.
13Cf. e.g. Broome (2004, ch.4).
14Cf. e.g. Beckstead (2013).
15Cf. e.g. McMahan (2010).
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1.2 This Dissertation
I shall now first state the main goal, the approach and main results of this
thesis in general terms; I then provide a synopsis of the later chapters; and
then I briefly mention some problems that I shall set aside.
Goals, Approach, and Relationship to the Existing Literature
Again, my core question is which options are u-better than which. As the
title of the thesis indicates, the answer I shall give to this question is Expected
Value Maximisation, or EVM. This view says, roughly, that an option is u-
better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value – where the
expected value of an option is a weighted sum of the values it is assigned by
the axiologies, with weights representing the probabilities of these axiologies.
So, roughly, the main goal of this thesis is to defend EVM as the correct
answer to my core question.
As the subtitle of the thesis indicates, I shall pursue an axiomatic approach
to this goal. I shall introduce formal theorems to the effect that EVM fol-
lows from a certain set of axioms; and I shall claim that these results are
philosophically important in various ways. If my arguments are sound, these
theorems can help us formulate what EVM means and help us understand
its nature and normativity; they can help us vindicate that EVM is true; and
they can also help us assess the prospects of formulating and defending EVM
as a general theory of normative (rather than merely axiological) uncertainty.
So more precisely, I might say that the goal of this thesis is to explore the
foundations of EVM.
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Unfortunately, there are various versions of EVM. I do not think that we
can be certain of any particular one; nor indeed do I think that we can be cer-
tain that EVM – rather than some other theory of axiological uncertainty – is
correct. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide full-blown axiomatic
foundations for different versions of EVM, let alone for different theories of
axiological uncertainty. So for most part, I shall simply elaborate on a form
of EVM that I find very convincing, and that lends itself most readily to an
axiomatisation. But wherever possible, I shall also indicate how alternative
versions of EVM could be axiomatised, and start to explore the axiomatic
foundations of theories of axiological uncertainty other than EVM. So in most
precise terms, the goal of this thesis is to outline possible axiomatic founda-
tions for one version of EVM, and to indicate possible axiomatic foundations
for other versions of EVM as well as for alternative theories of axiological
uncertainty. Thus I hope to argue for one specific theory of axiological un-
certainty, while at the same time providing at least the beginnings of an
overview over the space of possible views and their respective foundations.
To pursue this axiomatic approach, I shall rely as much as possible on
the existing literature about non-normative uncertainty. More specifically, I
shall rely on representation theorems from decision theory. These theorems
are standardly interpreted as grounding facts about what your preferences
should be under non-normative uncertainty. In this thesis, I shall take such
theorems from decision theory, extend them in various ways and reinterpret
them accordingly, and thus apply them to the context of axiological uncer-
tainty. In this context, I shall claim, they can ground facts about the u-value
relation. In some respects, this will naturally raise similar questions and
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problems as it does in the non-normative context. But it also raises various
very specific issues. So as I hope my thesis will show, it is worth investigating
the axiomatic foundations of Expected Value Maximisation under axiological
uncertainty specifically.
This has not been done. Quite generally, the theory of normative uncer-
tainty is still in its infancy.16 In the wake of Ted Lockhart’s (2000) pioneering
work, various people have endorsed EVM; some obvious similarities between
the problem of normative and that of non-normative uncertainty have been
mentioned; and various authors have expressed the idea that ‘decision theory’
might vindicate EVM.17 However, as far as I am aware, the theory has not
received a decision-theoretically sophisticated, or axiomatic exploration. The
reason for this may be that philosophers thought the application of expected
utility theory completely trivial and unproblematic,18 or that they took it
to be philosophically uninteresting.19 Be it as it may, the possible axiomatic
foundations of EVM – or indeed the problem of axiological or normative un-
certainty generally – have not been thoroughly investigated. I shall try to
fill this lacuna in this dissertation.
Synopsis
After this introductory chapter, the thesis will feature four main chapters,
16As far as I am aware, less than a dozen publications address the general problem; cf.
Hudson (1989), Gracely (1996), Lockhart (2000), Weatherson (2002), Sepielli (2006; 2009),
Ross (2006b), Guerrero (2007), MacAskill (2013), Gustafsson and Torpman (2014); cf. also
Hedden (forthcoming), Harman (forthcoming); Ross (2006a), Sepielli (2010), MacAskill
(2014) for PhD theses. Moral uncertainty is sometimes mentioned in specific debates in
applied ethics; cf. e.g. Pfeiffer (1985), Oddie (1994), Moller (2011), Broome (2012, 183ff.).
17Cf. e.g. Ross (2006b, 753ff.); also MacAskill (2014, ch.1).
18This seems to be true for Ross (2006b, 753ff.).
19This seems to be true for Sepielli (2009, 27; 2010, 169).
11
followed by a chapter of appendices. In the remainder of the present chap-
ter, I shall answer some objections against the importance of u-value, and
thus further motivate the project of formulating and defending a theory of
axiological uncertainty.
In chapter 2, I shall first introduce the decision-theoretic framework that
I employ in this thesis – that of so-called state-dependent utility theory –
and show why this framework is particularly congenial to the theory of axi-
ological uncertainty. I shall then reproduce a simple representation theorem
from state-dependent utility theory. Together with certain background as-
sumptions and extended by an additional axiom this result will imply the
most basic theorem of this thesis – the Expected Value Theorem. This the-
orem says, roughly, that EVM is true if the u-value relation satisfies the
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and a Pareto condition with respect to
the underlying axiologies. I shall suggest that, given certain restrictions and
simplifications, and modulo the problem of intertheoretic comparisons, this
theorem presents a powerful means to formulate and defend EVM.
In chapter 3, I shall then discuss the problem of intertheoretic comparisons
– the question whether sizes of value differences or heights of value levels can
be compared across axiologies. I first state an argument to the effect that
absolute scepticism about intertheoretic comparisons has unacceptably im-
plausible implications, and thus that at least some intertheoretic comparisons
must somehow be possible. Assuming that this is true, I then discuss differ-
ent accounts of why it is true, and begin to outline for each of these accounts
how the Expected Value Theorem can be interpreted or extended so as to be
compatible with it. On the account I shall ultimately find most convincing,
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some plausible axiologies are not comparable in a precise way. The Expected
Value Theorem presupposes that all axiologies are comparable in a precise
way. So this motivates the search for weaker conditions than those of the
Expected Value Theorem, so that our theory of axiological uncertainty can
cover less than fully comparable axiologies.
In chapter 4, I then focus on the concept of a credence distribution over
axiologies. In the Expected Value Theorem, this concept figures as an un-
explained primitive. I argue that this is ultimately unsatisfying, and that
we need an account of what this concept means. In line with my general
approach, I then employ and extend a representation theorem from decision
theory to provide an explication for it. According to this explication, roughly,
the credence you have in an axiology is the weight you give that axiology in
your u-value judgments. Like other explications that are based on represen-
tation theorems, this account has important implications for the normative
structure of EVM. In light of this, I shall discuss various recent objections
against the significance of representation theorems for the purposes of defin-
ing credences. At least with respect to axiological uncertainty, I shall answer
these objections and argue that representation theorems provide the best
account of credences, and thus that they can and should play an important
role in grounding EVM.
In chapter 5, I start to bring together the upshots from the previous three
chapters. I shall combine results from two branches of decision theory –
state-dependent utility theory, and utility theory without the Completeness
axiom – and state the most comprehensive theorem of this thesis. The result
is a representation theorem for state-dependent utilities without the Com-
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pleteness axiom, which at least goes some way towards dropping the presup-
position of axiological credences as primitives. This will allow the theory of
axiological uncertainty to cover axiologies that do not compare in a precise
way.
At the end of each of these main chapters I shall pursue a ‘further explo-
ration’: I shall discuss the possibilities of axiomatising views other than the
main theory outlined in the thesis. Thus I shall consider theories of axio-
logical uncertainty other then EVM (in chapters 3 and 4); I shall consider
whether we can defend expected value maximisation as a theory of uncer-
tainty about theories of axiological uncertainty (in chapter 2); and I shall
examine whether the axiomatic framework of this thesis can be extended be-
yond axiological uncertainty to cover general moral uncertainty (in chapter
5).
Problems that I Ignore
Let me briefly flag three problems that I shall not discuss in this thesis. First,
I shall not address any metaethical issues underlying the problem of norma-
tive uncertainty. My questions presuppose a notion of axiological ‘truth’, and
a notion of an agent’s ‘credences’ in an axiology. As far as the metaethics is
concerned, I shall simply take these notions for granted. It is a separate and
difficult question to what extent my questions arise, or can be made sense of,
within non-cognitivist or anti-realist metaethical views. Some people think
that non-cognitivists cannot account for the phenomenon of normative uncer-
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tainty;20 others think they can.21 And in any case, the ability to make sense
of normative uncertainty is generally treated as a desideratum on metaeth-
ical views: if such a view cannot account for normative uncertainty, that is
standardly taken to be a problem for this view, rather than a problem for
the project of normative uncertainty.22 I think that this is a plausible view of
the dialectic. But be that as it may, I shall ignore any metaethical dimension
in this dissertation.
Secondly, I shall not discuss the question about the deontic status of your
u-best option. It might be that, ceteris paribus, if one of your options is
u-best, you are under a normative (narrow-scope23) requirement to choose
that option. Or you might be under a normative (wide-scope) requirement
to the effect that, if one of your options is u-best, ceteris paribus, you choose
it. You might also be under both kinds of requirement, or under neither.
And perhaps these requirements would be requirements of morality, or of
rationality, or something else again. This involves large questions. They are
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Thirdly, as I already indicated, I shall not say anything more about the
conceptual questions surrounding different orders of goodness. In particu-
lar, I shall not discuss the existence of a putative notion of overall-goodness.
Suppose that your best option is a, but that given your axiological uncer-
tainty, your u-best option is b. Indeed, suppose you are also uncertain about
theories of axiological uncertainty, and that according to the true theory of
20Cf. e.g. Smith (2002), Bykvist and Olson (2009).
21Cf. e.g. Sepielli (2012).
22Cf. e.g. Smith (2002).
23Cf. Broome (2013, ch.7) for the terminology of ‘wide-’ or ‘narrow-scope requirements’.
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uncertainty about theories of axiological uncertainty, your u2-best option (as
we might call it) is c. We might imagine that the orders of value go ever
higher up. This raises the question about whether there is some overall-best
option, beyond or besides the different orders of value. I think that there is
no such notion of overall-betterness.24 But this is a conceptual debate on its
own. I shall not enter this debate in this thesis (though I shall briefly discuss
a related issue arising through a potential regress on page 25).
1.3 Objections
Before moving on to the main chapters, let me address some objections con-
cerning the importance of u-value.
The Fetishism Objection
Some people have argued that we do not need a theory of u-value (or of moral
uncertainty more generally) because concern with u-value is fetishistic. To
see what this means, suppose that you have a choice between a vegan meal
and a steak, and that you are uncertain between a speciesist and a non-
speciesist view about the value of animal welfare. Suppose that you find
the speciesist view much more plausible. However, you believe that if the
non-speciesist view is right, killing animals is very bad, and so you think it
is u-better to get the vegan meal. Suppose finally that you do get the vegan
meal because you think it is u-better. Then your vegan diet does not spring
24Cf. Sepielli (2013a, 13ff.) for a defence of a related view.
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from a core concern that you have for animals, it seems. Rather, you seem to
care about (u-)value as such – about whatever turns out to be (u-)valuable,
simply because it is (u-)valuable. And as Michael Smith pointed out in
a similar context, we might think that there is something inappropriate –
‘fetishistic’ – about that. Smith says:
Good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their
children and friends, the well-being of their fellows, people getting what they
deserve, justice, equality, and the like, not just one thing: doing what they
believe to be right, where this is read de dicto and not de re. Indeed, common-
sense tells us that being so motivated is a fetish or moral vice, not the one and
only moral virtue. (1994, 75)
Smith objected to de dicto concern with what is morally right. But similar
considerations arise in the context of axiological uncertainty: concern with
u-value might seem inappropriately fetishistic.
Brian Weatherson, for example, believes this. Concering the case of meat-
eating I just described, he says: ‘it would be perverse for [you] to turn down
the steak. To do so [you] would have to care about morality, whatever it is,
not about the list of things that Smith rightly says a good person will care
about’ (2014, 13). And this is one of the main reasons for why he concludes
that ‘being uncertain about the physical consequences of your actions should
matter both to what you do, and how you are assessed. [...] But a mere
probability that meat eating is immoral should not change one’s actions, or
one’s evaluations of meat eaters’ (2014, 2).25
However, it is not entirely clear what the ‘inappropriateness’ of being
motivated by u-value should consist in, and what conclusion we should draw
25The fetishism objection is also raised in Hedden (forthcoming, 22).
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from it. So let me suggest three interpretations of this fetishism-objection,
and answer each of them in turn.
On the first interpretation, the inappropriateness of being motivated by
u-value is a matter of first-order value: it is better to help animals (say) out
of true and deeply felt concern with their wellbeing, rather than to help them
because one believes that their welfare matters morally or dominates u-value
in a particular case. According to the true axiology, concern with u-value is
comparatively bad.
If this is the claim, I do not deny it. It might be better to be moved de re
rather than de dicto by what is valuable. This is simply an axiological claim,
and nothing I say contradicts it. In fact, it can simply be accommodated in
the theory I outline. What I shall defend is only a criterion of u-betterness.
It is not a decision procedure, an account of how to consciously make or be
motivated to make decisions.26 If an action can be performed under different
motivations, we can treat these motivations simply as different options – on
a par with the option of doing some completely different action. So if you
believe that being motivated by u-value is bad, my theory will imply that it
is comparatively u-bad to be consciously motivated by it. This is perfectly
consistent. Of course, if we could be certain that de dicto concern with u-
value is extremely bad, then my theory will be self-effacing: it will imply
that we should almost or literally never consciously act on considerations of
u-value. And although that would still not render it inconsistent, it might
raise the question why one should spend much time thinking about it. But
26For the classic distinction between a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure in
utilitarianism, c.f. e.g. Bales (1971), Mill (1861, ch.2, Par.19) or Sidgwick (1907, 413).
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we should clearly not be certain that this is so – let alone that de dicto
concern with u-value is so bad as to dominate all other possibly bad things.
So if the inappropriateness is understood as a standard claim about value, it
does by no means establish that we do not need a theory of u-value.
On a second interpretation, this inappropriateness has a slightly different
form. In the above quote, Smith says that ‘good people’ are motivated by
what is valuable de re. Perhaps this does not mean that such motivation is
bad. Rather, it might mean – in a virtue ethical spirit – that we are not
ideal moral agents if we are motivated by u-value. Moral philosophy does
not need a theory of u-value, this objection goes, because ideal moral agents
are not motivated by u-value.
Again, perhaps this is true. Perhaps an ideal moral agent will always
consciously be motivated by what is valuable, understood de re. However,
the entire project of examining normative uncertainty is based on the fact
that we are not ideal moral agents. We are inescapably uncertain about what
is valuable, de re; and our project is to determine how we non-ideal agents
should evaluate our options. So the question about what an ideal moral
agent will do is simply a different question from the one we are addressing.
Again, nothing I say contradicts any answer to that question. Presumably,
an ideal moral agent would always (ceteris paribus) choose the objectively
best option. But that in itself does not show that we need not reflect about
u-value. Similarly, perhaps an ideal moral agent would be motivated by what
is valuable, de re. But that in itself does again not show that we do not need
to reflect about u-value. So for all that this second interpretation says, it
still seems that u-value is important for us non-ideal agents.
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But here is a third interpretation: perhaps the objection is not only that
ideal agents are not motivated by u-value, understood de dicto. Perhaps the
objection is that even non-ideal agents should not be so motivated. Under-
stood thus, the objection is not that we do not need any theory of what to do
under normative uncertainty. Instead, the objection advocates a specific such
theory, according to which, under uncertainty, we should always intuitively
follow something that we care about de re. This claim does indeed address
the question of this thesis, and it contradicts the theory that I outline.
But I do not think that this claim is convincing. To begin with, this
alternative theory is not very useful. If we are axiologically uncertain, there
might not be anything that we unqualifiedly care about de re. Very often,
we will be torn between different values, and then the present theory will
not tell us what to do. But more importantly, the present idea simply seems
rather crazy. As I outlined in section 1.1, we have to make enormously
important moral decisions in the face of uncertainty – about existential risks,
global poverty, human enhancements, and so on. Making a morally bad
decision concerning any of these issues might have enormous ramifications,
involving vast numbers of beings until some very far future. It just seems
very implausible that we should run the risk of incurring such astronomical
badness, just to avoid a particular kind of motive.
I cannot think of any other interpretation of the fetishism objection. So
I conclude that, although being motivated de re by what is good may in
some ways be preferable to being motivated de dicto by u-value, this does
not imply that we do not need a theory of u-value.
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Harman’s Objection
Let me turn to another objection against the importance of u-value, which
is due to Elizabeth Harman.27 Harman argues against what she calls ‘Un-
certaintism’, and defends ‘Actualism’ instead. She says various things about
these views, and I am not sure whether I understand what she means by
them. Her paper is entitled ‘The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty’, and thus
the core dispute between these two views seems to be about the importance
of u-value or moral uncertainty more generally. Thus she says that ‘according
to Uncertaintism, an agent’s moral uncertainty (and specific moral credences)
are crucially relevant to how the agent should act’ (forthcoming, 1). In con-
trast, according to Actualism, an agent’s ‘moral beliefs and moral credences
are usually irrelevant to how she (subjectively) should act’ (forthcoming, 5).
Harman’s main argument for the ‘irrelevance of moral uncertainty’ is this:
(A) Uncertaintism implies that if you are certain of a false moral theory
and act in accordance with that theory, you are not blameworthy;
(B) if you are certain of a false moral theory and act in accordance with
that theory, you are blameworthy; therefore
(C) Uncertaintism is false.
To illustrate premise (B), she considers someone who works for a Mafia family
and is certain that he has a moral obligation of loyalty that requires him to
kill innocents when it is necessary to protect the family. Harman claims that
he would be blameworthy if he in fact killed an innocent person to protect the
27Hedden (forthcoming, 20ff.) tentatively raises the same objection.
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family, notwithstanding his belief in the respective obligation. This is so, she
argues, because ‘[a] person is blameworthy for her wrongful behavior just in
case it resulted from her failure to care de re about what is morally important
– that is, from her failure to care adequately about the non-moral features of
the world that in fact matter morally’ (forthcoming, 13). Hence, an agent’s
moral beliefs are generally irrelevant for whether he is blameworthy. And in
spite of his belief – or perhaps as his belief shows – our agent fails to care
adequately about the wellbeing of innocents.
In response, let me first say that I do not share the view that this person is
blameworthy – or at the very least, that we know remotely enough about him
to say that. I think that one may blamelessly acquire false moral beliefs, and
then blamelessly act upon them. This is so, I think, even if the beliefs and
the resulting acts are as bad as those of Harman’s Mafia member. But it is
particularly so with regards to the difficult axiological questions I mentioned
in section 1.1. Given the widespread disagreement, very many people will
have false moral beliefs about these issues. I do not think that these people
are necessarily blameworthy if they act upon their beliefs. So I think that
(B) is false.
This permissive view about blameworthiness would be enough to block
Harman’s objection. However, I shall not defend it here. It raises large
questions,28 and I think Harman’s argument fails even if we grant (B) and her
rigorist view of blameworthiness. That is, I think I can grant (B): whatever
Harman exactly means by ‘Uncertaintism’, nothing in my view implies that
if you are certain of a false moral theory and act in accordance with that
28Cf. particularly Rosen (2003; 2004) for criticism of (B).
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theory, you are not blameworthy. This is a claim about blameworthiness, and
thus an entirely separate issue. I am simply not making any claims about
blameworthiness in this thesis, nor am I committed to any such claims.
Harman thinks that Uncertaintism is committed to the permissive view
of blameworthiness because she believes that
(D) you are blameworthy for some behaviour only if you should not have
behaved in that way, given your beliefs and credences.
And at one point, she seems to define Uncertaintism as the view that, ‘given
[your] beliefs and credences’, you should maximise the expected moral value
of your actions (forthcoming, 4). Together with principle (D), this claim
seems to imply that if you are certain of a false moral theory and act in
accordance with it, you are not blameworthy.
However, I think this is not a helpful characterisation of ‘Uncertaintism’;
at least, it is not an adequate characterisation of my view. The clause ‘given
your beliefs and credences’ does not unequivocally pick out a precise sense
of ‘ought’. Consider again Example 2 on page 4: we assumed that Red is
uncertain between a speciesist and non-speciesist axiology, that according to
the speciesist axiology it would be better to benefit a person, and according to
the non-speciesist axiology it would be better to benefit an animal, and that
the speciesist view is right. Then what should Red do, given his beliefs and
credences? Again, I think there is no unequivocal answer to this question.
In one (objective) sense, his credences are of course irrelevant, and so even
given his beliefs and credences, he should benefit the person. So in one sense,
I agree, it is false that if you are certain of a false moral theory then, given
23
your beliefs and credences, you should maximise the expected value of your
actions.
So it is not true that principle (D) commits me to the permissive view
about blameworthiness. If Harman’s rigorist view of blameworthiness is cor-
rect, the ‘should’ that figures in this principle is not relative to your axiolog-
ical credences. And that is something that I could perfectly well agree with.
Again, I am simply not making any claim about blameworthiness.
Perhaps Harman would claim that if I believe your axiological credences
are irrelevant for whether you are blameworthy or not, I am not a true ‘Un-
certaintist’. In fact, in one passage, she seems to define Uncertaintism as
including the permissive view about blameworthiness.29 So if ‘Uncertain-
tism’ is defined in this way, and if I were to accept her rigorist view of
blameworthiness (which I do not), then I would simply not be an ‘Uncertain-
tist’. But that would by no means mean that I had to accept (with her title)
the ‘irrelevance of moral uncertainty’, or that I would have to deny that our
‘moral uncertainty (and specific moral credences) are crucially relevant’ (as
one apparent definition of Uncertaintism says). Harman’s argument seems
to manifest a very sad view of the role of value and u-value, making an ex-
traordinary fetish of blameworthiness. It suggests that the most important
or ‘relevant’ thing is that we avoid being blameworthy. But this is surely not
so. In light of our momentous decisions concerning climate change, human
enhancements, global poverty and so on, our main goal should not be to
deserve praise, or to avoid being blameworthy. It should quite simply be to
do, or try to do, good. And it is important to have a theory of u-value since
29Cf. the last line of the ‘Uncertaintist reasoning’ she outlines on page 1.
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we are not certain about what is good. It is a concern for doing good that
motivates the theory of axiological uncertainty. At least as I understand it,
the core relevance of u-value has nothing to do with questions of praise and
blame.
In conclusion, I think Harman’s rigorist view of blamewohrtiness is false;
and even if it were true, it can by no means establish the ‘irrelevance of axio-
logical uncertainty’. The importance of u-value does not hinge on questions
of praise and blame at all.30
Regress and Action-Guidance
I have not yet said why exactly it is important to reflect about u-value. The
most prominent motivation for subjective forms of value is the thought that,
while we are rarely in a position to know the objective values of our options,
we are generally in a position to know their subjective values (e.g., their
u-values). In this sense, it is often said, theories of subjective value can be
action-guiding whereas theories of objective value cannot.31 However, as I
already hinted at on page 15, there is a regress problem with this claim.
Like being uncertain about the true axiology, we might be uncertain about
the true theory of axiological uncertainty. So if due to uncertainty about
theories of value, we are not in a position to know which options are best
30One might argue that the concept of value is somehow conceptually tied to blamewor-
thiness, and that if I thus separate u-value from blameworthiness I can no longer claim
that u-value really is a form of value (or that it might have implications for an ‘ought’).
But for one thing, I doubt that the concept of value is thus tied to blameworthiness. For
another thing, I do not care very much about the conceptual question whether u-value is
ultimately truly a form of value. What matters is that it is important to reflect about
when an option is ‘u-better’ than another, however exactly we call it. And considerations
of blameworthiness do not challenge that.
31Cf. e.g. Hudson (1989).
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and our axiologies thus allegedly fail to be action-guiding, then it seems that
due to uncertainty about theories of u-value, we are neither in a position to
know which options are u-best, and our theories of u-value will also fail to
be action-guiding. But if our interest in u-value was motivated by the failure
of standard axiologies to be action-guiding, and theories of u-value (or any
un-value) are not action-guiding either, then why should we be interested in
u-value (or any un-value) in the first place?
I shall not object to the claim that we are not in a position to know the
u-value relation. I think we can justify reflection about u-value even if we
accept this claim. Unfortunately, however, I cannot give a fully worked out
justification. So what I shall do is simply to outline the direction where I
think the most plausible justification for exploring theories of u-value lies.
First of all, it is worth saying that axiological uncertainty need not imply
that axiologies cannot be action-guiding. At least in a standard sense of that
term, we can be ‘guided’ by norms even if we are not certain about them.
Consider the norm that it is best to get 0.8 grams of protein per kilogram of
body weight each day. Presumably, we cannot be entirely certain about that
norm, nor can we be certain about what it implies in our everyday practice.
But the norm seems perfectly action-guiding, in any standard sense of that
term. It’s not that, without some extra algorithm about how to deal with
our uncertainty, we would be completely paralysed, or that any action we
do would be a complete stab in the dark. Presumably, if we act in the face
of normative uncertainty but without explicitly considering theories about
normative uncertainty, we do so an on implicit and maybe unquestioned
acceptance of some such theory. We can do that. By the same token, even if
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we are uncertain about axiologies, that does not mean that they cannot be
action-guiding in any sense.
Why, then, do we need to explore theories of u-value? One answer one
might give is that, even though it is in principle possible to be guided by
norms about which one is uncertain, there are moments when our axiologies
are unable to guide us. One might argue that this is so when our uncertainty
becomes conscious. While our axiologies might guide us as long as we are
not conscious of our uncertainty, at least once we acknowledge our axiological
uncertainty, we may feel that our actions would indeed be mere stabs in the
dark. And at least in these moments, one might argue, it might be that only
a theory of u-value could guide us (even though we may not be altogether
certain about that either).
However, as it stands, this response is at least insufficient. It might be a
psychological fact that when we are conscious of our axiological uncertainty,
we need a theory of u-value to feel guided; and it might even be a fact that
only our acting on considerations of u-value will then count as ‘guided’. But
there still remains the normative question of why our acting on the basis
of considerations of u-value is normatively important. The question is not
whether an action counts as, or feels like, being guided. As Andrew Sepielli
(2014) has pointed out: if we really do feel paralysed by nagging uncertainty,
a glass of whisky might make us more confident, and thus prompt committed
and ‘guided’ action more quickly than a complex normative theory. So the
mere fact that theories of u-value will sometimes guide us when our axiolog-
ical uncertainty would otherwise make us feel at loss, in itself, does not show
why u-value is important. The real question is why acting on considerations
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of u-value is normatively important, or any better than acting while uncon-
scious of one’s uncertainty, or by (what is and feels like) a stab in the dark,
or after a glass of whisky.
Sepielli (2014) gives an argument for why it is. If I understand him cor-
rectly, his main point is that it is ‘less risky’ (2014, 92) to reflect about
u-value and act after serious reflection – even if that reflection does not lead
to certainty – than to act without any further reflection simply on the implicit
assumption of some theory. In the passage that comes closest to an argument
for this claim, he says: ‘there is no relevant difference between moral reason-
ing and evidence-gathering, and there is almost always some value from the
agent’s perspective to gathering additional evidence [and acting upon that
new evidence], as I.J. Good demonstrated in his classic 1967 paper “On the
Principle of Total Evidence”’ (2014, 93).32
I think that this is on the right track. But it is important to be clear
about what this suggested line of reasoning would show, and what would
be needed to turn it into a more full-fledged argument. What Good (1967)
proved was that the expected value of the action that has the highest expected
value after taking into account more evidence is always greater than that of
the action with the highest expected value before we take this evidence into
32Sepielli also says: ‘From this perspective [once you have reflected about theories of
u-value, or ‘meta-theories’], it must surely seem better to implicitly accept and act on
a meta-meta-rule that, as it were, aggregates the opinions of the various meta-rules you
find plausible, than to simply act on one of those meta-rules as though there were no
alternatives. [...] we might say that while acting on this meta-meta-rule is unguided
relative to acting on some competing meta-meta-rule [...], it is not unguided relative to
acting simply on a meta-rule’ (2014, 93). However, I think these points are red herrings.
What matters is not whether it ‘seems better’ from one perspective, or whether one action
is ‘guided’ relative to more alternative actions. What matters is whether reflected action
is better in some sense.
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account (if the cost of taking it into account is neglected, and unless the
action with the highest expected value would be the same for whatever piece
of evidence we gather). So if the analogy with Good’s argument is sound,
then the expected value of acting after reflection about u-value will be greater
than that of acting without that reflection (if the cost of moral reasoning is
neglected). The expected value of reflecting about one level of value will
be characterisable in the next meta-level of value. So in other words, if the
analogy is sound, then if expected value maximisation is the true theory of
u2-value, acting after reflection about u-value is u2-better than acting while
unconscious of one’s uncertainty, or through a stab in the dark, or after a
glass of whisky.
It would take a lot of argument to turn this into firm claim. The analogy
is not unproblematic. For example, Good assumed that whatever evidence
we receive, we will do what maximises expected value, given that evidence.
But if we receive good evidence for a theory of u-value that says we should
not maximise expected value, that is arguably a dubious assumption. More-
over, one would clearly have to characterise formally what acting ‘without
further reflection’ would amount to; one would have to argue more fully for
the parallel between evidence-gathering and moral reflection; one would ulti-
mately have to take into account the cost of moral reflection too, and thus say
something about the efficacy of moral reasoning. And of course, we would
also have to argue that EVM is the correct theory of u2-value. We are a
long way from having a full-fledged argument for the claim that acting after
serious reflection about u-value will be u2-better than acting unreflectedly.
But it does seem very plausible, just like it seems plausible that acting after
29
reflection about value will be u-better than acting unreflectedly.33
There is a next worry that the proponent of the regress objection might
raise. To show that reflecting about u-value is good, we have to assume some
form of EVM – or perhaps some other normative theory with the same impli-
cation. More generally, to show that more reflected action will be less risky
(normatively better, rather than just feeling better or being more guided), we
have to assume some normative criterion about what is risky. The proponent
of the regress objection might claim that we are begging the question against
her. She might argue that we are not entitled simply to assume EVM, or any
other theory, but instead would have to take into account uncertainty about
that again, and so on. In other words, she might demand that we show not
only that reflection about u-value will plausibly be u2-better, but also that
it is u3-better, and perhaps un-better all the way up (or overall-best in some
sense).
But note what the objector is now demanding. She is in effect asking
us to prove beyond any doubt that our project is ex ante worth pursuing.
I do not see how we could do that. But it seems to be an exceptionally
high demand. In particular, that demand would question not only why we
should reflect about what is u-valuable; it would also question why we should
reflect about what is valuable – or indeed why we should reflect on anything,
or do anything else that seems worthwhile, rather than just drink whisky
and do whatever we feel like. The objector raises a most radical normative
scepticism. That may be an interesting philosophical problem. But it is not
a problem that I can address in this thesis. And I hope it is not one that I
33This last claim is defended in MacAskill (2014, ch.7).
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have to address to motivate the project of this thesis.
I shall proceed on the – plausible seeming, though not much further sub-
stantiated – assumption that, given the prevalence and importance of axio-
logical uncertainty, reflection about u-value, just like much other reflection,
is important. So the main motivation for examining and developing theories
of u-value, I think, is not that we are always in a position to know the u-value
relation. We may not be. The main motivation, I think, is that it is plau-
sibly ex ante valuable to reflect about how we should respond to axiological




The Expected Value Theorem
Introduction
As I said in section 1.2., the most important goal of this thesis is to outline
what one may call the foundations of EVM under axiological uncertainty:
what EVM means and presupposes, and what axiomatic basis we can give for
it. In this chapter, I begin to pursue this goal by introducing the most basic
formal result of this thesis – the Expected Value Theorem. This theorem
says, roughly, that if u-value satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms
and a Pareto condition, EVM is true. This result is interesting in itself, but
it will also prove helpful for introducing some general features and problems
of my approach, and provide a fruitful starting point for the more specific
extensions pursued in subsequent chapters.
In section 2.1, I outline in general terms what role axiomatic theorems
can play in the theory of axiological uncertainty, and why such theorems are
important.
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In section 2.2, I first introduce the specific decision-theoretic framework
that I shall be using in this thesis – that of state-dependent expected utility
theory – and show why it is particularly useful for our purposes. I then
reproduce the specific representation theorem on which the main result of
this chapter is based.
In section 2.3, I apply this theorem to the context of axiological uncer-
tainty. This application will require some conceptual assumptions, as well as
an additional substantial condition. I shall introduce these claims in some
detail, state the actual theorem they support – the Expected Value Theorem
– and indicate some implications of that theorem.
In section 2.4, I discuss the conditions of the Expected Value Theorem in
more depth. Within the limits of this thesis, I cannot provide a full-blown
defence of these conditions. So what I shall do is to compare their plausibility
in the context of axiological uncertainty with their status in other contexts.
The main worry that these conditions raise, I shall argue, is the problem of
intertheoretic comparisons. I shall suggest that, given certain assumptions,
the theorem is sound if all axiologies are fully comparable and do not compare
in a lexical way. This will motivate a thorough discussion of the problem of
intertheoretic comparisons in chapter 3.
In section 2.5, I explore briefly whether something like the Expected Value
Theorem could be used to axiomatise EVM as a theory of u2-value. I shall
conclude that the prospects for this look bleak.
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2.1 The Problem
Before introducing any axiomatic theorems, it will be helpful to indicate
briefly why I think we need such theorems in the first place. Unsurprisingly,
the question about the role and relevance of axiomatic theorems in decision
theory is itself disputed.1 I shall in different ways come back to it throughout
my thesis, and shall try to defend the importance of such theorems at various
points. But very roughly, I think representation theorems can serve two
important purposes. Firstly, they can help to clarify what EVM means ; and
secondly, they can help to vindicate that EVM is true.
Let me briefly elaborate on this. Explaining what EVM means is impor-
tant because EVM features a number of concepts that have no use in ordinary
language, and that I think are in need of explanation. One such concept is
the quantitative notion of value. To understand EVM, it does not suffice to
understand qualitative, or ordinal statements like
(A) according to axiology Ti, outcome x is better than outcome y.
Rather, we have to understand statements like
(B) according to axiology Ti, the value difference between the outcomes
x and y is n times as great as the value difference between the
outcomes z and t.
I shall call such statements cardinal intratheoretic comparisons (of value).
They state intratheoretic value difference ratios – the ratios between certain
1Cf. e.g. Meacham and Weisberg (2011, 644ff.) for a brief overview over different
possible interpretations of representation theorems, and for important challenges to them
(some of which are addressed in chapter 4).
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value differences, according to one specific axiology. It depends on such
value difference ratios whether one option has a higher expected value than
another. However, I think that unless more is said we do not understand
quantitative statements like (B). As an example, suppose you can either save
the life of a human being, or of a non-human animal. And suppose you claim
that according to your favourite axiology, saving the person is five, or ten
times as good as saving the animal. Unless you give me some account of
what you mean by that, I would not understand what you meant – only that
you chose a slightly swaggering way of expressing, say, that according to your
favourite axiology, saving the person is considerably better than saving the
animal, and I would have thought the same if your numbers had been seven,
or fifteen. This is not to say that you cannot give me an explanation of what
you meant. For example, with this particular statement of yours, you may
mean that saving the person would be equally good as saving five animals
like the one we considered, and that may count as a proper explanation.
What I claim is that you have to give me an explanation, or else I do not
understand your original statement. So more generally, I think we have to
give an account of cardinal intratheoretic comparisons to make clear what
we mean by ‘EVM’.
But cardinal intratheoretic comparisons are only one kind of statement
that EVM presupposes, and that are in need of explanation. Another, and
even more problematic kind are claims about intertheoretic value difference
ratios – claims like
(C) the value difference between outcomes x and y, according to axiology
Ti, is n times as great as the value difference between outcomes z
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and t, according to axiology Tj.
I shall call such claims cardinal intertheoretic comparisons (of value). Whether
statements like (C) can be meaningful and true is part of the problem of in-
tertheoretic comparisons, which I shall discuss in some depth in chapter 3.
What is relevant for now is that, again, I think we do not understand state-
ments like (C) unless we are given some account of them.
Finally, there is a third problematic notion that EVM presupposes. To
understand EVM, we have to understand a quantitative notion of the prob-
ability of an axiology – statements like
(D) the probability of axiology Ti is pi,
for some pi ∈ [0, 1]. And again, such statements have no use in ordinary
language and I think we have to provide an account of them to make clear
what we mean by ‘EVM’.
In all three cases, I think representation theorems can help us define and
explain the relevant concepts. This is one of the purposes of these theorems.
Only once we’ve answered these conceptual questions can we ask whether
EVM is true. And this, I think, is the other purpose of these theorems.
Represensentation theorems can help us argue that EVM is true.
All of these claims are controversial. But I shall argue for them in this
and the following chapters. So let me now introduce a pertinent result.
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2.2 State-Dependent Utility Theory
There are a number of different versions and formal frameworks of decision
theory. I shall not compare these different versions in terms of how well
they can be applied to axiological uncertainty. This would be an interesting,
but extensive task, and it is not one of the aims of this thesis. Instead, I
shall simply use one kind of decision theory that serves my purposes. The
framework I employ is so-called state-dependent utility theory. Section 2.2.1
briefly explains what state-dependent utility theory is and why it is suitable
for the theory of axiological uncertainty. Section 2.2.2 then reproduces its
most basic result.
2.2.1 History and Motivation
State-dependent utility theory is best illustrated by how it departed from
Leonard Savage’s Foundations of Statistics (1954). On Savage’s framework,
there is a set of states of nature (or just ‘states’), and a set of outcomes
(or ‘consequences’). An act is a mapping from states to outcomes: to each
state, it associates an outcome, which – as Savage interprets it – that act
brings about if the respective state is the actual state of the world. An
agent is uncertain about which state is actual, and thus about the ultimate
outcomes of her acts. Savage provided necessary and sufficient conditions for
a preference relation over acts to be representable by a utility function over
outcomes and a probability distribution over states.
To clarify, suppose you must choose between going on a hike and reading
at home on an afternoon, but you are uncertain whether it will be rainy or
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sunny. We can then distinguish two states – the state of rain and that of
sunshine – and four possible outcomes – your reading or hiking, both either
while it is rainy or while it is sunny. Your choice is between an act which
leads either to ‘hiking in the rain’ or ‘hiking in the sun’, and one that leads
either to ‘reading while it rains’ or ‘reading while the sun shines’.
However, note that having distinguished states and outcomes in this way,
we can now define an ‘act’ that leads to the outcome ‘hiking in the rain’
under both states of nature, whether it is rainy or not. Indeed, in order for
your choices to be representable by a utility function, on Savage’s frame-
work, you must have a preference between other acts and this one – a hike
that is certainly rain-swept, even if the weather is sunny. More generally,
Savage’s result required that you have preferences about acts leading to any
arbitrary outcome in any state (from the sets of states and outcomes under
consideration).
I am not suggesting that this is a severe problem for Savage’s framework.2
What is important in our context is that it led decision theorists to revise
one of his main assumptions – viz., that utility is a function of outcomes
only. Note that the apparently inconsistent combinations of outcomes and
states could be avoided by individuating outcomes more coarsely – in our
example, distinguishing not four outcomes, but only ‘hiking’ and ‘reading’.
These outcomes can arise under any state of the weather. However, such
an individuation seems impossible for Savage. Savage takes utility to be
a function of outcomes alone, but the pleasantness of your act does not
2Cf. e.g. Joyce (1999, 107ff.) for a discussion of this problem. For Savage’s own
unapologetic stance on it, cf. Dre`ze (1987, 78).
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only depend on whether you’re ‘hiking’ or ‘reading’. It also depends on
the weather. So what examples like this motivated is the theory of state-
dependent utility : a formal framework in which the utility of an outcome
can depend on the state in which it comes about. In such a framework, the
role of Savage’s utility functions is played by state-dependent utility functions :
two-place mappings u(·, ·), which assign a utility to every state-outcome pair.
Given our more coarse-grained individuation of outcomes, such a theory may
distinguish u(rain, hiking) from u(sunshine, hiking), as seems plausible. So
state-dependent utility theory promises to give a more natural interpretation
of your stance, without requiring you to contemplate a rainy hike in a sunny
state of nature.
This development in decision-theory is interesting for the theory of nor-
mative uncertainty. On a natural application of Savage’s framework to axio-
logical uncertainty, the ‘states of nature’ among which we are uncertain are
axiologies, and ‘utility’ corresponds to (u-)value. But different axiologies gen-
erally assign different values to empirical outcomes – i.e., to non-normative
states of affairs like a pleasurable hike, or the suffering of an animal, or what-
ever. So the ‘utility’ of such an outcome generally depends on the ‘state’ in
which it arises; its value depends on which axiology is true. Accordingly,
state-dependent utility theory promises to be a useful tool for the theory of
axiological uncertainty. On a natural interpretation, the problem of axiolog-
ical uncertainty is one of state-dependent utility.
Again, this does not mean that state-dependent utility theory is the only
formal framework allowing for a decision-theoretic approach to our problem.
But the structural equivalence perhaps makes it the obvious starting point.
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So it is the framework I shall use in this thesis.
2.2.2 Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem
Let me now introduce the specific result I shall employ in this chapter. The
result is due to Edi Karni and David Schmeidler (1980), based on a theorem
in Fishburn (1970), and is a fairly simple extension of the standard von
Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) result.
To state it, let X be a finite set of outcomes and S a finite set of states. Let
Y be the set of state-outcome pairs, Y = {(s, x) | s ∈ S, x ∈ X}. Define the
set A as A = {a : Y → R+ |
∑
(s,x)∈Y a(s, x) = 1}. Karni and Schmeidler
interpret members of A as acts of a specific kind; so an act in A assigns
a probability to every state-outcome pair. Their original understanding of
this does not need to concern us now;3 what is important for now is the
mathematical fact they present. We shall later see that this fact has a very
natural interpretation in the context of axiological uncertainty. For some p ∈
[0, 1], define the act pa+(1−p)b in A that leads to a with probability p, and
to b with probability (1−p), as (pa+(1−p)b)(s, x) = pa(s, x)+(1−p)b(s, x)
for all (s, x) in Y . Finally, let  be a reflexive binary relation on A, and let
its irreflexive part  be defined as usual: a  b if a  b but not b  a.
We can then define the following four conditions as applying to :
TransitivityA: if a  b and b  c, then a  c;
3They ultimately use the framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), who interpret
an act as a sequence of two lotteries – a lottery among the states, and then a lottery
among outcomes within each state. The result I present in this chapter is a subsidiary
result to their main theorem, which I introduce in chapter 4, and which remains closer
to the framework of Anscombe and Aumann (distinguishing a subjective ‘horse lottery’
among states from an objective ‘roulette lottery’ among outcomes within states).
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CompletenessA: for any a and b ∈ A, a  b or b  a;
IndependenceA: if a  b and p ∈]0, 1[ then pa+(1−p)c  pb+(1−p)c
for any c ∈ A;
ContinuityA: if a  b and b  c then there exist p and q ∈]0, 1[, s.t.
pa + (1− p)c  b and b  qa + (1− q)c.
These conditions are the standard axioms of von Neumann-Morgenstern ex-
pected utility theory. So let me use the term ‘vNM-conformable’ for all bi-
nary relations on A that satisfy these four conditions. Karni and Schmeidler
(1980, 8) then state4
Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem: If a reflexive binary relation  on
A is vNM-conformable, then there is a function u : Y → R, unique up to
positive affine transformation,5 such that for all a and b in A,
a  b iff
∑
(s,x)∈Y
a(s, x)u(s, x) ≥
∑
(s,x)∈Y
b(s, x)u(s, x). (2.1)
To apply this theorem to the context of axiological uncertainty, we have to
interpret the relevant binary relation () as the u-value relation, the states
(in S) as axiologies, and the state-dependent utility functions (u(s, ·)) as the
value-functions of our axiologies. Let me turn to this now.
4The result is restated in Karni (1985, 14). Basically, the theorem is Fishburn’s (1970)
Theorem 8.2, applied to state-outcome pairs rather than outcomes.
5A function g : Y → R is a positive affine transformation of another function f : Y → R
if there are s, t ∈ R, s > 0 such that g(z) = sf(z) + t, for all z ∈ Y .
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2.3 Applying State-Dependent Utility The-
ory
In order to apply Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem to our context, I first
have to put my core question in a more formal terminology. I shall do that
in section 2.3.1. Section 2.3.2 then introduces some additional assumptions
and conditions, and applies Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem in a slightly
extended form to axiologies. Section 2.3.3 discusses the significance of the
resulting theorem.
2.3.1 The Terminological Framework
My focus is on axiological uncertainty, so – except for section 5.2 – I shall
ignore non-axiological normative uncertainty, such as uncertainty between
various deontological theories. I will assume that all uncertainty is either
axiological or non-normative.
To represent non-normative uncertainty, let X again be a finite set of
outcomes – where an outcome is a non-normative state of affairs whose de-
scription does not involve any further probabilities or uncertainty. An option
is a prospect over X. Each of these prospects leads to particular outcomes in
X with particular given probabilities – thus reflecting non-normative uncer-
tainty (or risk6). I shall denote these prospects by lower-case letters a, b, c...,
and the set of these options by O. Formally, an option a in O is thus a
function from X to R, which assigns a probability a(x) to each outcome x in
6In line with much philosophical literature, I use ‘uncertainty’ for what economists and
formal decision theorists call ‘risk’. My formal definitions should make clear what I mean.
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X. Hence, O = {a : X → R+|
∑
x∈X a(x) = 1}. As an example, an option in
O may assign probability 0.5 to benefiting an animal, and probability 0.5 to
benefiting a human being. Moreover, for any a and b in O, and any p ∈ [0, 1],
define pa + (1 − p)b in O by (pa + (1 − p)b)(x) = pa(x) + (1 − p)b(x) for
all x in X. That is, ‘pa + (1 − p)b’ denotes the option that leads to a with
probability p, and to b with probability (1 − p). For some outcome x in X,
let ax be the prospect that certainly leads to x: ax(x) = 1.
I shall assume, at least for now, that an axiology Ti is a transitive binary
relation on O, whose reflexive part is the ‘at least as good as’ relation. –
I say ‘for now’, because in chapter 3 I shall consider whether axiologies are
individuated more finely than by the ordering they imply. But this need
not concern us now. – For two options a and b, I shall write ‘a i b’ to
denote that a is at least as good as b according to Ti. The relations of strict
betterness and equality in goodness are induced as usual: a is better than b
on Ti (‘a i b’) if a i b but not b i a, and a is equally as good as b on Ti
(‘a ∼i b’) if a i b and b i a. I shall say that an axiology is non-uniform
if there are a and b in O such that a i b. For simplicity, I shall assume
throughout the thesis that the set T = {T1, T2, ...Tn} of axiologies under
consideration is finite, and I shall denote its index set by I = {1, 2, ...n}.
If we are both non-normatively and axiologically uncertain, we face more
complex prospects: prospects that lead to certain theory-outcome pairs with
particular probabilities – now corresponding to Karni and Schmeidler’s ‘acts’,
which lead to state-outcome pairs. In our context, such prospects represent
acts that have certain probabilities of arising under different axiologies, and
certain probabilities of yielding different outcomes. For example, such an
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option may assign equal probability to a utilitarian and a speciesist axiology,
and (regardless of the axiology) equal probability to resulting in a benefit for
a human being and a benefit for an animal; it will thus assign probability 0.25
to all four theory-outcome pairs. For simplicity, I shall also call these more
complex prospects options. The resulting ambiguity of the term ‘option’ will
not produce confusion: I will always make clear which type of options I am
referring to. To distinguish them formally, I shall use bold letters a, b, c...
to refer to such more complex options, write a(i, x) for the probability with
which option a leads to outcome x while axiology Ti is true, and denote the
set of all such options by Q. Defining the set of theory-outcome pairs by Z =
{(i, x) | i ∈ I, x ∈ X}, we thus have Q = {a : Z → R+ |
∑
(i,x)∈Z a(i, x) = 1}.
The probability assigned to an axiology Ti under some option a is thus∑
x∈X a(i, x). And we can again define pa + (1 − p)b in Q as the option
that leads to a with probability p, and to b with probability (1 − p), hence
(pa + (1− p)b)(i, x) = pa(i, x) + (1− p)b(i, x) for all (i, x) in Z.
Note that this means that I am presupposing a quantitative notion of prob-
abilities. My very definition of options in Q presupposes that we understand
what it means that an axiology has a particular probability of being true (as
well as that an outcome has a particular probability of arising). I assume
this only for simplicity, and to focus on some other problems for now. I shall
provide an explication for this quantitative notion of probabilities in chapter
4.
In line with this definition of options, I assume that the u-value relation
is a transitive binary relation on Q. I shall denote its reflexive part – the
‘at least as u-good’ relation – by ‘U ’. The strict u-betterness relation (U)
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and the ‘equally as u-good’ relation (∼U) are induced equivalently to the
respective value relations.
Even though options like a, b and c (in Q) are formally distinct from
options like a, b and c (in O), and I said that axiologies order the latter, I
shall sometimes say that a is at least as good as b according to an axiology
Ti. By this I shall mean, intuitively, that the prospect represented by a,
given Ti, is at least as good according to Ti as the prospect represented
by b, given Ti. This will only make sense if the probability assigned to Ti
under a and b is strictly positive. So to define this concept formally, let
Qi ⊂ Q be the set of options in which Ti has a strictly positive probability,
i.e. Qi = {a ∈ Q | ∑x∈X a(i, x) > 0}. Define for each axiology Ti a function
Hi : Qi → O; a 7→ Hi(a), such that




The mapping Hi thus turns an option a into the prospect that a represents,
given Ti (if there is such a prospect). So for some a and b, with a and b in
Qi, I shall say that a is at least as good as b according to Ti if Hi(a) i Hi(b)
– and similarly for ‘better’ and ‘equally good’.
Since this framework will underlie many of my formal results, let me make
two brief remarks about it at this point. First, note that my definition of the
set of options Q has an implication similar to the one we encountered with
Savage. For any probability distribution over theory-outcome pairs, there is
an ‘option’ in Q that is defined by it. In particular, Q includes options that
lead to different actual outcomes, or different probability distributions over
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outcomes, depending on which axiology is true. That is, for some a in Q,
with a in Qi and Qj for some Ti and Tj, Hi(a) 6= Hj(a). These options will
be very unnatural. For example, there is no natural option which leads to
benefiting an animal if a utilitarian axiology is true, and benefiting a human
being if a speciesist axiology is true. Such an option will be definable in
the framework I adopt. And indeed, my results will require that the u-value
relation ranges over all options in Q – such unnatural options included.
However, unlike (arguably) the ones in Savage’s framework, such options
are not conceptually or metaphysically impossible. Consider again the option
I just mentioned. Suppose a demon constructed a button for you. He tells
you that if you push it, then, if the speciesist view is true, a human being will
be benefited, and if the utilitarian view is true, an animal will be benefited.
On the adequate decision-theoretic representation of pushing the button, the
probability with which an animal or a person will be benefited should depend
on the true axiology. This is clearly somewhat unnatural. But since this
story seems (conceptually and metaphysically) possible, I do not think this
is a fatal problem for our framework. However unnatural and extraordinary
such options are, it does not seem implausible that u-value relations hold
even among them.
Secondly, there is another potentially unnatural feature of the framework.
It allows the u-value relation to range over options that involve different prob-
ability distributions over axiologies. That is, for some options a and b in Q,
and some theory Ti,
∑
x∈X a(i, x) 6=
∑
x∈X b(i, x). Indeed, again, my results
will require that the u-value relation ranges over such options. And although
all these options may be perfectly natural considered by themselves, we can-
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not face choices between them. For example, we cannot face a choice between
benefiting an animal if utilitarianism is true, and doing so if a speciesist view
is true.
But again, it does not seem implausible that u-value relations hold even
among such options. If benefiting an animal is better on the utilitarian view
than on the speciesist view, then it seems adequate to claim that it has more
u-value if the former is certain than if the latter is. So again, this perhaps
unnatural, or unpractical aspect of the present framework does not seem to
be a problem. In fact, I shall later argue that these somewhat unnatural
aspects of my framework may actually be an advantage, since they make it
easier to think about certain questions. But I can only show this after much
further argument. It will have to wait until page 192.
2.3.2 The Expected Value Theorem
With the formal terminology I have now introduced, Karni and Schmeidler’s
Theorem straightforwardly applies to the relationU and the set of optionsQ
that represent both our axiological and non-normative uncertainty. Nonethe-
less, we cannot yet use it to derive EVM. What Karni and Schmeidler’s
Theorem now shows is this: if U is vNM-conformable, there is a function
u : Z → R, unique up to positive affine transformation, such that for all a
and b in Q,
a U b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)u(i, x). (2.3)
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However, (2.3) is not EVM. For all we know, the function u is a purely math-
ematical function with no non-mathematical significance. To turn (2.3) into
EVM, we have to interpret the theory-dependent utility functions u(i, ·) as
the value-functions of our axiologies, and thus give them an extra-mathematical
significance. I will do that by introducing three additional assumptions and
an extra condition. I shall introduce these claims rather succinctly, and then
state the theorem; section 2.4 will elaborate more on these claims.
The Form of Axiologies
In defining axiologies, on page 43, I assumed that each axiology is as a matter
of definition transitive. My first additional assumption is that all axiologies
that I consider satisfy the other von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms as well.
That is, I shall assume that all axiologies under consideration satisfy the
following conditions:
TransitivityO: if a  b and b  c, then a  c;
CompletenessO: for any a and b ∈ O, a  b or b  a;
IndependenceO: if a  b and p ∈]0, 1[ then pa+ (1− p)c  pb+ (1− p)c
for any c ∈ O;
ContinuityO: if a  b and b  c then there exist p and q ∈]0, 1[, s.t.
pa+ (1− p)c  b and b  qa+ (1− q)c.
Since no confusion will arise, I will often leave out the subscript ‘O’ when
referring to these conditions; and as with Q, I shall use the term ‘vNM-
conformable’ for all binary relations on O that satisfy these conditions. So
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I assume – at least for now – that all axiologies under consideration are
vNM-conformable.
This is a substantial restriction. Not all possible axiologies, nor even all
the plausible ones, are vNM-conformable. I shall give some examples of non-
vNM-conformable axiologies in section 2.4.1. But it is worth emphasising
now that this first assumption substantially restricts the range of my result.
I will actually not explore axiological uncertainty generally. My results – at
least until chapter 5 – concern uncertainty about vNM-conformable axiolo-
gies only.
Intratheoretic Comparisons
My second assumption concerns the meaning of cardinal intratheoretic com-
parisons. As I mentioned, we do not use such statements in ordinary lan-
guage. And I do not think that we have a pre-theoretic concept of value that
has a cardinally significant meaning. That is, I think that we cannot find
out what cardinal intra- and intertheoretic comparisons of value really mean.
Instead, when we come to precise philosophical theorising and to formulate a
theory like EVM that presupposes cardinal comparisons, we have to choose
an explication of our pre-theoretic concept of value, and decide what we shall
mean by them. This claim may be controversial. I shall go some way towards
defending the need of an explication in section 2.4.3, and again (in similar
contexts) in chapters 3 and 4. But let me first introduce the explication that
I shall use.
To state this explication for intratheoretic comparisons, suppose that for
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some utility function u : X → R on outcomes and some axiology Ti, and for
all options a and b in O,







I shall then say that the expectation of u represents i ordinally – or for
convenience, simply that u represents i ordinally. Note that if there is a
utility function that represents i ordinally, then there are infinitely many
such utility functions. If u is one of them, any positive affine transformation
of u is another such utility function; and any function that represents i
ordinally will be a positive affine transformation of u. Now suppose that
for some utility function u on outcomes, and some axiology Ti, the cardinal
intratheoretic comparisons between all outcomes, according to Ti, are the
same as the ratios among the utility differences between these outcomes; that
is, for all x, y, z, t in X and n ∈ R, the value difference between outcomes x
and y is n times as great as the value difference between z and t, according
to Ti, if and only if (u(x)− u(y))/(u(z)− u(t)) = n. I shall then say that u
represents Ti cardinally.
According to my explication, if a utility function u represents an axiol-
ogy ordinally, then that utility function represents it cardinally. So in that
case, the ratios among the value differences between outcomes, according to
this axiology, are the same as the ratios among the utility differences be-
tween these outcomes. I shall call this the decision-theoretic explication of
intratheoretic comparisons.7
7Cf. Broome (2004, 89ff.) for a similar assumption about ‘personal goodness’, and
a helpful discussion of the nature of this assumption. Other illuminating discussions of
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If a utility function represents an axiology Ti cardinally, we can represent
that axiology with a value-function Gi that determines the goodness of any
outcome, according to Ti, quantitatively. For our purposes, we can simply
pick one among the family of utility functions that represent Ti cardinally,
and take it to be Ti’s value-function Gi. The reason is that, for our purposes,
the absolute heights of value levels or sizes of value differences do not matter.
All that matters are the ratios among the value differences, and these are the
same for all functions that represent Ti cardinally. So out of that family, we
can pick any function we like. Consider temperature as an analogy. Temper-
ature can be measured equally well in Fahrenheit or in Celsius; and it could
be measured by any other positive affine transformation of these scales. In
principle, we could have picked any of these scales to measure temperature.8
We can do the same for goodness. If a utility function u represents an ax-
iology Ti cardinally, we can simply pick one of the functions that represent
Ti, and take that to be its value-function Gi. For example, for any x and
y, where y has a greater utility than x, we could pick the utility function
on which u(x) = 0 and u(y) = 1, and suppose that Gi = u. This would
amount to picking a particular scale, just as Fahrenheit or Celsius picked a
scale for temperature. So in what follows, if an axiology can be represented
ordinally by a utility function, I shall often represent it with a value-function.
And since the choice of a scale would be arbitrary, I shall do that without
specifying a specific scale.
Note what the decision-theoretic explication does. Suppose someone says
the issue of cardinalising goodness are provided in Broome (1991, 142ff., ch.10/11), and
Greaves (forthcoming; ms).
8Cf. Broome (1991, 145f.) for this analogy.
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that according to axiology Ti, the best option is the one that maximises the
expected square root of value:











The square root function is concave. So a given increase in the argument of
that function will not always produce the same increase in the value of the
function. It will produce a greater increase the lower the argument is. This
will be manifested in our axiology. Consider the following three options,
which all lead to two different outcomes with equal probability (0.5); and
suppose the numbers in the the table refer to the values of these outcomes,
according to Ti.
a b c
0.5 1 1 4
0.5 0 1 0
Table 2.1
Both b and c differ from a in that one of their possible outcomes is better
than in a. In b, the relevant outcome is 1 unit better than that in a; in c,
the relevant outcome is 3 units better than that in a. However, since
0.5 ·
√
1 + 0.5 ·
√
1 = 0.5 ·
√
4, (2.6)
our theory Ti implies that b ∼i c. Hence according to this axiology, the
relevant increases in the value of outcomes (by 1 and 3 respectively) count
the same in determining the value of prospects, even though they are not
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the same.
This is ruled out by the decision-theoretic explication. If a relation  on
O is vNM-conformable, then utility is defined as that quantity of which 
maximises the expectation, in the sense of (2.4). So by definition, increases in
the utility of outcomes always count the same in determining the utility of the
prospect. According to the decision-theoretic explication, we can use utility
to represent goodness. So the explication assumes that, if two differences in
value count the same in determining the goodness of prospects, then they
necessarily are the same. The explication rules out views like the one I just
sketched. I shall say it assumes that goodness is expectational, like utility.
We might say that according to the decision-theoretic explication, quanti-
ties of goodness acquire their cardinal significance in the context of weighing
goods under uncertainty. As I emphasised on page 49, I treat this as an expli-
cation, not as a substantial assumption or faithful analysis of our pretheoretic
concept of goodness. Accordingly, I do not think that this is the only possible
explication of cardinal intratheoretic comparisons. For example, the context
of weighing goods over time could also provide a cardinal concept of value.
We could assume that if two differences in value coming at different times
count the same in determining the goodness of the history of the world over
time, then they necessarily are the same.9 And there may be still other pos-
sibilities. When we come to precise theorising about goodness, we have to
choose some explication. We can do that in different ways; the assumption
that goodness is expectational is one way of doing so. It is the one we have
to choose to apply Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem to our context. I shall
9Cf. Broome (2004, ch.15) for a cardinalization of personal goodness by time.
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consider objections to it in section 2.4.3. But let me use it for now.
Intertheoretic Comparisons
I said that, given this explication, if a utility function represents an axiology
Ti cardinally, we can simply pick one among the family of utility functions
that represent it and take it to be Ti’s value-function Gi. But actually, this
is somewhat imprecise. That we can arbitrarily pick any of these functions is
only true if we consider axiologies in isolation. It is not so when we consider
multiple axiologies jointly. Suppose we assume that Ti’s value-function is
Gi. If we then simultaneously represent another axiology Tj by some value-
function Gj, this implies claims about how values compare intertheoretically
among these theories. For example, if Gi(x) > Gj(x), then the value of x
is greater according to Ti than according to Tj. At least, this is how I shall
understand it.10 If we consider axiologies jointly, then once we picked a global
scale for representing axiologies – or once we picked a scale for some Ti – it
will not be true that we can arbitrarily pick a scale for some other axiology
Tj.
My third assumption concerns what it would mean, more precisely, for
two axiologies to compare in a specific way. I have just assumed that, if
an axiology can be represented ordinally by a utility function, then on that
axiology, intratheoretic comparisons acquire their cardinal significance in the
context of weighing goods under uncertainty. My third assumption will be,
similarly, and very roughly, that if the u-value relation could be represented
10Of course, one might use the same notation (i.e., represent Ti and Tj simultaneously by
Gi and Gj) but assume that the implied intertheoretic comparisons have no significance.
I assume that they have.
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ordinally by a utility function, then intertheoretic comparisons would ac-
quire their cardinal significance in the context of weighing axiologies under
axiological uncertainty. Let me state this more precisely.
For practical purposes, it is only intertheoretic unit comparisons that mat-
ter. What is relevant are the intertheoretic value difference ratios – the truth
of statements like ‘the value difference between x and y, according to axiol-
ogy Ti, is n times as great as the value difference between z and t, according
to axiology Tj’. Level comparisons do not matter. It is irrelevant whether
statements like ‘the value of x, according to axiology Ti, is greater than the
value of y, according to axiology Tj’ are true. The reason is that in practice
we do not face choices between options with different underlying probability
distributions over axiologies (as I said on page 47). And if the probability
distribution over axiologies is the same for all options, then which of these
options has the highest expected value does not depend on the heights of










a(i, x)[u(i, x) + ti] ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)[u(i, x) + ti] ⇔
∑
(i,x)∈Z
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)u(i, x). (2.8)
So for practical purposes, we would not have to explicate intertheoretic com-
parisons of value levels. However, since Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem
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ranges over options with different underlying probability distributions over
states, it implies a utility function that is unique up to positive affine trans-
formation – not only unique up to the multiplication with a joint scalar and
state-wise addition of a constant (su(i, x) + ti). So we can actually use this
theorem to explicate intertheoretic comparisons of value levels as well. That
is, we can explicate not only what I called ‘cardinal intertheoretic compar-
isons’ on page 36. We can also explicate more complex statements of the
form
(E) the difference between the value of x, according to Ti, and the value
of y, according to Tj, is n times as great as the difference between
the value of z, according to Th, and the value of t, according to Tk.
I shall call statement like (E) crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons
(of value). If we can explicate such statements, we can explicate value level
comparisons – as well as cardinal intra- or intertheoretic comparisons, which
are limiting cases of (E).
How exactly can we do so? As I suggested, we can think of axiological un-
certainty as a case of state- or theory-dependent utility – where the relevant
utility depends on theory-outcome pairs, and the utility functions u(·, ·) are
thus mappings from I×X to R. So suppose that for some theory-dependent
utility function u, the crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons, ac-
cording to our axiologies, are the same as the respective intertheoretic utility
difference ratios. I shall then say that u jointly represents all axiologies car-
dinally. If that is so, we can represent our theories jointly by u, or one of its
positive affine transformations. We can assume, say, that Gi(·) = u(i, ·) for
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all Ti. If a theory-dependent utility function satisfies (2.3) for all a and b in
Q, I shall say it represents the u-value relation ordinally.
Now the most straightforward explication of intertheoretic comparisons
would be this: if a theory-dependent utility function u represents the u-value
relation ordinally, then it jointly represents all axiologies cardinally. How-
ever, this explication would be unfortunate. For one thing, it would make
our explication of cardinal intratheoretic comparisons redundant: we would
be explicating both inter- and intratheoretic comparisons via the u-value re-
lation. For another thing, it would rule out an unnecessarily great number of
theories of axiological uncertainty by conceptual fiat. For example, consider
Expected Disvalue Maximisation, or EDM – the view that one option is u-
better than another if and only if it has the greater expected disvalue. On
the present explication, that view would be ruled out by definition. The rea-
son is that, if EDM is true, then there is a theory-dependent utility function
u that represents the u-value relation ordinally. So our explication would
imply, by definition, that we can pick a global scale such that Gi(·) = u(i, ·)
for all Ti. Intuitively, however, EDM should imply that −Gi(·) = u(i, ·).
And although it is true that every explication will rule out some views by
such conceptual fiat, it is desirable to rule out as few theories as possible
with one’s definitions. So I shall make our explication weaker than the one
we have now considered, and instead introduce another substantial condition
into the theorem.
More precisely, I shall use the following definition. Consider again some
theory-dependendent utility function u(·, ·), from I × X to R. And sup-
pose that this function is such that, for each axiology Ti, the utility function
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u(i, ·) represents that axiology cardinally. I shall then say that u represents
each axiology cardinally. Stated precisely, my explication will be that if a
theory-dependent utility function u represents the u-value relation ordinally
and represents each axiology cardinally, it jointly represents all axiologies
cardinally. That is, if there is such a utility function u, then the cross-
cutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons, according to our axiologies, are
the same as the respective intertheoretic utility difference ratios according
to u. We can thus assume, say, that Gi(·) = u(i, ·) for all Ti. I shall call
this the decision-theoretic explication of interheoretic comparisons, and shall
sometimes express it by saying that intertheoretic comparisons acquire their
cardinal significance in the context of weighing axiologies under axiological
uncertainty.
Again, I treat this as an explication, not as a substantial claim. I shall
be relying on this explication in the entire thesis. But instead of discussing
it in more detail at this point, let me now state the actual theorem it supports.
The Pareto Condition, and the Theorem
To apply Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem to the context of axiological un-
certainty, we need a final substantial condition that guarantees that our
utility function will represent each axiology cardinally. To that end, we can
introduce a Pareto Condition concerning options with the same underlying
probability distribution over axiologies, to the effect that if two such options
are equally good on all theories with nonzero probability, they are equally
u-good, and if one of them is at least as good as another on all theories with
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nonzero probability and strictly better on some, then it is strictly u-better.
To state this condition formally, define for any probability distribution P
on I the set QP ⊂ Q of options in which P is the underlying probability
distribution over axiologies, QP = {a ∈ Q |∑x∈X a(i, x) = P (i) ∀ i ∈ I}.
Employing the function H (from page 45), we can then state the
Pareto Condition: For any probability distribution P on I, and for all
a and b in QP , if Hi(a) ∼i Hi(b) for all Ti with P (i) > 0, then a ∼U b;
and if Hi(a) i Hi(b) for all Ti with P (i) > 0 and Hj(a) j Hj(b) for
some Tj with P (j) > 0, then a U b.
Given my previous assumptions, this condition together with the condition
that U is vNM-conformable suffices to imply EVM. That is, given the
decision-theoretic explications, and the assumption that all axiologies un-
der consideration are vNM-conformable, the following theorem holds:
Expected Value Theorem: If the u-value relationU is vNM-conformable
and satisfies the Pareto Condition, then for all a and b in Q,







The sums on the right-hand side of this biconditional denote the expected
value of a and b respectively. So according to (2.9), an option is at least as
u-good as another if and only if it has at least as great an expected value.
This is EVM. So the Expected Value Theorem says that if u-value satisfies
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and the Pareto Condition, EVM must
be true. This is the main result of this chapter.
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This theorem is a very simple consequence of Karni and Schmeidler’s The-
orem. In the appendix to this chapter, I carry out the derivation in all detail.
But the implication is straightforward: given Karni and Schmeidler’s The-
orem and a very simple application of the Pareto condition, the conditions
of the Expected Value Theorem imply that there is a theory-dependent util-
ity function that represents U and satisfies the criteria of our explications.
Given our explications, this utility function can thus simply be interpreted
as a set of value-functions, and instead of the biconditional (2.3) from page
47, we get EVM.
2.3.3 The Significance of the Theorem
The philosophical significance of the Expected Value Theorem depends, on
the one hand, on whether its conditions are plausible. That is a question I
shall start to consider in the next section, and that I can only answer more
fully at the end of chapter 3. Ultimately, I shall conclude that the conditions
of the theorem do not hold in general – i.e., as conditions for a theory of axio-
logical uncertainty about any vNM-conformable set of axiologies. However, I
do think that they hold if we consider only a restricted class of axiologies (the
axiologies that are fully comparable and do not compare in a lexical way).
So at least concerning uncertainty about this restricted class of axiologies, I
think the Expected Value Theorem is indeed sound.
On the other hand, even a sound theorem is philosophically significant
only if it establishes an interesting proposition or rules out some interesting
rivals to it. And since it will take a lot of space to examine all the conditions,
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it may be helpful to highlight at this juncture why the Expected Value The-
orem would be interesting if it were sound – or rather, why it is interesting
with regards to the restricted class of axiologies within which I think it is
sound. So suppose for now that the conditions of the theorem are true, and
that my additional assumptions are acceptable. And let me highlight briefly
how the Expected Value Theorem can then serve the two purposes I assigned
to representation theorems in section 2.1.
The Meaning of EVM
Firstly and most fundamentally, the theorem allows us to explain – or, as I
understood it, to explicate – what EVM means. More precisely, it guarantees
that there are conditions under which our explications can be used. These
explications were conditionals (‘If there is a utility function ...’); Karni and
Schmeidler’s Theorem shows that if U is vNM-conformable and satisfies the
Pareto Condition, then the antecedents of these conditionals hold, and we
can actually employ these explications to define a cardinal concept of value.
This is particularly significant with respect to cardinal intertheoretic com-
parisons. As far as I see, no one has provided an alternative explication for
such statements. And indeed, many standard explications of value seem in-
adequate for them. Consider the explication via time. As I said on page
53, time is a possible context for explicating intratheoretic comparisons: we
could assume that if two differences in value coming at different times count
the same in determining the goodness of the history of the world over time,
then they necessarily are the same. In the context of intertheoretic compar-
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isons, however, such an explication seems to be impossible, or at best very
unfortunate. We would have to imagine that different axiologies are true at
different periods of time; and we would then consider how valuable the over-
all empirical-cum-axiological history of the world is, when different events
occur during these periods of time. Such an explication may be feasible on
a technical level. But since the truth of axiologies is (arguably) a timeless
matter, each option in which different axiologies are true at different times
is a metaphysical impossibility. So it is dubious whether there are any facts
about the relevant overall value-relation. And even if there are, we do not
seem to have a very good grasp of the (presumed) value relation that orders
empirical-cum-axiological histories. Hence it would at best be unfortunate if
we explained our theory in terms of that relation.
Similar considerations apply to many other candidate explications. Con-
sider space. Space might again be a context for explicating intratheoretic
comparisons: we could assume that if two differences in value arising at dif-
ferent places count the same in determining the goodness of the world, then
they necessarily are the same. Within certain assumptions and restrictions,
such an explication may be technically feasible, and sounds fairly natural.
But again, the related explication of intertheoretic comparisons seems in-
adequate. We would have to imagine that different axiologies are true at
different places in space; and we would then consider how valuable the world
overall is, when different events occur at these places. And though that might
again be technically feasible, it again involves a metaphysical impossibility,
since the truth of axiologies is (arguably) a spatially universal matter. So
it is again dubious whether there are facts about the relevant value-relation,
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and if there are, we would not have a very good grasp of them.
In the next chapter, I shall consider whether it is possible to provide a
cardinal concept of intertheoretic comparisons via a fitting attitude account
of value. I think that this is the most promising alternative proposal, and
I cannot rule it out entirely. But I shall raise various doubts about it, and
remain very sceptical. So I think that the decision-theoretic explication is
ultimately the best explication of cardinal intertheoretic comparisons that
we have. This makes the Expected Value Theorem a very important result.
The Truth of EVM
A second and equally significant purpose of the Expected Value Theorem is
that – if its conditions are plausible, or within the restricted context in which
they are plausible – it allows us to defend EVM. So let me elaborate briefly
on how the theorem rules out the most prominent alternatives to EVM.
Consider first the view that under axiological uncertainty, we ought to be
risk-averse about value. To express this view, let pai be the probability of Ti














0 if pai = 0.
(2.11)
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Say that u-value is risk-averse if there is an increasing strictly concave func-
tion ρ, such that for all a and b in Q,











The inputs of ρ are the values of the prospects that an option represents
for given axiologies. Since the function is concave, increases in these values
have more weight in determining u-value the lower these values are. This is
a standard interpretation of risk-aversion.11 And prima facie, this view is
perfectly reasonable. If we want to rule it out, we need some argument.
The Expected Value Theorem may provide one. The view expressed in
(2.12) is inconsistent with the assumption that U is vNM-conformable. In
particular – and as we may have expected from standard decision theory –
it is inconsistent with the Independence axiom for U . To see this, let ρ be
the square root function, ρ(x) =
√
x, and consider the following example.
Suppose there are two outcomes x and y, and two theories T1 and T2 with
p1 = p2 = 0.5, and G1(x) = G2(y) = 0, G1(y) = 30 and G2(x) = 31. Suppose
option a leads to either x or y with a probability of 0.5 each, while b and c
lead to x and y respectively (with certainty):
11Cf. e.g. Buchak (2013) for a slightly different one.
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a b c
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2
p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5 p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5 p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5
0.5 0 31 0 31 30 0
0.5 30 0 0 31 30 0
Table 2.2
According to (2.12), b U c. So Independence would require that b (or
1/2 b+
1/2 b) is u-better than
1/2 c+
1/2 b – which is equivalent to a. However,
since
3.9 ≈ 0.5 ·
√
0.5 · 30 + 0.5 ·
√
0.5 · 31 > 0.5 ·
√
31 ≈ 2.8, (2.13)
(2.12) implies that 1/2 c+
1/2 b U b. Similar examples could be given for any
other increasing strictly concave ρ. If the conditions of the Expected Value
Theorem hold, then the utility functions that enter the u-value relation are
those that represent our axiologies ordinally. If we assume that goodness is
expectational at the level of first-order value, the axioms – and Independence
in particular – guarantee that the utility functions that determine u-value
represent our axiologies cardinally. In this sense, Independence may provide
an argument for risk-neutrality.
Consider next the view that under axiological uncertainty, you simply
ought to evaluate options in accordance with the theory you find most plau-
sible: an option is u-better than another if and only if it is better according
to the axiology with the highest probability (if there is such an axiology; if
more than one axiology has maximal probability, there is some rule for break-
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ing ties). This view is generally called My Favourite Theory. Some people
have endorsed it with regards to moral uncertainty generally.12 It blatantly
contradicts the Pareto Condition. To see this, suppose the probabilities of T1
and T2 are 0.6 and 0.4 respectively, so that T1 determines U . And suppose
two options d and e are equally good according to T1, but d is strictly better
according to T2. Then, according to My Favourite Theory, d is equally as
u-good as e, which violates the Pareto Condition. I shall argue presently
that this condition is very plausible. So I take it that the Pareto Condition
provides a strong – indeed presumably the strongest – argument against My
Favourite Theory.
More interestingly perhaps, the Expected Value Theorem also shows that
there is no straightforward way for My Favourite Theory to remedy this flaw
(if it is a flaw). In light of the above example, one may be tempted to say
something like this: under axiological uncertainty, you ought to evaluate
options in accordance with the most plausible theory, except if two options
are equally good on that theory, and one is at least as good as the other on
all axiologies with nonzero probability and strictly better on some, in which
case the former is u-better than the latter. Views along these lines have
also been suggested.13 However, the Expected Value Theorem shows that
if U is vNM-conformable the Pareto Condition implies that the u-value of
12cf. Gracely (1996).
13With regards to moral uncertainty generally, Gustafsson and Torpman (2014, 169ff.)
are at least steering towards such a position. They revise My Favourite Theory so as to
make it compatible with a Pareto (or ‘Dominance’) condition. Unfortunately, they do
not discuss the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms; and they explore uncertainty about
theories that ‘require’ or ‘permit’ certain options, which may involve disanalogies to our
case. But at least within the theory of axiological uncertainty, making My Favourite
Theory satisfy the Pareto Condition forces one to deny that U is vNM-conformable.
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an option is the weighted sum of the values it is assigned by the axiologies.
There is simply no consistent intermediate position, on which u-value is vNM-
conformable and Paretian, and yet does not reduce to a weighted sum of the
axiologies, thus retaining the spirit of My Favourite Theory. If U is vNM-
conformable, the project of making My Favourite Theory satisfy the Pareto
Condition is doomed to fail. This is an important result.
Finally, when defending EVM in conversation, I have often heard the
objection that it is not ecumenical enough as a view about normative un-
certainty. If EVM is true, the u-best option is determined rather mathe-
matically. But – the objection goes – people who are at heart sympathetic
to virtue ethics, say, may deny that the appropriate choice is a matter of
strict computation, even insofar as goodness is concerned. Rather, such peo-
ple may endorse something like a meta-virtue ethical view about axiological
uncertainty. On such a view, under axiological uncertainty, one ought to
make a virtuous choice: circumspective but not overcautious, neither reck-
less nor overly anxious, and so on. Beyond that, there are no rigorous rules
that determine the u-value relation. Similarly, some people have suggested
meta-deontological principles for how to determine one’s u-best option under
axiological uncertainty, which potentially differ from EVM quite radically.14
Such less formal views are hardly ever taken seriously or even mentioned in
decision theory. But prima facie, they are just as plausible in the theory of
u-value as they are in moral theory or the theory of ordinary value. If we
14E.g., Guerrero (2007, 94) endorses the following principle: ‘Don’t Know, Don’t De-
stroy: If one knows that one doesn’t know whether some entity has moral value, then
it is morally blameworthy to destroy that entity, unless one believes that something of
substantial moral significance compels one to do so.’
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take seriously the challenge of defending a view of normative uncertainty,
we need an argument against these views. And again, the Expected Value
Theorem may provide one. It shows that these meta-virtue ethical or meta-
deontological views must deny that u-value satisfies the conditions of the
theorem. If u-value satisfies these conditions, EVM simply follows.
In sum, various views that have been suggested contradict one of the
conditions of the Expected Value Theorem. If the theorem is sound – or
within the restrictions in which it is sound – it is a very significant result.
2.4 Evaluating the Theorem
Let me now examine the conditions of the theorem in more detail. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to defend all the conditions of the Expected
Value Theorem, or even one of them conclusively. So what I shall do instead
is to compare their plausibility in the context of axiological uncertainty with
their plausibility in other contexts – specifically, that of decision theory or
first-order axiology, and (in the case of the Pareto Condition) that of social
choice theory. Section 2.4.1 discusses the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms,
and section 2.4.2 examines the Pareto Condition. Section 2.4.3 will then
elaborate again on the decision-theoretic explications.
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2.4.1 The von Neumann-Morgenstern Axioms
Non-vNM-conformable Axiologies
Is it plausible that the u-value relation is vNM-conformable? It is worth
emphasising that this is in fact very implausible unless we assume that all
underlying axiologies are vNM-conformable. Note that, as I defined it, EVM
is a theory of both axiological and non-normative uncertainty. So in the
limiting case, U ranges over non-normative prospects in which some theory
Ti is certain (i.e., options in the set {a ∈ Q |
∑
x∈X a(i, x) = 1}). And if Ti
itself is not vNM-conformable with respect to non-normative prospects, then
U does arguably not satisfy the axioms with respect to these prospects if
Ti is certain.
15 Or more generally, if Ti is one of the axiologies under consid-
eration, then U does arguably not satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms on Q. And as I mentioned on page 49, not all reasonable axiologies
are vNM-conformable.
It has even been disputed whether the betterness relation is transitive.16
I cannot enter this debate here, but I think it is an analytic fact that ‘better
than’ and ‘at least as good as’ are transitive. ‘Better’ is the comparative of
‘good’, and all comparatives are transitive.17 At any rate, this is what I am
assuming.
The most problematic axiom, I think, is Completeness. Many axiologies
15In fact, given a suitable Pareto condition, U then cannot satisfy these axioms. The
Pareto Condition on page 59 is slightly too weak to guarantee this. It does not rule out
that the u-value relation may represent a sharpening of an underlying axiology that is
incomplete. But a slightly stronger condition (like the one on page 236) would do.
16Cf. most prominently Temkin (2012); also Rachels (1998).
17This view is defended in Broome (2004, ch.4); cf. e.g. Binmore and Voorhoeve (2003)
and Voorhoeve (2013) for further defences of the transitivity of betterness.
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are incomplete by allowing for incommensurability – i.e., the existence of
two options a and b, such that it is false that a is at least as good as b, and
false that b is at least as good as a.18 The Expected Value Theorem cannot
range over such axiologies. More precisely, the u-value relation is arguably
not vNM-conformable (i.e., not complete) if it ranges over them. This is a
very significant restriction. Many incomplete axiologies are plausible, and
have been prominently defended by philosophers.19 We should clearly not be
certain that all such views are false. So this is one major reason for exploring
axiomatisations without the Completeness condition. A representation the-
orem without the Completeness axiom would allow the theory of axiological
uncertainty to cover incomplete axiologies. I shall turn to that in chapter 5.
Something similar is true for Continuity. There are axiologies that violate
that condition. If a theory assigns infinite value to some outcome and finite
values to others it will violate Continuity. If we do not put any restrictions
on the set of outcomes X, then many plausible axiologies are of this sort.
An example is standard total utilitarianism, according to which a world that
contains beings whose lives are worth living, and only such beings, for an
infinite stretch of time, will be infinitely valuable. But there are other ways
in which axiologies violate Continuity. Some of them do so, for example, by
allowing that some kinds of values dominate others lexically. Consider an
axiology on which the value of wellbeing dominates the value of beauty lex-
ically – in that whenever an option expectably leads to more wellbeing than
another, that option is better, but ceteris paribus an option is better than
18Note that I shall use ‘incommensurable’ and ‘incomparable’ interchangeably.
19Cf. e.g. Raz (1986, ch.13).
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another if it expectably leads to more beauty. This axiology does not satisfy
Continuity.20 Finally and most straightforwardly, an axiology may simply
violate Continuity by implying a discontinuous behaviour of value with re-
spect to probabilities. For example, consider an axiology on which, for some
p0 ∈]0, 1[, outcomes that arise with a probability of less than p0 are irrelevant
for the evaluation of prospects. This axiology will not be continuous. Again,
the u-value relation is arguably not vNM-conformable if it ranges over such
axiologies, and this is a practically significant restriction. My sense is that –
in contrast to Completeness – most people find views that violate Continu-
ity comparatively implausible (at least if discontinuities arise through lexical
dominance between different values, or through probability thresholds). But
presumably, we cannot be certain that such views are false. So in principle,
even this presents a restriction of the Expected Value Theorem.
Similarly, there are axiologies that violate Independence. For example,
some views are ‘risk-averse’ in a sense that is inconsistent with Indepen-
dence.21 And again, the u-value relation is arguably not vNM-conformable
if it ranges over such axiologies. Here too, my sense is that most people
find views that violate Independence comparatively implausible. But again,
we can arguably not be certain that all such views are false.22 So this too
presents a restriction of the Expected Value Theorem.
In sum, unless we consider only vNM-conformable axiologies, there is a
systematic reason why the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms are less plau-
sible, or indeed implausible, if we take into account both non-normative and
20Cf. e.g. Vallentyne (1993) for a view with this structure.
21Cf. e.g. the example in Allais (1953).
22Cf. e.g. Buchak (2013) for a defence of risk-sensitivity in decision theory.
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normative uncertainty. Even if we think that according to the most plausible
axiology, the standard betterness relation satisfies these axioms, we should
arguably not be certain that this is so. And this uncertainty is enough to
imply that u-value is not generally vNM-conformable.23
Fortunately, this is not so if we assume that all underlying axiologies are
vNM-conformable. This is why I made this assumption in section 2.3.2. So
suppose again that all axiologies are vNM-conformable, and let me exam-
ine whether the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms are plausible within this
limited scope.
The Problem of Intertheoretic Comparisons
Unfortunately, there is an additional reason for why the u-value relation may
not be vNM-conformable – viz., the problem of intertheoretic comparisons.
This problem affects the Completeness and Continuity axioms in particular.
To assume that U is complete is to assume that all axiologies are fully
comparable, in the sense that they are all jointly representable by single
value-functions. This is a strong assumption. Some radical sceptics about
intertheoretic comparisons may hold that axiologies are not comparable at
all, and thus that the u-value relation should be radically incomplete – that
is, that an option a is at least as u-good as an option b only when a is at
23This has a very important implication for decision theory, understood as a theory of
rational preferences. If u-value is not vNM-conformable, then our preferences arguably
need not be vNM-conformable either, because we can justifiably care about u-value in
our preferences. More generally, once we admit that people may justifiably be uncertain
about the axioms of decision theory, and that they may take this normative uncertainty
into account in their preferences, we should admit that their preferences need not satisfy
these axioms. This may in fact be the most straightforward and convincing way to criticise
the axioms of decision theory as general axioms of rational preference.
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least as good as b on all axiologies with nonzero probability. Less radically,
one might hold that some axiologies are at least not fully comparable. For
example, suppose that Ti is a view on which only beauty has value, and Tj is
a form of total utilitarianism. Even if one is not a radical sceptic, one might
hold that the value of beauty, according to Ti, may not be fully comparable to
the value of wellbeing on Tj, even if both Ti and Tj are themselves complete
with respect to O.
So to assess whether the Completeness condition is plausible, we have to
address the large problem of intertheoretic comparisons. The next chapter
is devoted to that problem, and I shall thus formulate my ultimate stance
on Completeness only at the end of that chapter. To anticipate: I do not
think that U is radically incomplete, but I do not think that it is fully
complete either, even if all underlying axiologies are complete. On the view
about intertheoretic comparisons that I find most plausible (a view I shall
call ‘Absolutism’), there are axiologies that are less than fully comparable.
And I think some such less than fully comparable pairs of axiologies are very
plausible. So this will present another major reason for exploring axiomatisa-
tions without the Completeness condition. A representation theorem without
the Completeness axiom would allow the theory of axiological uncertainty to
cover axiologies that are less than fully comparable.
The Continuity condition also raises the problem of intertheoretic com-
parisons. One might hold that there are axiologies that compare in a lexical
way – axiologies Ti and Tj such that any positive value difference between
options according to Ti is greater than any positive value difference between
options according to Tj. This may be so, one might hold, even if Ti and Tj
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themselves satisfy Continuity with respect to O. And if two theories compare
in a lexical way, then the u-value relation will not satisfy Continuity with
respect to them.
Again, I shall come back to this question in the next chapter. On the view
about intertheoretic comparisons that I find most plausible, I think there are
indeed axiologies that compare in a lexical way. However, even if such theo-
ries are in principle possible, I think that they present a very extreme case,
and are comparatively implausible. So unlike with the case of Completeness,
I think it is not an all too significant restriction if we disregard such theories.
But I have to defer this to the next chapter.
Conclusion
As far as I see, apart from the problem of non-vNM-conformable axiologies
and the problem of intertheoretic comparisons, the question about whether
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms are plausible constraints on U re-
sembles the question about whether they are plausible constraints on first-
order betterness. And I think that apart from these two caveats, they are
indeed plausible.
Perhaps some people would question whether U is even transitive. But
since I take u-betterness to be a form of betterness, I again think it is an
analytic fact that U satisfies Transitivity.
As with ordinary value, u-value would fail to satisfy Continuity if it dis-
played a discontinuous behaviour with respect to probabilities – say, if there
were probability thresholds p0 ∈]0, 1[ below which an axiology suddenly be-
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came irrelevant for determining u-value. This could be true even if all ax-
iologies were continuos. But such thresholds or discontinuities seem com-
paratively implausible, in the context of non-normative as in the context of
normative uncertainty. Perhaps there are still other reasons why one might
doubt Continuity.24 I shall not enter that debate. I take Continuity to be a
plausible axiom in the context of first-order value (at least for finite worlds),
and so I think that modulo our two caveats it is a plausible condition about
u-value too. I have to content myself with that.
U-value may also violate the Independence axiom even if all underlying
axiologies are vNM-conformable. In particular, it is possible that (u-)value
is risk-neutral with respect to non-normative uncertainty, but risk-sensitive
with respect to axiological uncertainty, in ways that are inconsistent with
Independence. But as far as I see, there is no reason why that should be the
case – at least none that is somehow specific to the problem of axiological
uncertainty. There is a long debate about the Independence axiom in the
context of decision theory or first-order value.25 Again, I shall not enter this
debate. I take it to be a plausible axiom in these contexts, so I think it is a
plausible axiom about u-value too, and I content myself with that.
So to conclude: as soon as we assign some nonzero probability to a non-
vNM-conformable axiology, our u-value relation will not generally be vNM-
conformable. If we assume that all our axiologies are vNM-conformable, the
problem of intertheoretic comparisons still raises doubts about Completeness
24E.g., Temkin (2012, 245ff.) mentions that some outcomes may be ‘good enough’, or
very significantly better than others, so that Continuity fails. I am not sure whether he
would regard those as instances of the kind of ‘lexical betterness’ I mentioned.
25For recent contributions to this debate, cf. e.g. McClennen (2009), Temkin (2012,
237ff.), Buchak (2013, 157ff.).
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and Continuity. But assuming that all axiologies are vNM-conformable, and
modulo the problem of intertheoretic comparisons, I think it is plausible that
U satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms.
2.4.2 The Pareto Condition
Let me now turn to the Pareto Condition. Recall what this condition says: for
any options with the same underlying probability distribution over axiologies,
if two such options are equally good on all theories with nonzero probability,
they are equally u-good, and if one of them is at least as good as another on
all theories with nonzero probability and strictly better on some, then it is
strictly u-better. Since options are prospects, this is a kind of ex ante Pareto
requirement: it is concerned not with outcomes, but with what is expectably
better.
One may have doubts about this condition too. Pareto conditions are
rarely discussed in decision theory. However, there is also a close formal anal-
ogy between the theory of axiological uncertainty and social choice theory.
Where we are concerned with an overall u-value ordering that depends on
the value-orderings of axiologies, social choice theory (on one interpretation
at least26) deals with a ‘general betterness’ ordering which depends on the
‘individual betterness’ orderings of people.27 And ex ante Pareto conditions
are controversial in social choice theory, with regards to people. That is, it is
controversial whether, if one prospect is at least as good for all individuals as
26Cf. particularly Broome (1991).
27Indeed, note that the Expected Value Theorem is similar to John Harsanyi’s (1955)
famous ‘utilitarian cardinal welfare theorem’. I have chosen to work with Karni and
Schmeidler’s rather than Harsanyi’s theorem mainly because of the extensions that have
been proved to the former (such as Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem 2, on page 185).
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another and strictly better for some, it is ceteris paribus better (as far as gen-
eral goodness is concerned). Given the close formal analogy between the two
contexts, we should thus be careful to assume an ex ante Pareto condition
in the theory of axiological uncertainty. So let me elaborate on this condition.
The Egalitarian Objection
The most pertinent argument against the ex ante Pareto condition for indi-
vidual goodness is due to Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve (2013). Their
argument shows that we have reason to reject this condition if egalitarianism
is true (where egalitarianism is the view that equality in people’s wellbeing
is intrinsically valuable). To see their argument, suppose that we can either
let both Blue and Red end up with 20 units of good (option f) or let them
each face a lottery yielding either 10 or 31 with probability 0.5 (option g).
Suppose further that, in this lottery, if Blue gets a benefit of 31, Red gets a
benefit of 10, and vice versa:
f g
Blue Red Blue Red
0.5 20 20 10 31
0.5 20 20 31 10
Table 2.3
Supposing that individual goodness is expectational, g is better than f for
both Blue and Red. So if general goodness is ex ante Paretian with respect
to personal goodness, g is better than f . However, according to (a suitable
form of) egalitarianism, a state in which both Blue and Red have 20 units of
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good is better than a state in which one has 31 and the other 10. Suppose
this is true. Then if it were certain that g would lead to 31 benefits for Blue
and 10 for Red, f would be better. Similarly, f would be better than g if
it were certain that the latter would lead to 10 benefits for Blue and 31 for
Red. So whatever the outcome of g will be: if it was certain, g would be
worse than f . Therefore, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve believe, g is then worse
than f even if its outcome is uncertain. This is because we should ‘decide
as [we] would with full information’ (2013, 113), they argue. More precisely,
they invoke what they call the ‘Principle of Full Information’ (and what is
basically Savage’s (1954, 21ff.) ‘Sure-Thing Principle’): ‘When one knows
that, in every state of the world with positive probability, one would rightly
rank two alternatives in a particular way, then one should so rank them’
(2013, 120).
For egalitarians like Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, this may be a good reason
to reject the ex ante Pareto condition concerning individual goodness. I shall
not explore this. However, there does not seem to be a plausible parallel
reasoning with regards to axiologies. Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve’s argument
crucially depends on the premise that f would be better than g if the outcome
of g were certain. They can justify this claim as egalitarian. But it is not
clear how an analogous premise could be justified in the context of axiological




T1 T2 T1 T2
p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5 p1 = 0.5 p2 = 0.5
20 20 31 10
Table 2.4
But why might f be u-better? What immediately comes to mind is risk-
aversion – the view I expressed as











For some suitable increasing, strictly concave function ρ (e.g., ρ(x) =
√
x),
this view indeed implies that f U g. However, we cannot use it to argue
against the Pareto Condition. As is easily verified, (2.14) actually satisfies
this condition.
To argue against the Pareto Condition, we would thus have to endorse a
different form of risk-aversion. Let me say that u-value is ex post risk averse
if there is an increasing strictly concave function ρ, such that













In (2.15), the function ρ is applied not to the prospects that our options
represent on given axiologies, but instead to outcomes. This form of risk-
aversion does not violate Independence in the sense in which the theory
defined in (2.14) does. On the other hand, as is again easily verified, it
does indeed violate the Pareto Condition, and imply that f U g (for some
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relevant ρ). So it might be used in an argument against the Pareto Condition.
However, (2.15) is a very problematic view. Note what it implies if you
are certain of one theory. Suppose you are certain of T1, and face options
k and l: k leads to an outcome of value 20 (according to T1), and l with
equal probability either to an outcome of value 10, or to one of value 31
(according to T1). Since you are certain of T1, if goodness is expectational at
the level of axiologies, you are certain that l is better than k. Yet, (for the
relevant ρ) (2.15) implies that the latter is u-better. This is very implausible.
Surely, if we are certain that one axiology is true, we ought to rank options
in accordance with it.
Perhaps there are other reasons, apart from these forms of risk-aversion,
for believing that f is u-better than g, and for denying the Pareto Condition
on that basis. But I cannot think of any plausible candidate. So let me
tentatively conclude that there is no parallel to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve’s
objection in the context of axiological uncertainty. As far as their objection
is concerned, the condition seems plausible with respect to u-value.
Pareto Improvements and False Beliefs
It may be worth mentioning that in social choice theory there is a second
standard objection against the ex ante Pareto condition, as understood in a
particular way.28 Some authors find ex ante Pareto improvements problem-
atic when they depend on differences in people’s beliefs. To see this worry,
suppose Red and Blue have an apple and an orange each, but Red does not
like apples at all, and Blue does not like oranges at all. In this case, there is
28Cf. e.g. Gilboa et al. (2014), and Mongin and D’Aspremont (1998, 442).
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a Pareto superior state in which Red gets both oranges and Blue gets both
apples. This state is possible because the two have different tastes, and it
seems clearly preferable from the point of view of general goodness. But now
suppose White is certain that it will rain tomorrow, and Brown is certain
that it will snow, and suppose they both own £100 (which they both cherish
very much). Relative to their own beliefs, it is ex ante better for both of
them to agree to the bet in which White will receive Brown’s £100 if it rains,
and Brown will receive White’s £100 if it snows. However, since one of them
clearly has false beliefs, there seems to be something problematic about their
agreement, even if it is an ex ante Pareto-improvement. This may be par-
ticularly so, for example, if one of them was intentionally ill-informed about
the weather.
However, this objection too does not carry over to our context. I do allow
that the probability distribution over outcomes in an option in Q may differ
from theory to theory. But that is not because axiologies themselves some-
how assign different probabilities to outcomes – let alone because they do
that in some objectionable way. Rather, I am simply stipulating that these
probabilities are objectively correct. So whatever exactly it is that we find
problematic about belief-relative Pareto improvements, that will not apply
to our Pareto Condition.
Conclusion
Perhaps there are other kinds of objections to our Pareto Condition, other
than reasons that parallel the egalitarian objection, or the objection from
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false beliefs. But I cannot see any that I find remotely convincing. So as far
as I see, in our context, the ex ante Pareto Condition is indeed very plausible.
It seems to be a major drawback if a theory violates it.
2.4.3 The Decision-Theoretic Explications
Let me finally discuss the decision-theoretic explications of intra- and in-
tertheoretic comparisons. These do not appear as substantial conditions of
the Expected Value Theorem, but they were nonetheless necessary to de-
rive that theorem from Karni and Schmeidler’s result. And one might have
worries about these definitions.
Some people worry that the decision-theoretic explication of intertheoretic
comparisons makes the argument from Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem to
EVM circular. Indeed, it may seem that the explication simply defines quan-
tities of value in a way that renders EVM true – that in assuming that in-
tertheoretic comparisons acquire their cardinal significance in the context of
weighing axiologies under uncertainty I must already assume that EVM is
correct. And this would obviously be a vicious circle.29
This objection is misguided. The argument from Karni and Schmeidler’s
Theorem to EVM is not circular. To see this, it may be helpful to distinguish
two assumptions that are involved in the explication. The first assumption
is that, if a theory-dependent utility function represents the u-value rela-
29This objection seems to be raised (or suggested) by Andrew Sepielli (2009, 27): ‘The
main problem with [the decision-theoretic explication of intertheoretic comparisons] is
that it simply assumes the rationality of maximizing [expected value] under normative
uncertainty. But this is a position that should be argued for independently of one’s solution
to the [problem of intertheoretic comparisons], not merely assumed as a means to solving
the problem.’
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tion ordinally, and represents each axiology cardinally – and in particular, if
U thus satisfies Completeness – then all axiologies are somehow fully com-
parable, and can somehow jointly be represented by single value-functions.
This claim does not say anything about which specific value-functions jointly
represent our theories, or how that is determined. It merely says that axi-
ologies are somehow fully comparable. The second assumption involved in
our explication is that the specific value-functions that can figure in a joint
representation of our theories are then determined, in a certain way, by the
u-value relation in which those theories are involved. In my explication, I
have joined those two assumptions together. I could also have stated them
separately, and perhaps that would have aroused less suspicion of circularity.
Consider the former assumption first. This is simply a claim about what
(perhaps among else) it means that two theories are comparable. And though
the truth of this assumption is necessary for EVM, it does by no means pre-
suppose EVM. Moreover, the assumption simply does not seem very prob-
lematic. As I shall elaborate in the next chapter, there might be stronger and
weaker senses in which axiologies can be ‘comparable’. But at least in the
sense that is relevant for our purposes – i.e., in the sense that is relevant for
the u-value relation – the assumption seems innocuous. If there is a theory-
dependent utility function that represents the u-value relation ordinally, and
represents each axiology cardinally, there is a unique way in which axiologies
weigh against each other to determine a complete u-value relation. As far as
the problem of axiological uncertainty is concerned, that simply means that
all axiologies are ‘comparable’. I cannot see anything problematic about this.
And in any case, again, it clearly does not presuppose EVM.
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So suppose this first assumption is true: if a theory-dependent utility
function represents the u-value relation ordinally, and represents each axi-
ology cardinally, then all axiologies can somehow jointly be represented by
value-functions. In that case, if there is such a utility function, then the re-
spective state-wise utility functions must be positive affine transformations
of the value-functions of our theories. That is, if Gi are our value-functions,
there must be numbers si and ti in R, si > 0, such that for all options a and
b,







Hence the only alternative way in which our value-functions could determine
the u-value relation would be if, apart from their probabilities, one theory had
systematically and constantly across decisions more weight in determining u-
value than another (in that ti 6= tj or si 6= sj for some i and j). So the second
assumption – that intertheoretic comparisons acquire their specific cardinal
significance in the context of axiological uncertainty – does not rule out
risk-aversion, or the quasi-deontological or virtue-ethical accounts sketched
in section 2.3.3. It only rules out such constant unequal weighing. And
although EVM presupposes that u-value is not determined by such unequal
weighing, to turn this final step into a matter of definition is again by no
means to assume EVM.
What may be questioned is whether there is a utility function that repre-
sents U in the relevant way – that is, whether U satisfies the conditions of
our theorem, and particularly Completeness. These assumptions are doing
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the important work in guaranteeing intertheoretic comparability. Once these
assumptions are in place, the explication of interhteoretic comparisons itself
does not do very much further work, and certainly not enough to warrant a
charge of circularity.
Let me discuss another objection against the decision-theoretic accounts of
intra- and intertheoretic comparisons. I have suggested in section 2.3.2 that
we do not use cardinally significant concepts of value in ordinary language,
that we therefore cannot find out what cardinal intra- and intertheoretic
comparisons really mean, and have to choose some explication to decide what
we shall mean by them. One might object to this. One might argue that
we do have a pretheoretic understanding of comparisons of value differences.
For example, prima facie, we seem to understand statements like ‘investing
these resources in poverty reduction would do more good than investing them
in repainting the town hall’. That is, prima facie, we seem to understand
statements of the form
(F) according to Ti, the value difference between x and y is greater than
the value difference between z and t.
Now, it is not true in general that a comparative ranking of value differences
among a set X of outcomes will entail a cardinal concept of value. For
example, suppose thatX has only three members, and that according to some
theory, the difference between the first and the second outcome is greater than
the difference between the second and the third. Clearly, this is not enough to
yield a utility function that is unique up to positive affine transformation.30
30Cf. e.g. Bossert (1991, 212) for such an example.
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However, under some conditions – if the relevant set of outcomes is rich
enough – difference comparability is enough to yield cardinal measurability.
That is, under some conditions, if a theory entails a comparative ranking of
value differences, there will be a value-function representing that theory that
is unique up to positive affine transformation.31 So if these conditions hold,
an intuitive understanding of value difference comparisons would be enough
to provide a cardinally significant concept of value. So one might argue that
this is where cardinally significant comparisons get their significance, indeed
that this is what they must really mean, and that the decision-theoretic
‘explication’ is therefore inadequate.
However, I am not entirely convinced by this proposal. For one thing, I am
not convinced that we have a clear understanding of value difference compar-
isons. We might understand (or think we understand) such comparisons in,
as it were, unproblematic contexts where various aspects of our pretheoretic
understanding of value differences come together. For example, if investing
our resources in poverty reduction would do more good than investing them
in repainting the town hall, that probably implies that it would now be bet-
ter to invest them in poverty reduction than in paint, that it would be better
to invest them tomorrow in poverty reduction than today in paint, that a
prospect in which they are invested with a 50% chance in poverty reduction
is better than an equivalent prospect in which they are invested with a 50%
chance in paint, and so on. But as soon as these aspects come apart, it is
much less clear whether we have a direct grasp on value difference compar-
31Cf. e.g. Basu (1983) and Bossert and Stehling (1994) for statements of sufficient
conditions; e.g.Bossert (1991), Bossert and Weymark (2004, 1126ff.) and Bossert et al.
(2005, 34f.) for a general discussion.
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isons. Consider again the view I introduced on page 52, on which the best
option is the one that maximises the expected square root of value:











As I have shown, on this theory, two value differences can count the same in
determining the value of prospects even though they are not the same. I’m
inclined to think that unless more is said we do not understand this view.
If someone claims to endorse (2.17), I think he owes us an explanation of
what he means by it. For example, suppose someone says that for him the
ex post value of money increases linearly with monetary value, but in his
betterness ordering of prospects he is risk averse about monetary value. I
think he does need to tell us in what sense he (ex post) values money linearly
instead of assigning it diminishing marginal value, if that is how it appears
in his ordering of prospects. Our grasp of value difference comparisons is as
it were not robust enough, or not precise enough. I think we really do need
an explication.
But moreover, even if we grant that we have a direct understanding of
intratheoretic value difference comparisons, that is only half of what we need
to formulate EVM. EVM also presupposes intertheoretic value difference
comparisons – statements of the form
(G) the value difference between x and y, according to Ti, is greater than
the value difference between z and t, according to Tj.
And it seems fairly uncontroversial that we have no direct grasp on state-
ments like (G). That is the difficulty of the problem of intertheoretic com-
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parisons. So ultimately, our direct grasp of value difference orderings will in
any case not be enough.
In the next chapter, as a possible solution to the problem of intertheoretic
comparisons, I shall introduce fitting attitude accounts of value. I shall
consider whether an ordering of the strength of attitudes corresponding to
value differences might provide a cardinally significant concept of value. As
I mentioned on page 63, I cannot rule this out entirely. But I am very
sceptical about it. And added to this, fitting attitude accounts in general
face problems. So I shall ultimately proceed without assuming the truth of
such an account. And at least without these accounts, again, we do not seem
to have the necessary grasp on intertheoretic value difference orderings.
So let me consider a final worry about the decision-theoretic explications.
One might think that these explications get the order of explanation the
wrong way round. Consider the intratheoretic case first. Take two prospects
a and b, and suppose that (according to the true axiology), a is better than
b. Intuitively, it’s not that outcomes compare in a specific way because there
is the brute and inexplicable fact that a is better than b; rather, it seems, a
is better than b precisely because outcomes compare in a specific way. So my
explication seems to put the cart before the horse: it explains comparisons in
terms of betterness relations, whereas actually betterness relations seem to
be explained by comparisons. And the same worry arises in the intertheoretic
case. Intuitively, it’s not that axiologies compare in some specific way because
certain u-value relations hold; rather, these u-value relations hold because
axiologies compare in a specific way.32
32This objection is made in MacAskill (2014, 146); it is often raised against similar
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Let me say two things in response to this objection. For simplicity, I shall
only discuss the intratheoretic case; but what I say applies mutatis mutan-
dis to intertheoretic comparisons. First, a point of clarification: nothing in
the decision-theoretic explication implies that the value relations must be
‘brute and inexplicable’. In fact, according to the explication, value rela-
tions on prospects might well be explained by facts about outcomes. To
illustrate, suppose that according to the true axiology, both natural beauty
and wellbeing have value; suppose option a leads to the destruction of some
natural beauty with a probability of 0.4, and to some benefits for Blue with
a probability of 0.6; option b leads to the status quo:
a b
0.4 destruction of natural beauty status quo
0.6 benefits for Blue status quo
Table 2.5
And suppose that a and b are equally good. This may well be explained
by the fact that a – while having a good probability of benefiting Blue –
also has a decent probability of destroying some natural beauty. What the
decision-theoretic explication implies is only that it cannot be explained by
the cardinal fact that the value of benefitting Blue is 2/3 times the disvalue
of the destroying the bit of natural beauty. That is, the explication does not
imply that no facts about outcomes can explain the value relation among
prospects. It only implies that no independent cardinal facts can do so.
And this reveals the second point I wish to make: claiming that the value
explications in slightly different contexts (cf. e.g. Eriksson and Ha´jek (2007, 207)).
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relation is explained by this cardinal fact presupposes an independent car-
dinal notion of intratheoretic comparisons. So if the present objection is to
get off the ground, it has to provide an alternative account of such cardinal
facts. And if my response to the previous objection was sound, our direct
grasp of value difference comparisons is insufficient to provide one.
Now, as I indicated on page 53, there are other possibilities for explicat-
ing a cardinal concept of value in contexts where values are weighed against
each other. For example, we could assume that values acquire their cardinal
significance in the context of weighing goods over time. So one could sub-
stantiate the present objection against my explication by using a different
explication of the relevant cardinal facts. But my guess is that with all these
explications, it will prima facie seem that they get the order of explanation
wrong. With this explication concerning time, it will seem that two differ-
ences in value coming at different times count the same in determining the
goodness of the history of the world over time, because they are the same.
In terms of this order-of-explanation objection, nothing seems to be gained
by the move from one explication to the other.
But this tu quoque-response does not imply that the entire project of
getting a cardinal concept of value is hopeless. Instead, I take it, it reveals
that the intuitive appeal of the order-of-explanation objection is deceptive.
We may intuitively feel that we understand the alleged explanation that this
objection relies upon. But on closer inspection, I think that that assumption
is dubious, and the objection gets beaten at its own game.
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2.5 Further Explorations: Expected Value and
u2-Value
Before I conclude this chapter, it may be interesting to note an upshot of
my discussion. It concerns the regress problem that I mentioned in section
1.3. As I explained, a regress threatens because we might not be certain
about the true theory of axiological uncertainty. If so, we need a theory of
uncertainty about theories of axiological uncertainty – a theory of u2-value,
and so on.
Now, one might think that, if Expected Value Maximisation is a plau-
sible theory of u-value, it is also a plausible theory of u2-value – and in
fact, that the argument I have provided for EVM as a theory of u-value can
straightforwardly be extended to Expected Value Maximisation as a theory
of u2-value, using theories of axiological uncertainty instead of axiologies,
and the u2-value relation instead of the u-value relation.
Unfortunately, however, this is true only to a very restricted extent. As
I said, the Expected Value Theorem presupposes that all first-order the-
ories (i.e. all axiologies) are vNM-conformable; and it shows that, then,
EVM is the only theory of u-value that is vNM-conformable and satisfies
the Pareto Condition. Accordingly, on the level of u2-value, a similar ar-
gument will presuppose that all theories of u-value are vNM-conformable.
But – as the Expected Value Theorem shows – apart from theories that vio-
late the Pareto Condition, EVM is the only theory of u-value that is vNM-
conformable. And as I argued in section 2.4.2, as far as u-value is concerned,
the Pareto Condition is very plausible. So the set of theories of u-value that
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are vNM-conformable but not Paretian is not a very interesting set. The
more interesting set of theories are probably those that fail to satisfy the
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. It follows that my argument, applied to
u2-value instead of u-value, is almost completely uninteresting.
More generally, we cannot simply assume that the same kind of argument
will in principle be available, and of the same importance, on each level of
value. If representation theorems are indeed as important as I will argue
throughout this thesis – not only in defending, but in so much as defining
our views – then the problem of uncertainty about theories of axiological
uncertainty is even more serious than it might have seemed. We may not
even be able, in any interesting sense, to define our views of uncertainty
about theories of axiological uncertainty.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that state-dependent utility theory provides a
promising framework for an axiomatic approach to axiological uncertainty.
More specifically, I introduced a simple representation theorem from state-
dependent utility theory, and derived from it the Expected Value Theorem
about axiological uncertainty: given the decision-theoretic explications and
the assumption that all axiologies under consideration are vNM-conformable,
EVM is true if U is vNM-conformable and satisfies the Pareto condition.
I argued that the u-value relation is not complete if some axiologies are not
fully comparable, and that it is not continuous if some compare in a lexical
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way. So the Expected Value Theorem raises the problem of intertheoretic
comparisons. Apart from this problem, and if all underlying axiologies are
vNM-conformable, I suggested that the Expected Value Theorem presents a







The most important question that the Expected Value Theorem raised is the
problem of intertheoretic comparisons – the question whether sizes of value
differences or heights of value levels can be compared across axiologies. So
in this chapter, I shall address this problem in more depth.
In section 3.1, I shall state more precisely what the problem of intertheortic
comparisons is, and what I take to be the main motivation for denying that
intertheoretic comparisons are possible.
In section 3.2, I shall outline what I call the ‘Minimal Argument’: an argu-
ment to the effect that at least some intertheoretic comparisons are possible.
This argument does not provide a positive account of why these comparisons
hold, nor does it show that a large number of comparisons do. Instead, it
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claims that absolute scepticism about intertheoretic comparisons has unac-
ceptably implausible implications, and thus that at least some intertheoretic
comparisons must somehow be possible.
Assuming that this is true, I then explore two accounts of why it is true.
In section 3.3, I discuss Comparativism, the view that axiologies are merely
orderings, and that there are independent facts about how they enter the
u-value relation, and thus how they compare. I shall defend Comparativism
against various objections, and argue that it entails a kind of positive slippery
slope: if Comparativism explains why some intertheoretic comparisons are
possible, a very large number of theories are plausibly comparable. Finally,
I shall outline how Comparativism is, or can be made, compatible with the
Expected Value Theorem.
In section 3.4, I do the same for Absolutism, the view that axiologies are
more than merely orderings, and themselves make claims about the sizes
of value differences or heights of value levels on an intertheoretic scale. I
show that Absolutism too entails a broad range of intertheoretic comparisons,
and outline how it is, or can be made, compatible with the Expected Value
Theorem. For reasons I shall outline, I personally find Absolutism more
plausible than Comparativism. So for most parts of chapters 4 and 5 I shall
assume a form of Absolutism.
In all these sections, I assume that if theories are not comparable, then
the u-value relation is incomplete. To end this chapter, in section 3.5 I
shall explore the alternative assumption that the u-value relation may be
complete even if intertheoretic comparisons are impossible. I shall provide
axiomatisations for My Favourite Theory and Weighted Value Maximisation
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on the basis of this assumption. But ultimately, I will reject this alternative
approach.
3.1 The Problem
To clarify what I mean by the problem of intertheoretic comparisons, let me
introduce some definitions. Let a positive fact about intertheoretic compar-
isons be a fact of the form
(A) the value difference between x and y, according to Ti, is greater than
the value difference between z and t, according to Tj; or
(B) the value of x, according to Ti, is greater than the value of y, ac-
cording to Tj.
In most parts of this chapter, I shall not be concerned with the distinction
between intertheoretic unit-comparisons (like (A)) and intertheoretic level-
comparisons (like (B)). I shall say that two vNM-conformable axiologies are
fully incomparable if no positive facts about intertheoretic comparisons hold
between them. And as stated roughly on page 72, I shall say that two vNM-
conformable axiologies are fully comparable if they can jointly be represented
cardinally by a theory-dependent utility function u, such that the crosscut-
ting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons between them are the same as the
respective intertheoretic utility difference ratios on u (i.e., if they can jointly
be represented cardinally by two utility functions that are unique up to pos-
itive affine transformation by the same scalar and constant).
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Thus understood, full comparability and full incomparability are not ex-
haustive alternatives. It might be that no two axiologies in a set of vNM-
conformable theories are fully comparable, but that there are facts of the
form ‘the difference between the value of x, according to Ti, and the value
of y, according to Tj, is at least n times and at most m times as great as
the difference between the value of z, according to Th, and the value of t,
according to Tk’, for some n,m ∈ R. If such facts hold for all pertinent value
differences, we might say that these theories are roughly comparable.
By the problem of intertheoretic comparisons I mean the question whether
there are some positive facts about intertheoretic comparisons – or, as I shall
say equivalently, whether intertheoretic comparisons are possible. At least,
that is how I understand this problem for now. On page 106, I shall mention
another understanding of the problem; but this is what I mean for now, and
unless otherwise stated. Scepticism about intertheoretic comparisons, or just
scepticism, is the view that there are no such facts.
The main motivation behind scepticism, I think, is the rough thought
that axiologies are simply sets of claims about which options are better than
which. According to sceptics, axiologies do not contain any information
about how good options are on some global, intertheoretic value-scale or
compared to other axiologies, nor are there any independent facts that would
determine that. Many philosophers have endorsed scepticism, or at least
something close to it.1
1To be precise, none of the people quoted in the following explicitly say that all ax-
iologies are fully incomparable. So I am not sure whether they endorse what I called
‘scepticism’, or some less radical claim as that most standard axiologies are fully incom-
parable. It does not matter, as I am not concerned with exegetical questions, and I shall
argue against both of these claims.
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For example, Edward Gracely considers a form of person-affecting utili-
tarianism and total utilitarianism. He asks:
is a small loss of utility as seen by a [person-affecting utilitarian] more or less
important under that theory than a large loss of utility (involving lives not
created) under total utilitarianism? I don’t quite see how this question could
be answered. (I’ll refrain from saying that it is like comparing apples and
oranges, but it is!) [...] There is no abstract scale of “wrongness” outside of the
rank provided within a theory. (1996, 331)
Similarly, John Broome is concerned with the fact that total and average
utilitarianism have different ‘units of value’ (2012, 185): wellbeing, and well-
being per person respectively. He says:
We cannot take a sensible average of some amount of well-being and some
amount of well-being per person. It would be like trying to take an average of
a distance, whose unit is kilometres, and a speed, whose unit is kilometres per
hour. Most theories of value will be incomparable in this way. (2012, 185)
And in a similar vein, James Hudson imagines a person who has some cre-
dence in the view that pleasure-minus-pain is the only good (its units being
‘hedons’), and in the view that self-realization is the only good (its units
being ‘reals’). He argues:
What is the common measure between hedons and reals? Note that the agent,
for all her uncertainty, believes with complete confidence that there is no com-
mon measure: she is sure that one or the other – pleasure or self-realization
– is intrinsically worthless. Under the circumstances, the two units must be
incomparable by the agent, and so there can be no way for her uncertainty to
be taken into account in a reasonable decision procedure. (1989, 224)
Other people have expressed similar views.2
2Cf. Gustafsson and Torpman (2014), Hedden (forthcoming).
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As I explained in the last chapter, if the conditions of the Expected Value
Theorem hold, there are positive facts about intertheoretic comparisons. So
if scepticism is correct, the argument based on the Expected Value Theorem
– as well as my main arguments in chapters 4 and 5 – are not sound. So let
me now argue against this view.
3.2 The Minimal Thesis and Two Explana-
tions
There is a close analogue in social choice theory to the problem of intertheo-
retic comparisons – viz., the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility,
or wellbeing; the question whether, or how, the wellbeing enjoyed by one
person can be compared to that enjoyed by another. It is a difficult ques-
tion what precisely the basis for such interpersonal comparisons is, or what
precisely they mean. But I think it is helpful to begin this discussion in
social choice theory with a simple observation. It is a plain fact that in
everyday life – say, in cases of minor distributive moral problems – we fre-
quently make (what look like) interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing; and
in these contexts, there does not seem to be anything spurious about them.3
This observation does not prove that interpersonal comparisons are possi-
ble, nor does it explain what the basis of such comparisons is. But it does
strongly suggest that something has gone wrong if we deny the possibility of
interpersonal comparisons altogether.
3This is observed e.g. by List (2003, 229).
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I think it is helpful to begin a discussion of intertheoretic comparisons with
a dialectically similar observation. So let me begin by giving the Minimal
Argument. I will introduce this argument in section 3.2.1, and elaborate on
it in section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 The Minimal Argument
In the last chapter, I suggested that u-value plausibly satisfies Transitivity,
Independence and the Pareto Condition. I mentioned that Continuity is
false if some axiologies compare in a lexical way. However, if there are such
axiologies, then intertheoretic comparisons are in any case possible. So it is
only a concession to scepticism to assume that such axiologies do not exist.
And I have suggested that, barring such axiologies, Continuity is plausible
too. So for present purposes, let me assume Transitivity, Independence,
Continuity and the Pareto Condition. If U satisfies these conditions, we
can give the following argument.
(C) The u-value relation is not radically incomplete;
(D) if the u-value relation is not radically incomplete, intertheoretic com-
parisons are possible; therefore
(E) intertheoretic comparisons are possible.
As mentioned, I call this the Minimal Argument. It is minimal in two ways.
First, if sound, it establishes only the comparatively weak claim that there
are some positive facts about intertheoretic comparisons. The argument does
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not show that all, or most of our standard axiologies are comparable. Sec-
ond, it does not provide any positive explanation for why these comparisons
are possible. If sound, it only implies that intertheoretic comparisons must
somehow be possible. I shall thus call (E) the Minimal Thesis. For now, this
Minimal Thesis is all I am concerned with. Let me elaborate on premises
(C) and (D) in turn.
Premise (C)
What do I mean by premise (C)? Say that two options a and b in Q are in
the same possibility-space if they assign non-zero probability to exactly the
same axiologies, i.e., if for all i in I, a ∈ Qi if and only if b ∈ Qi. Let a
binary relation  on Q be radically incomplete if for all a and b in the same
possibility space,4
a  b only if Hi(a) i Hi(b) for all i in I with a, b in Qi. (3.1)
So intuitively, if the u-value relation is radically incomplete, then whenever
there is one theory with nonzero probability according to which b is better
than a, a cannot be at least as u-good as b. (C) claims that this is not so.
It says that, sometimes, an option a is at least as u-good as another option
b even if, according to some axiologies with nonzero probability, a is worse.
This is very plausible, I think. To see how extreme the denial of (C) is,
consider a toy example. Take some version of standard total utilitarianism,
and a form of ‘anthropocentric total utilitarianism’, according to which one




option is better than another if and only if it leads to more total human
wellbeing (while the wellbeing of non-human animals is irrelevant).5 Suppose
you can control the fate of some enormous number of animals and of one
human being. You can choose among the outcomes
x all the animals live very long, happy and painless lives but the person
suffers from a pinprick; and
y all the animals live very long lives full of torture and agony, but the
person does not suffer from the pinprick (and lives otherwise as in x).
According to the anthropocentric utilitarian theory, y is better than x; ac-
cording to the standard theory, x is better than y. Suppose you find the
anthropocentrism of the former very repulsive, and thus assign it a 0.1%
probability – as opposed to the 99.9% you assign to total utilitarianism. It
is very implausible that you necessarily have to judge your options incompa-
rable in u-value. Surely, you can truly claim that x is u-better than y.
If so, this is enough to guarantee that (C) is true. In fact, we could con-
sider two theories that are even more similar to each other than standard and
anthropocentric utilitarianism, and construct an even more radical example.
It is enough if there is one single case where the u-value relation is not rad-
ically incomplete. So denying (C) really is a very extreme view. Perhaps
it is implausible that U is fully complete. I shall consider that in more
detail below. But it is definitely implausible that U is radically incomplete.
I think that this is something we can say even before we give any positive
account of why any intertheoretic comparisons hold.
5I thank William MacAskill for suggesting this example to me.
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Premise (D)
Premise (D) says that if the u-value relation is not radically incomplete,
intertheoretic comparisons must be possible; or, if intertheoretic comparisons
are not possible, the u-value relation must be radically incomplete. Given
our other conditions, I think we can treat this as a matter of definition. I
suggested in the last chapter that, as a matter of definition, if the u-value
relation is complete and satisfies Transitivity, Independence, Continuity and
the Pareto Condition, then all axiologies are fully comparable. Similarly, I
take it, if the u-value relation satisfies Transitivity, Independence, Continuity
and the Pareto Condition, we can assume as a matter of definition that if the
u-value relation is not radically incomplete with respect to two underlying
axiologies, these axiologies are not fully incomparable. At least in a sense
that is relevant for us – that of how they determine the u-value relation – they
will then be (at least) roughly comparable. They will weigh in a particular
way against each other, and we can thus say that they compare in this way.
Unfortunately, the technical aspects of this definition will be slightly more
complex. Roughly speaking, given all our conditions and premise (C), we can
represent axiologies by sets of utility functions. And we can say, for example,
that the value difference between x and y, according to Ti, is greater than the
value difference between z and t, according to Tj, if that is true on all utility
functions in the sets that represent these axiologies. But I shall explore that
on a technical level only in chapter 5. I think it is intuitively clear, and for
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now I will content myself with that. What I said on a non-technical level in
defence of the decision-theoretic explication of full comparability will carry
over to this present context, to the idea of roughly comparable axiologies.
Assuming Transitivity, Independence, Continuity, the Pareto Condition and
premise (C), taking (D) to be a matter of definition is not circular, or overly
stipulative, or wrong in some respect.
So I believe that the Minimal Argument is sound. Very plausibly, there
are at least some positive facts about intertheoretic comparisons.
But before moving on, let me elaborate again on My Favourite Theory.
As I have argued, My Favourite Theory violates the Pareto Condition, and
this is a major drawback. But there is another, and in a sense more fun-
damental problem with My Favourite Theory. Note that according to My
Favourite Theory, (C) is true: U is not radically incomplete. Instead, U is
complete (or as complete as the most plausible axiology is). However, people
who endorse My Favourite Theory generally think that it is compatible with
scepticism – indeed, they take scepticism to motivate My Favourite The-
ory.6 In principle, this does not contradict anything I have said. I have only
claimed that scepticism is incompatible with (C) if U among else satisfies
the Pareto Condition. But it nonetheless contradicts, as it were, the spirit
of premise (D), which suggests that scepticism should give rise to incom-
pleteness. So let me say a word about the inference from scepticism to My
Favourite Theory.
I think that this inference is very dubious. Take the analogy with in-
tratheoretic comparisons again. Suppose art and philosophy are radically
6Cf. e.g. Gracely (1996) and Gustafsson and Torpman (2014).
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incomparable in the sense that, for any pair of lives, if one contains more
philosophy and one contains more art, then they are neither exactly equally
good, nor is one of them better. Now consider the following two options:
a b
0.6 Comparatively good Comparatively bad
philosophy; no art philosophy; no art
0.4 Comparatively bad art; Comparatively good art;
no philosophy no philosophy
Table 3.1
With a probability of 0.6, both a and b lead to lives containing only phi-
losophy, and a contains better philosophy than b; with a probability of 0.4,
they both lead to lives containing only art, and b contains better art than
a. If these values are radically incomparable in the way I assumed, no pos-
itive value relation should hold between a and b. The betterness relation
should be incomplete with regards to these options. There is no reason for
just focusing on the probabilities, and ranking a strictly better than b, just
because philosophy-lives are the most likely outcome and a promises better
philosophy than b. This would simply be to disregard the incomparability
between philosophy and art, and pretend that the difference between good
and bad art is as great as that between good and bad philosophy.
More generally: when we determine the value of a prospect, absent any
incomparability, it is extremely implausible that we can focus on probabilities
only and ignore the values of outcomes. Both the probabilities of outcomes
and their values are relevant to determine the goodness of prospects. One
might say that this is the basic tenet of decision theory, in its simplest form.
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So if there is incomparability in values, there is no reason why we could
ignore that, and just focus on probabilities.
Similarly, there seems to be no positive reason why scepticism about in-
tertheoretic comparisons should lead to a unique focus on axiological proba-
bilities, and thus to My Favourite Theory. Accepting My Favourite Theory
seems like an ad hoc solution for sceptics to accommodate (C). That is an-
other drawback of this view.
But in any case, My Favourite Theory also violates the other conditions
I have outlined. And since I take these to be plausible, I think that My
Favourite Theory is false, and the Minimal Argument is sound. Very plausi-
bly, not all axiologies are fully incomparable.
One might perhaps say that whether or not the Minimal Thesis (E) is true
is not the most important question. The real problem of intertheoretic com-
parisons, one might say, is not whether all axiologies are fully incomparable,
but whether most, or most standard axiologies are. And from a practical
point of view, that is certainly true. But I think philosophically, the truth
of (E) is actually very significant. The reason is that once we assume that
there are some positive facts about inthertheoretic comparisons, we open the
door for a vast number of them. At least, that is what I shall argue in the
remainder of this chapter.
3.2.2 Two Explanations
If the Minimal Thesis (E) is true, there must be some explanation for why
it is true, or why intertheoretic comparisons are possible. Various classify-
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ing schemes have been proposed for distinguishing accounts of intertheoretic
comparisons.7 I think the most fundamental distinction is between two types
of accounts that differ in terms of their conception of what axiologies are.
On the first conception of axiologies, axiologies are only betterness order-
ings of prospects. These orderings may be cardinal orderings – that is, they
may give rise to facts about the ratios of value differences. But they do not
themselves make any claims about the heights of value levels or sizes of value
differences on some intertheoretic scale. If there is nonetheless a fact about
how these orderings compare intertheoretically in a relevant sense, then that
is some independent principle or fact about how axiological orderings enter
the u-value relation; axiologies themselves are silent on it. I shall call this
view of what axiologies are Comparativism; and I shall refer to accounts of
intertheoretic comparisons that presuppose Comparativism as comparativist
accounts (of intertheoretic comparisons). At least as far as the problem of
intertheoretic comparisons is concerned, we might say that Comparativism
is a conservative view about axiologies: it does not assume that axiologies
themselves make claims about the heights of value levels or sizes of value
differences on some intertheoretic scale. So for comparativist accounts of
intertheoretic comparisons, I take it, the challenge is not to defend Compar-
ativism itself. Instead, the challenge is to argue that – even though axiologies
do not make these relevant claims – there are nonetheless positive facts about
intertheoretic comparisons.
On a second conception of what axiologies are, axiologies themselves make
claims about the heights of value levels or sizes of value differences on some
7Cf. e.g. MacAskill (2014, 129ff.).
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intertheoretic scale. That is, an axiology is not only an ordering of prospects,
but also in itself makes claims about how good certain options are, or how
much better some are than others, on a global, intertheoretic scale. I shall call
this view of what axiologies are Absolutism; and I shall refer to accounts of
intertheoretic comparisons that presuppose Absolutism as absolutist accounts
(of intertheoretic comparisons). If Absolutism is true, we have a straightfor-
ward explanation for why intertheoretic comparisons are possible: axiologies
themselves simply imply the relevant facts. So the challenge for absolutist
accounts of intertheoretic comparisons, I take it, is to defend Absolutism
itself – to explain why, or in what way axiologies imply these intertheoretic
facts.
I am not aware that anyone has made this distinction between Absolutism
and Comparativism.8 It will become clearer when I elaborate on the two
views in the next sections. But one helpful way to see the distinction is
via the question of how many axiologies there are. If Comparativism is
true, there is only one axiology corresponding to any ordering of prospects.
If Absolutism is true, there are infinitely many axiologies corresponding to
any ordering. The reason is that, if Absolutism is true, a comprehensive
theory of goodness must be more than a theory of betterness: it has to
include claims about the sizes of value differences or heights of value levels
on an intertheoretic scale. And if such claims make sense, then one can
8MacAskill (2014, ch.4) also makes a distinction between ‘Absolutism’ and ‘Compara-
tivism’ in the context of the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. However, his distinc-
tion concerns the question whether value-relations ground value-properties, or vice versa.
As far as I understand it (and as he tells me), my distinction is different from his: a view
that is absolutist in my sense could be either absolutist or comparativist in MacAskill’s
sense.
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consistently and meaningfully combine one and the same claim about the
betterness ordering with different claims about this intertheoretic scale. The
intuitive reason for this is that an ordering can be represented by infinitely
many utility functions: there is simply nothing in an ordering that would
make it inconsistent to combine that ordering with certain claims about this
global scale. And that it is consistent for a comprehensive theory of goodness
to combine one and the same betterness ordering with different claims about
the sizes of value differences or heights of value levels on a global scale,
simply means that there are theories that imply the same betterness ordering
but different claims about that global scale. That different theories can be
meaningfully formulated is what it means for there to be different theories.
So if Absolutism is true, there are infinitely many axiologies corresponding
to any ordering.9
Comparativism and Absolutism are mutually exclusive and (at least on
one level of generality) jointly exhaustive. Axiologies either do or do not
make claims about the heights of value levels or sizes of value differences
on some intertheoretic scale; so if (E) is true, any explanation for this must
either be absolutist or comparativist. So let me examine both of these views
in turn.
9I should note that I do not take ‘Absolutism’ to mean that axiologies in themselves
make claims like ‘the value of x is 5’, or ‘the value of x is 10’. Even on Absolutism,
axiologies will imply such claims only once we picked a scale (as explained on page 51).
But once we have picked a scale, on Absolutism, axiologies themselves imply value-facts
on that scale; on Comparativism, axiologies themselves do not imply such facts, and if
there nonetheless are such facts, they are implied by independent principles.
109
3.3 Comparativism
Again, if Comparativism is true, and axiologies themselves do not make any
claims about the heights of value levels or sizes of value differences on some
intertheoretic scale, then if the u-value relation is not radically incomplete,
there are independent facts that determine how axiologies compare, or weigh
against each other to determine the u-value relation.
Considerable work has been devoted to finding principles that integrate
axiological orderings into the u-value relation in a plausible seeming way.
For example, one principle that has been suggested is what we might call
Best/Worst Normalisation. According to this principle, under uncertainty,
the best and worst conceivable outcomes should be considered equally good
and bad according to all theories. To formulate this idea in terms of value-
functions, let xwi and x
b
i be the worst and best conceivable outcomes respec-









j) for all Ti and Tj.
10 Another principle that has
been suggested is what we might call Variance Normalisation. The vari-
ance of an axiology is a measure of how, according to that axiology, moral
value is spread out over different outcomes – viz., the average of the squared
differences in the value of outcomes from their mean value. According to
Variance Normalisation, under uncertainty, this quantity should be iden-
tical for all theories.11 A third principle that has been proposed is what
10This principle is a slight variation of the ‘Principle of Equity Among Moral Theories’,
as stated in Lockhart (2000, 84); it is considered in Sepielli (2013b, 588), and MacAskill
(2014, 103ff.).
11A particular interpretation of this idea is endorsed in MacAskill (2014, ch.3); cf. also
Cotton-Barratt et al. (ms).
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we might call Paradigm Normalisation. On this proposal, there are certain
paradigmatically heinous outcomes (say, that people are tortured), and cer-
tain paradigmatically value-neutral outcomes (say, an empty world with no
sentient beings), and the value of these outcomes is the same according to





n) for all Ti and Tj.
In theory, there are infinitely many other principles that could be sug-
gested. And one might also hold a kind of particularist view, on which there
are facts about how any two orderings compare, but no very general principle
about how all theories do. All these proposals face certain problems. An ob-
vious problem of Best/Worst Normalisation is that there might not be best
and worst conceivable outcomes; a problem for Variance Normalisation is
that it needs to define a measure over outcomes in order to be well-defined;13
and Paradigm Normalisation faces the problem that there seem to be theo-
ries on which these ‘paradigmatically’ neutral or heinous outcomes are not
neutral or heinous. I shall not say which specific comparitivist account I find
most plausible, although I shall offer a general consideration on page 122.
But before I come to that, let me consider some general objections against
Comparativism. That will be the main task of section 3.3.1. In section
3.3.2, I shall then consider how Comparativism can be incorporated into the
Expected Value Theorem.
12This is suggested in Sepielli (2010, 186f.).
13Cf. MacAskill (2014, ch.2) for a suggestion about how to solve this problem.
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3.3.1 Possibility, Arbitrariness, and Swamping
The Possibility of a Comparativist Account
As I mentioned, considerable work has been devoted to finding a plausible
seeming principle to integrate axiological orderings into the u-value relation.
However, one might think that if Comparativism holds, there is a general
and fundamental reason why all such principles must be false. I think that
this is not so, but it is worth getting clear about it.
The thought is this. Consider an axiology TAP on which both artist- and
philosophy-lives are valuable. Suppose that TAP implies a complete better-
ness ordering of the artist-lives, and a complete ordering of the philosophy
lives, but on TAP , there are no positive facts of the form ‘the value dif-
ference between artist-lives L1A and L
2
A is at least (or at most) as great as
the value difference between philosophy-lives L1P and L
2
P ’. So according to
this axiology, we might say, the ordering of artist-lives and the ordering of
philosophy-lives are fully incomparable. As I argued in section 3.2.1, the
overall value relation of this axiology should be radically incomplete with
respect to art and philosophy.
Now consider two axiologies, an axiology TA on which only artist-lives are
valuable, and an axiology TP on which only philosophy-lives are valuable. It
may seem that – if axiologies are merely orderings and do not make claims
about value on an intertheoretic scale – then according to our axiologies,
there are again no facts of the form ‘the value difference between artist-
lives L1A and L
2
A, according to TA, is at least (or at most) as great as the
value difference between philosophy-lives L1P and L
2
P , according to TP ’. So
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if on our single axiology TAP the ordering of artist-lives and the ordering of
philosophy-lives were radically incomparable, it seems that the axiologies TA
and TP must be fully incomparable too. Hence, in claiming that axiologies
are merely orderings, we seem to be denying that they are comparable, and
seem forced to conclude that the u-value relation is radically incomplete. It
is no good, it seems, just to outline a prima facie plausible principle about
how to combine axiological orderings into a complete u-value relation. If
Comparativism is true, we have to provide a more fundamental reason for
why any such principle could be true in the first place.
However, this argument is invalid. Note that our axiology TAP must imply
a verdict on whether, or how, artist- and philosophy-lives compare. If it
simply remains silent on that, it is arguably not a fully specified axiology.
So if it is a fully specified axiology, then it positively claims that there are
no facts of the form ‘the value difference between artist-lives L1A and L
2
A is
at least (or at most) as great as the value difference between philosophy-
lives L1P and L
2
P ’. However, if theories are merely orderings, then they are
simply silent on the heights of value levels or sizes of value differences on
an intertheoretic scale – just like, say, Darwin’s theory of evolution is silent
on Kepler’s laws of planetary motion. By themselves, they simply do not
make any claims about value-facts on an intertheoretic scale; so neither do
they claim that there are no such facts. If they did, they would after all
imply (negative) facts about an intertheoretic scale; and in that case, there
could arguably be theories that imply positive facts about that scale, and so
our picture of axiologies would collapse into Absolutism. In slogan form, we
might say that the absence of a verdict (about intertheoretic comparisons)
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is different from the verdict of absence (of such comparisons).
For this reason, the above analogy fails. For all we know, if Compara-
tivism is true, there may be independent facts – facts that are not part of
any axiology itself – that determine how axiologies weigh against each other
to form a u-value relation that is not radically incomplete. We might per-
haps say that the sense in which theories are then ‘comparable’ is somehow
weaker than under Absolutism. Indeed, under Comparativism, it is slightly
misleading to say ‘the value difference between x and y, according to Ti, is
greater than the value difference between z and t, according to Tj’, since
these theories themselves do not make claims about the sizes of value differ-
ences. They might merely imply them, given certain other truths. But that
should not mislead us into thinking that the u-value relation would therefore
necessarily have to be incomplete. It need not be. If it is not, axiologies
would still be ‘comparable’ in the sense that is relevant for our purposes –
i.e., that of featuring in a u-value relation that is not radically incomplete.
And given that, I think it is more plausible to accept (E), and the possibility
of at least some such facts about how axiologies weigh against each other to
form a u-value relation, than to deny (E).
Arbitrariness
However, even if (E) could be true under Comparativism: in arguing for it, I
considered standard total utilitarianism and a form of anthropocentric total
utilitarianism, according to which only human wellbeing matters. These two
theories are very similar. So this still leaves open whether only very few
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intertheoretic comparisons are possible, or whether in fact an interestingly
large number of comparisons are. So let me address some further sceptical
arguments that are particularly salient under Comparativism.
One prominent motivation for being sceptical about comparing certain
more distinct axiologies is that for some of these theories, any intertheoretic
comparisons seem arbitrary. For example, Brian Hedden claimed that any
comparisons between total and average utilitarianism would be ‘arbitrary and
unmotivated’ (forthcoming, 9). Similarly, Johan Gustafsson and Tom Torp-
man consider certain allegedly general principles for making intertheoretic
comparisons, and conclude from their discussion that ‘there does not seem
to be any way of making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons of value’
(2014, 160). And a similar concern with the arbitrariness of any alleged ‘de-
cision procedure’ also seems to have motivated James Hudson’s scepticism
(1989, 224).
However, I think that this arbitrariness-objection can be answered. One
criterion that many authors find plausible is the rough idea that apart from
their probabilities, all theories should somehow get ‘equal say’ in the u-value
relation. I shall call this the Idea of Equal Say. This is certainly the mo-
tivating intuition behind Best/Worst Normalisation and Variance Normali-
sation.14 I shall consider on page 122 whether this idea is plausible. But
suppose for now that it is. As MacAskill (2014, 100ff.) argues, it then offers
a response to the arbitrariness objection. The Idea of Equal Say provides a
general, non-arbitrary criterion for making intertheoretic comparisons, and
that idea can arguably itself be cashed out non-arbitrarily. For example, it
14Cf. e.g. Lockhart (2000, 86), MacAskill (2014, ch.3).
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can be proved that Variance Normalisation is the only normalisation that
satisfies certain prima facie appealing conditions (such as that, in a specific
sense, all value-functions have the same ‘distance’ from a uniform value-
function that assigns all outcomes the same value).15 So insofar as these
general principles and the Idea of Equal Say are concerned, it is simply not
true that any normalisation would be arbitrary.
Perhaps the arbitrariness concern is more pertinent if we assume that the
Idea of Equal Say is flawed and that there is no general principle about how
axiologies enter the u-value relation – hence that, if any, a more particularist
picture would have to be true. But I think that the arbitrariness-objection
can be answered even then.
As an analogy, consider the class of pluralist axiologies on which there are
two different sorts of value. Presumably, there is no very general principle
about which of these axiologies is the most plausible in each case. It seems
unlikely, say, that the most plausible axiology on which both beauty and well-
being have value combines these values in a way that is formally somehow
equivalent to the way in which the most plausible axiology on which biodi-
versity and virtue have value combines these two values. So an arbitrariness
worry might arise in this context too. Consider the pluralist axiologies on
which both beauty and wellbeing have value. Different such axiologies weigh
these values differently against each other. On one possible axiology, the
disvalue of destroying a work of Raphael is the same as the disvalue of some-
one’s suffering from a pinprick; on another, it is the same as the disvalue
of the sufferings caused by the First World War; on others, the comparison
15Cf. Cotton-Barratt et al. (ms).
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is somewhere in between. Presumably, any precise comparison will to some
extent be arbitrary. But that does not mean that the most plausible such
pluralist axiology is one on which these values are radically incommensurable
– on which the disvalue of destroying any child painting would be incompa-
rable to the disvalue brought about by the First World War. Instead, for one
thing, it arguably means that we should spread our credences among differ-
ent axiologies that make different comparisons between the values of beauty
and wellbeing. For another thing, it arguably means that we should assign
considerable credence to views on which these values are less than perfectly
comparable – axiologies on which, say, destroying a Raphael is worse than
giving someone a pinprick, not as bad as a war, but not exactly as good or
bad as any wellbeing difference in between. The inference from an alleged
arbitrariness of any specific comparison to complete incommensurability is
simply a non-sequitur.
Similarly, suppose Comparativism is true, and consider the axiology on
which only beauty is valuable, and the utilitarian axiology on which only to-
tal wellbeing is valuable. And suppose we think that these axiologies should
not get ‘equal say’ in determining u-value, in the sense of some general prin-
ciple like Best/Worst Normalisation or Variance Normalisation. Then even
if there is no uniquely privileged way of comparing these two orderings, that
does not imply that these axiologies are fully incomparable. At least if it
is in principle possible for there to be independent facts about how axiolo-
gies determine the u-value relation, it arguably means that we should spread
our credences among different comparisons, and particularly, that we should
have credence in the view that these axiologies are less than fully comparable.
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Again the inference from an alleged arbitrariness to complete incomparabil-
ity is unmotivated.
Swamping
Let me consider a final argument to the effect that certain specific axiologies
are incomparable. The argument is given in MacAskill (2014), and concerns
the case of total and average utilitarianism – although it could be raised
in a very similar way against other pairs of axiologies. Suppose that we
have some adequate cardinal representation of wellbeing, and consider the
following three options in O (n being some natural number):
a leads to n people at wellbeing 100;
b leads to 10n people at wellbeing 99;
c leads to 1000n people at wellbeing 1.
According to the total utilitarian ordering, c is the best option, but b is 99%
as valuable as c; according to the average utilitarian ordering, a is the best
option, but b is 99% as valuable as a.16 This is so for any number n.
Now suppose you assign both of these theories probability 0.5, and let a, b
and c be the corresponding options in Q, relative to this credence distribu-
tion.17 MacAskill claims that, since b is almost as good as the best option
for both theories, for any number n, b should be your safest and thus u-best
option: ‘[b] seems to represent the best hedge between the two views’ (2014,
94), for any number n. As he points out, however, there is no pair of value-
16Note that these statements make sense: as mentioned on page 107, even on Compar-
ativism, axiologies may be (intratheoretically) cardinal orderings.
17That is, a(total utilitarianism, n people at wellbeing 100)=0.5, and so on.
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functions GT and GA for the total and average utilitarian orderings for which
this will be the case. To see this, let z be the outcome in which there is one
person, at wellbeing 1, and let GT (z) = x and GA(z) = mx. We then have
b u a iff 1/2 · 990nx+ 1/2 · 99mx > 1/2 · 100nx+ 1/2 · 100mx
iff 990n+ 99m > 100n+ 100m;
b u c iff 1/2 · 990nx+ 1/2 · 99mx > 1/2 · 1000nx+ 1/2 ·mx
iff 990n+ 99m > 1000n+m.
For n = 1, these inequalities are jointly satisfied only if 890 > m > 10/98;
for n = 10’000, they are jointly satisfied only if 8’900’000 > m > 100’000/98
≈ 1020. So whatever value we choose for m (and x), it cannot be the case
that b is your u-best option for any number n.
MacAskill concludes from this argument that ‘it’s unclear how any way
of comparing [average] and [total utilitarianism] could be correct’ (2014, 95),
and hence that this is a case ‘where choice-worthiness differences [i.e. value
differences] seem to be incomparable between different theories’ (2014, 97).
Other people have drawn similar conclusions from this case.18 If MacAskill
and these people are right, total and average utilitarianism cannot be com-
parable.
However, I think that this is a dubious objection, and there is a debunk-
ing argument against the intuition it relies upon. It is easy to see why the
alleged problem arises. Intuitively, we may start by considering options in-
volving comparatively few people. We can choose our value-functions in such
18Cf. e.g. Hedden (forthcoming).
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a way that both total and average utilitarianism matter significantly in de-
termining the u-value of these options. If we now increase the differences
in the number of people that our options affect while leaving their average
wellbeing the same, this will not affect the value of our options according
to average utilitarianism, but it will increase the stakes of our decision ac-
cording to total utilitarianism. So if we increase these numbers sufficiently,
total utilitarianism will swamp average utilitarianism: the u-best option will
simply be that which is best according to total utilitarianism. If instead
we consider options involving comparatively many people, and choose our
value-functions in such a way that both theories matter significantly in de-
termining the u-value of these options, then there will not only be options
with still more people, for which total utilitarianism swamps average utili-
tarianism. But also, if we now consider options where the difference in the
number of people affected is comparatively small, average utilitarianism will
swamp total utilitarianism.
But this is exactly what we should expect, and what should happen if
these theories are comparable. It is clear that one theory comes to dominate
u-value if we increase the stakes for that theory while leaving them exactly
the same for the other. Hopefully it does that. It is simply not true that
b should represent the safest option for any number n. We may think that
it does, because b is so close to the best option on both these orderings.
But this fact about the orderings is insignificant once we think of these two
axiologies as comparing somehow on an intertheoretic scale. What matters
is not how close in the ordering b comes to being the best option (‘99%’).
What matters is the absolute difference between b and the best option on
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the intertheoretic scale – as it were, the size of the 1%. And naturally, for
total utilitarianism this will increase for increasing numbers of people. So we
should not at all be tempted by the intuition that b should be your safest
and thus u-best option for any number n. This intuition is fundamentally
flawed.
Conclusion
Let me end this discussion here. I argued that even if theories themselves are
merely orderings, there may be independent facts that determine how they
enter the u-value relation, and I claimed that it is more plausible to assume
(E) and the existence of at least some such facts, than to reject (E). I then
argued that neither the arbitrariness nor the swamping worry are convincing
objections against the assumption that in fact all theories are comparable.
3.3.2 Comparativism and EVM
Completeness and Contuinity
At the end of chapter 2 we were left with the question whether in light of
the problem of intertheoretic comparisons it is plausible that U satisfies
Completeness and Continuity. So it remains to ask about the status of these
axioms under Comparativism. This status depends on which facts about
comparisons would be most plausible. So let me finally say something about
that question. My remarks shall be brief, and somewhat speculative. The
discussion about the problem of intertheoretic comparisons is in the early
stages, and no one has addressed the problem explicitly in light of the dis-
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tinction between Absolutism and Comparativism. And to some extent, my
formal results are open to very different views about what the most plausible
comparison-facts are. But let me nonetheless suggest a rough view.
As far as I see, the Idea of Equal Say does indeed have at least a prima
facie plausibility under Comparativism. To begin with, there may be reasons
of simplicity and parsimony that favour a theory with some general principle
over a more particularist theory of u-value. But moreover, if we really do
think of comprehensive theories of value as being merely orderings, and if
intertheoretic comparisons are given by independent facts about how these
orderings enter the u-value relation, it seems plausible that they should in
some sense (apart from their probability) weigh equally in the u-value re-
lation. If a theory of the good says that the best world is the world with
most beauty, say, and that is all it can claim, there does not seem to be
any reason why (apart from its probability) it should weigh heavier or less
heavily in the u-value relation than some other ordering. In other words,
there does not seem to be any ground for a particularist view that treats
theories differently. Or more positively, in treating axiologies differently, our
very theory of axiological uncertainty would arguably be biased against some
axiologies. It would not be neutral among them, as a theory of uncertainty
arguably should be. So if there is some independent fact about how order-
ings enter the u-value relation, it seems prima facie plausible that this fact is
some general principle, and that on this principle all orderings somehow get
equal weight (apart from their probabilities). I think that the case is in some
sense different under Absolutism, and I shall come back to this distinction
in section 3.4.3. But at least under Comparativism, the rough Idea of Equal
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Say seems plausible.
Suppose that this is true. Then, if all underlying axiologies are complete,
it does in fact seem plausible under Comparativism that U is complete
as well. If there is a general equal-say-principle, this principle plausibly
determines a complete u-value relation – as indeed all the principles that
have been suggested in the literature do. Of course, there could be an equal-
say-principle that induces some equally balanced incommensurability in the
theories, and yields a less than fully complete u-value ordering. And perhaps
we cannot be altogether certain that all such incommensurability-inducing
equal-say-principles are false. But it is hard to see why such a principle
should hold. If only for reasons of elegance and simplicity, it seems that
equal-say-principles that render U complete will be more plausible.
The Continuity condition is all the more plausible, at least as far as consid-
erations of intertheoretic comparisons are concerned. As I said, this condition
fails if some axiologies compare in a lexical way – if there are axiologies Ti
and Tj such that any positive value difference between options according to
Ti is greater than any positive value difference between options according to
Tj. But given the Idea of Equal Say, that will not be the case. If one theory
dominates another lexically, they have anything but equal weight. We might
say that the former has infinitely more weight. Perhaps we can again not as-
sign zero credence to the possibility of such intertheoretic lexical dominance.
But under Comparativism it does seem very implausible.
Suppose that all of this is correct. Then, if Comparativism explains why
some intertheoretic comparisons hold (thesis (E)), it is plausible that a large
number of theories are comparable. Indeed, it seems plausible that all vNM-
123
conformable axiologies are comparable – that is, that all vNM-conformable
axiologies combine in some way into a complete and continuous u-value re-
lation. Thus I take it that, under Comparativism, and within the restricted
scope of vNM-conformable axiologies, all the conditions of the Expected
Value Theorem are plausible.
Axiomatising Specific Comparativist Accounts
Nonetheless, we can extend the Expected Value Theorem in some interesting
ways. As it stands, and given the decision-theoretic explication of interthe-
oretic comparisons, the Expected Value Theorem does entail EVM; but it
does not entail a specific form of EVM, a form of EVM with certain specific
comparisons. So if we find a particular comparison principle most plausible,
we might say that the theorem is not as informative as it could be. But we
can of course add conditions to the theorem to make it imply a specific form
of EVM.
For example, consider Best/Worst Normalisation again, the view that the
best and worst conceivable outcomes are equally good and bad according to
all theories. And let a(i,x) in Q be the option that certainly leads to x while
Ti is true: a(i,x)(i, x)=1. If we want to axiomatise EVM with Best/Worst
Normalisation, we could assume the
Best/Worst Comparison Principle: For all Ti and Tj, a(i,xwi ) ∼U
a(j,xwj ) and a(i,xbi ) ∼U a(j,xbj).
It is easy to see that if we add this principle to the Expected Value Theorem,
given the decision-theoretic explications, the only value-functions that satisfy
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our assumptions are such that Gi(x
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i ) = Gj(x
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Similarly, consider Paradigm Normalisation again, the view on which there
are certain paradigmatically heinous and value-neutral outcomes, xh and xn,
whose value is the same according to all theories. If we want to axiomatise
EVM with Paradigm Normalisation, we could assume the
Paradigm Comparison Principle: For all Ti and Tj, a(i,xh) ∼U a(j,xh)
and a(i,xn) ∼U a(j,xn).
Similar principles will be formalisable for other specific comparativist ac-
counts. If we add these principles to the Expected Value Theorem, the
theorem will imply specific comparativist forms of EVM.
3.4 Absolutism
Let me now turn to Absolutism. Again, according to Absolutism, an axiology
is not only an ordering of prospects, but also in itself makes claims about
how good certain options are, or how much better some are than others, on
an intertheoretic scale. I think that Absolutism can come in two variants.
On the one hand, it might be that axiologies make claims about the heights
of value levels and sizes of value differences on an intertheoretic scale in a
way that is entirely independent of the u-value relation. I shall call this
Substantial Absolutism. However, at least prima facie, it might also be that
an axiology itself makes claims about the heights of value levels and sizes of
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value differences on an intertheoretic scale, but in a way that is not ultimately
independent of the u-value relation. I shall call this idea Non-Substantial
Absolutism.
What I mean by this distinction will become clearer when I elaborate
more on both of these versions. In section 3.4.1, I shall outline what I take
to be the most promising version of Substantial Absolutism. In section 3.4.2,
I shall elaborate on how that view is compatible with the Expected Value
Theorem. And in section 3.4.3, I shall explore the idea of Non-Substantial
Absolutism.
3.4.1 Fitting Strengths of Attitudes
Fitting Attitude Accounts
I think that the most plausible form of Substantial Absolutism is based on
so-called fitting attitude accounts of value, or FA-accounts. FA-accounts are
analyses of what it means that something has value, or that one thing has
more value than another. According to these accounts, there is an attitude
or set of attitudes such that the fact that x is better than y means that it
is fitting to have these attitudes towards x and y; or similarly, there is an
attitude or set of attitudes such that the fact that x has value means that
it is fitting to have these attitudes towards x. So FA-accounts define value
in terms of attitudes that it is fitting to have. Versions of the account can
differ in the set of attitudes they consider relevant in defining value. If we
take ‘preference’ to be the relevant (two-place) attitude, then the account
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says: that x is better than y means that it is fitting to prefer x to y.19 More
plausibly perhaps, there may be a variety of relevant attitudes – including,
say, some form of pleasure about the fact that x rather than y was brought
about (if that is so), hope that x rather than y will be or was brought about
(if you do not know it), regret that y rather than x was brought about (if
that is so), and so on.20
At least some versions of FA-accounts can be understood as implying a
form of Absolutism. Suppose that the attitudes should come in degrees, and
that the intensity of the attitudes it is fitting to have correlates with the
sizes of the relevant value differences or the heights of the relevant value
levels. For example, suppose that if according to some theory, the value
difference between x and y is larger than the value difference between z and
t, it would, according to that theory, be fitting to feel more regret about
the fact that y rather than x was brought about than about the fact that
t rather than z was brought about (if these are facts). If that is so, we
can take the strength of these attitudes to be the ‘common scale’ between
different axiologies. And axiologies will imply facts about the sizes of value
differences or heights of value levels on an intertheoretic scale because they
imply facts about the strengths of the relevant attitudes. Consequently, the
value difference between x and y, according to Ti, would be greater than the
value difference between z and t, according to Tj, if the regret that it would
be fitting to feel, if Ti was true and y rather than x was brought about, is
stronger than the regret it would be fitting to feel if Tj was true and t rather
19Cf. Rabinowicz (2008) for such an account.
20For defences of FA-accounts, cf. e.g. Brentano (1889, 18), Broad (1930, 283), Ewing
(1947, 152), Wiggins (1987, 206), Gibbard (1990, 51) and Scanlon (1998, ch.2).
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than z was brought about. A similar account could be given for heights
of value levels, involving some monadic attitude. For example, suppose the
greater the value of x, the greater the pleasure it is fitting to feel about the
fact that x was brought about (if that is a fact). Then the value of x according
to Ti would be greater than the value of y according to Tj if the pleasure it
would be fitting to feel if Ti was true and x was brought about is greater than
the pleasure it would be fitting to feel if Tj was true and y was brought about.
So a strength-sensitive FA-account would vindicate a form of Absolutism.21 I
say that it vindicates Substantial Absolutism, because if a strength-sensitive
FA-account is true, there is something substantial, independent of the u-value
relation, that determines value-facts on an intertheoretic scale – viz., facts
about fitting attitudes.
It is also clear that the truth of such a strength-sensitive FA-account will
give rise to the large number of axiologies that I suggested on page 108. One
and the same axiological ordering can consistently be combined with different
claims about the strength of attitudes that it is fitting to have with respect
to various outcomes. For example, if x is better than y, then if y rather than
x was brought about, it may be fitting to feel just a mild form of regret, or it
may be fitting to feel a very strong and intense form of regret, or something
in between. In principle, there are infinitely many strengths of regret that
it may be fitting to feel. And the same is true for any other attitude. So if
an axiology is a consistent combination of a betterness ordering and a claim
about what attitudes it is fitting to have with what strength, then there are
21Such an account is endorsed by Ross (2006b); something similar is suggested in Sepielli
(2010, 181ff.); MacAskill (2014) discusses but rejects it.
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infinitely many axiologies corresponding to any betterness ordering. If you
want to assign a particular probability to an axiology, intuitively, you not
only have to decide what values there are, but also how important these
values are – that is, what attitudes would be fitting.
Interestingly, if this fitting attitude account is true, we have an error the-
ory for why people thought that any comparisons between two orderings like
the total and the average utilitarian one are arbitrary. If a strength-sensitive
FA-account is true, this is precisely what we should expect. There is no
uniquely privileged or non-arbitrary way in which the total and the average
utilitarian orderings should be compared, because there are infinitely many
ways in which theories implying these orderings compare. Different versions
of these orderings will compare in different ways, and no two versions may
stand out as most plausible. Moreover, MacAskill’s argument against the
comparison between total and average utilitarianism will again be flawed:
we should again not at all be tempted by the principle that he invokes for
his sceptical conclusion. And of course, the fundamental objection against
Comparativism that I discussed on page 112 does not even arise for Sub-
stantial Absolutism. So as far as the objections against Comparativism are
concerned, a fitting attitude account promises to provide a plausible response
to the problem of intertheoretic comparisons.
Objections
However, this solution to the problem of intertheoretic comparisons will also
face objections. Some of these objections apply to FA-accounts in general.
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One of them is the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. For any candidate
attitude, there are cases in which you ought to have that attitude towards
an object (or pair of objects) even though that object is not valuable (or the
value relation does not hold). For example, if some disaster occurs unless you
are pleased about a cup of mud, you arguably ought to be pleased about that
cup of mud – but that does not make it valuable.22 So proponents of an FA-
account need some story about when a reason to have the relevant attitudes
is of the right kind to define value. A second prominent objection to FA-
accounts is the Circularity Objection. The objection is that it is not possible
to find a relevant set of attitudes that are indeed fitting to have towards what
is valuable, and that are not itself evaluative judgments (which would render
the account circular).23 A third worry is that normative ethics and value
theory should primarily be concerned with what we ought to do, or perhaps
what kind of people we ought to be, but not with what attitudes it would be
fitting to have – when it would be fitting to feel guilty or pleased, saddened,
disappointed or regretful. If those are matters of ethics, the argument goes,
they are surely marginal. And it seems that on FA-accounts, axiologies are
ultimately theories about that.24
Moreover, there will be problems that arise specifically – or at least most
urgently – for strength-sensitive FA-accounts. One such problem is to moti-
vate the idea that there indeed are truths about which strength of attitudes
are fitting.25 We might call this the Truth Problem. One might be sceptical
22This example is due to Crisp (2000, 459); cf. also D’Arms and Jacobson (2000).
23Cf. Bykvist (2009a) for this objection.
24John Broome raised this objection in conversation.
25I thank Bastian Stern for pointing this out to me.
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about that, even if one generally accepts the existence of moral facts (in some
sense). For example, one might believe that it is a fact that pain is bad, and
perhaps even that a fitting response to pain is some negative attitude, but
doubt whether there are facts about how strong that negative attitude would
fittingly be. True, we may have intuitions about what strength of attitudes
are fitting: we may find some people oversensitive, and others rather too ap-
athetic. But perhaps there is a debunking argument against these intuitions:
if for some reason, all of mankind had always been more sensitive or more ap-
athetic than we are, we would presumably have different intuitions. Perhaps
the same debunking argument could not be given against the claim that pain
is bad, and perhaps not even against the claim that a fitting response to the
existence of pain is some negative attitude. So even if one finds FA-accounts
plausible, one might be sceptical about the relevant versions required for our
purposes.
I do not think that all these objections are sound, or devastating.26 But
this is not the place to address them. FA-accounts are popular enough, and
they remain a promising candidate for grounding Substantial Absolutism. So
let me investigate how such an account could be used to vindicate EVM.
3.4.2 Substantial Absolutism and EVM
Completeness and Continuity
Suppose a strength-sensitive FA-account is true, and explains the truth of
26I think that Schroeder (2010) has provided a convincing response to the Wrong Kind
of Reasons Problem. Moreover, as far as I see, the Circularity Objection raised in Bykvist
(2009a) simply reduces to an instance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem, and is also
answerable with Schroeder’s account.
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the Minimal Thesis (E). Obviously, in that case too positive facts about
intertheoretic comparisons hold among a large number of axiologies. But
what exactly is the status of Completeness and Continuity? Unfortunately,
strength-sensitive FA-accounts are very underexplored.27 And the general
picture that emerges from such an account might depend on its details –
e.g., the precise way in which strengths of attitudes are cashed out, or the
way in which incommensurability is understood. So again, much of the fol-
lowing will have to be somewhat speculative. But let me offer some general
considerations that I think should be true on any plausible strength-sensitive
FA-account.
To see whether Completeness and Continuity are plausible, we need to
ask again how many, or what kind of axiologies there exist under such an
account. And I think we can answer that question by considering the set
of pluralist axiologies on which there are two different sorts of value. If an
FA-account is true, these pluralist axiologies must imply facts about what
attitudes are fitting towards these two values. And for each such pluralist
axiology, there will be two non-pluralist axiologies that each accept only one
of the two values that the pluralist axiology accepts, and imply the same
fitting attitudes with respect to these values as the pluralist axiology does.
If fitting attitudes reflect value comparisons, then these axiologies should
compare in the same way in which the two separate value-orderings compare
according to the pluralist axiology. So we can learn about how axiologies
can compare under this form of Substantial Absolutism by looking at what
27Though cf. e.g. Rabinowicz (2008; 2012).
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possible pluralist axiologies there are.28
So what pluralist axiologies are there? Presumably, for any two values,
there should be complete pluralist axiologies according to which these two
values are fully comparable. That is, a strength-sensitive FA-account should
allow for the existence of such theories. If it did not, our very account of value
would have the substantial implication that there must be value incommen-
surability (or that there cannot be pluralist axiologies), which would be very
unfortunate. Consequently, it seems that for any two orderings there will be
axiologies implying these orderings that are fully comparable. That will be
axiologies that imply the same attitudes with respect to these values as the
respective complete pluralist axiologies do. With respect to these axiologies,
the u-value relation is indeed complete.
However, there should also be non-complete pluralist axiologies on which
the two values are less than fully comparable. By the same reasoning as
above, for any two orderings, there will thus be versions of these orderings
that are less than fully comparable. With respect to these axiologies, the
u-value relation is not complete. In fact, presumably, there should also be
non-complete pluralist axiologies on which the two values are radically incom-
28I do not mean to suggest that there is a principled distinction between pluralist and
non-pluralist axiologies. Perhaps almost any non-uniform axiology could be understood
as pluralist, accepting the separate values of x, of y, of z, and so on. This only makes the
above argument more general.
Nonetheless, there are axiologies that may not naturally be combinable into a plural-
ist axiology. For example, if ordering i is a sort of extension of j that accepts more
valuable outcomes (in the sense in which standard utilitarianism is an extension of an-
thropocentric utilitarianism), there may be no natural third axiology which accepts ‘both’
values. However, in that case, we can simply consider bridging-orderings k with some
third value (like beauty, say) and apply the above reasoning. We can look at how pluralist
axiologies can combine the orderings i and k, as well as the orderings k and j , and
thus learn how theories implying the orderings i and j can compare. For convenience,
I consider only the simple case above.
133
parable (like the art/philosophy theory I considered in section 3.2.1). Those
axiologies may be less plausible, but it should be possible to state them con-
sistently, and thus they should exist. Consequently, for any two orderings,
there will also be versions of these orderings that are fully incomparable.
With respect to these axiologies, the u-value relation is radically incomplete.
So if all of this is true, then under a strength-sensitive FA-account, it is false
that U satisfies Completeness. It satisfies Completeness only with respect
to the restricted class of fully comparable axiologies.
This would not be a practically significant restriction for the Expected
Value Theorem if it was plausible that we should have credence only in axi-
ologies that are fully comparable. So this raises the question which versions
of each ordering we should have credence in. One answer would be that there
is a general principle about what the most plausible versions of each ordering
are. In fact, we could again invoke something like the Idea of Equal Say, or
something like Best/Worst Normalisation. For example, we could claim that
if you find T1 the most plausible version of total utilitarianism, you should
have credence only in versions of the other orderings on which the best and
worst conceivable outcomes are equally as good and bad as they are on T1.
But I think that this is implausible. The reasons I gave for the Idea
of Equal Say under Comparativism do not support an equivalent principle
about what the most plausible axiologies are corresponding to each ordering.
The present question is a matter of first-order axiology. And if we give a
particular axiology only little credence, that is not (necessarily) to be biased
against that axiology or against its ordering, let alone does it make our
theory of u-value biased. And neither does our theory of u-value become less
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simple or parsimonious if we suppose that there is no such principle. Under
Absolutism, our theory of u-value is simply EVM, and does not include an
additional, independent weighing-principle like under Comparativism.
So if a strength-sensitive FA-account is true, I take it, it is implausible
that there is such a general equal-say-principle about what our credences
should be. Instead, a more particularist view will be plausible. For exam-
ple, it will seem reasonable to believe that compared to the most plausible
version of anthropocentric utilitarianism, the most plausible version of total
utilitarianism simply posits more value in the world. That is, it will seem
reasonable to believe that if animal wellbeing in addition to human wellbeing
had value, that would not change the importance of human welfare (i.e., the
attitudes that would be fitting towards it). And it will seem less reasonable
to believe that if animal wellbeing had value, that would lessen the value of
human welfare precisely to the extent so that the best and worst conceivable
outcomes become equally good and bad as on anthropocentric utilitarianism.
The question about which versions of each ordering we should have credence
in seems to become similar to the question about how these orderings would
most plausibly combine into a pluralist axiology.
Suppose that this is true. Then it does seem that we should have con-
siderable credence in axiologies that are less than fully comparable – just
as non-complete pluralist axiologies are plausible. As I mentioned on page
117, if both beauty and wellbeing have value, it seems plausible that these
values are less than fully comparable. Similarly, I take it, the most plausible
versions of the orderings on which only beauty and only wellbeing have value
need not be fully comparable either. So the Completeness assumption of the
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Expected Value Theorem is arguably a very significant restriction. At least
under Absolutism, is important to explore axiomatisations of the u-value re-
lation without the Completeness axiom. That will be the task for chapter
5.
Unfortunately, the theorem I shall introduce in chapter 5 does not cover
theories that are fully incomparable. In a very restricted sense, it will still
feature something like a Completeness condition. To that extent, even the
scope of the theorem in chapter 5 will be restricted. It will not apply to
theories that are fully incomparable, even though under Absolutism, such
theories seem to exist. However, I take it that even if fully incomparable
axiologies exist, they are an extreme case, and comparatively very implausible
– just like pluralist axiologies that posit radical incommensurability. In this
sense, the restriction of the theorem in chapter 5 will at least be less severe
than that of the Expected Value Theorem.
How about the Continuity condition? We can again apply the same rea-
soning as above. Presumably, for any two values, there should be possible
pluralist axiologies on which one of the two values dominates the other lex-
ically. Accordingly, for any two orderings, there will be versions of these
orderings that compare lexically. With respect to these axiologies, the u-
value relation is not continuous.
Unfortunately, as with fully incomparable axiologies, the theorem in chap-
ter 5 will not apply to theories that compare in a lexical way. It will still
feature a Continuity condition. So this is another respect in which even that
theorem’s scope will be restricted. However, axiologies that lexically domi-
nate others or are lexically dominated by them also seem to be an extreme
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case, and comparatively very implausible – like pluralist axiologies that posit
lexical dominance among values. So in this respect too, the restriction of the
theorem in chapter 5 will be less severe than that imposed by Completeness.29
Fitting Attitudes and Cardinal Value
If these considerations were sound, then under an FA-account, there are axi-
ologies that are fully comparable, and for which the Completeness condition
of the Expected Value Theorem will hold. Let me thus elaborate at this
point on how EVM, as restricted to these axiologies, could be axiomatised.
This will then also suggest how the result from chapter 5 could be applied
to an FA-account.
As I emphasised in section 2.1, EVM presupposes a cardinal concept of
intertheoretic comparisons. In order to explain what EVM means, we have
to know what it means that the value difference between x and y, according
to Ti, is n times as great as the value difference between z and t, according
to Tj. So if something along the lines of an FA-account should explain our
concept of value, we would have to ensure that it provides a cardinal struc-
29On the other hand, note that implausible and extreme as fully incomparable and
lexically comparing theories are, they present interesting philosophical problems. Prima
facie, it seems that we should not have zero credence in such theories. And prima facie,
it seems that if we have some nonzero credence in such theories, they should affect the
u-value relation very radically: if a theory is fully incomparable to all our other axiologies,
and has nonzero probability, that should lead to massive and widespread incompleteness
in the u-value relation; and if a theory lexically dominates all our other axiologies, and has
nonzero probability, it should effectively swamp the u-value relation completely. But prima
facie, it seems implausible that the u-value relation is so very incomplete, or dominated
by one theory. Similar problems arguably arise under Comparativism, once we take into
account uncertainty about the true facts about comparisons. It is not clear to me what
the solutions to these problems are. They resemble other paradoxes in decision theory
that arise, roughly speaking, due to infinity or unbounded utility functions. In this thesis,
I ignore all these problems; I ignore the extreme axiologies that would give rise to them.
(Cf. e.g. MacAskill (2013) for a discussion.)
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ture. We arguably have no unmediated understanding of what it means that
one attitude is, say, 3, or 3.5, or 5 times as strong as another.
Whether or how it is possible to supply an FA-account with cardinality
depends on precisely what kind of FA-account would be true (if any). A
first suggestion might be that there is some quantitative empirical state that
allows for a cardinal concept of the strength of attitudes. For example,
perhaps there is a particular region in the brain where neurons generally
fire when we feel regret; and perhaps if we feel more regret then more such
regret-neurons fire. If so, we could assume that axiologies imply claims about
precisely how many regret-neuron firings would be fitting in different cases;
and we could explicate intra- and intertheoretic comparisons in terms of that.
For example, that the value difference between x and y, according to Ti, is
twice as great as the value difference between z and t, according to Tj could
mean, say, that the number of regret-neuron firings that would be fitting if
Ti was true and y rather than x was brought about is twice as great as the
number of regret-neuron firings that would be fitting if Tj was true and t
rather than z was brought about.
However, I am sceptical about that. For one thing, emotions like regret
are extremely complicated patterns. Being deeply and intensely regretful
does not mean having a one-time flush of some bodily feeling. If regret is
to be distinguished from a mere sad mood, for example, it should arguably
include certain cognitive attitudes – say, beliefs of the form ‘this was bad’,
or something of the sort. Furthermore, regret arguably also includes certain
behavioural dispositions, and these can come in extremely diverse forms –
e.g., as attempts to rectify things, to apologise, to comfort, and so on. And
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even if there is a feeling that accompanies regret, being more deeply regretful
about an event need not mean having a more intense episode of that feeling.
It might mean revisiting that event more frequently in one’s mind, revisiting
it for a longer period, having the relevant behavioural dispositions more
strongly, and so on. Or more precisely still: different people regret very
differently. In some, regret will manifest in their active engagement with the
event; in others, it will manifest in their evading any thought and memory
of it. And similar points seem to apply to all plausible candidate attitudes.
Hence I doubt whether it is possible to find a quantitative measure – such as
neuron firings – that captures our intuitive understanding of their intensity
even roughly.
For another thing, even if that were possible, the above-mentioned Truth
Problem would arguably be all the more serious if we had to assume that
axiologies imply facts about (say) the numbers of neuron firings that are
fitting. Even if one generally accepts the existence of moral facts, it seems
difficult to believe that there could be truths about that. So I am sceptical
about explicating comparisons by means of some quantitative empirical state.
A second suggestion would be to explicate cardinal intra- and intertheo-
retic comparisons by means of an intuitive comparative notion of the strength
of attitudes. While we have no unmediated understanding of what it means
that one attitude is 3, or 5 times as strong as another, we arguably do have
at least some understanding of what it means that one attitude is stronger
than another. For example, it seems clearly true that if you regret some event
by weeping and mourning for ten days then your regret is stronger than if
you regret that event by briefly thinking ‘what a pity’. So while our under-
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standing of attitudes will not directly give us a cardinal concept of value, it
might directly give us a comparative concept of value differences – that is, a
ranking of value differences according to their size. And as I mentioned in
section 2.4.3, under some conditions difference comparability among a set X
is enough to yield cardinal measurability. So if these conditions hold, then
the truth of a relevant FA-account, paired with a relevant comparative notion
of the strength of attitudes, will allow us to explicate cardinal intratheoretic
comparisons without the help of decision theory. And by the same token,
they would allow us to explicate cardinal intertheoretic comparisons, without
the help of decision theory.
However, it is a large and difficult question whether that is indeed possible.
On the one hand, the formal question about the conditions under which
difference comparability is sufficient for cardinal measurability seems very
underexplored; as far as I see, the question of when the two are equivalent is
still open.30 On the other hand, and more importantly, it is not clear whether
we really do have a comparative understanding of the strength of attitudes
that is rich enough to meet the relevant conditions.
To see the difficulties that will arise here, consider a condition introduced
by Kaushik Basu. Basu (1983, 197) proved that if an ordering of a set X
of outcomes can be represented by a utility function u : X → R such that
the image u(X) of X under u is dense in a connected subset of R, then
the ability to compare all differences of utility is equivalent to cardinality.
In our context, this formal condition will only help to construct a cardinal
intertheoretic concept of value if our comparative notion of the strength of
30As of 2005, this is stated in Bossert et al. (2005, 35).
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attitudes is fine enough, and if axiologies indeed imply the relevant truths, to
allow for difference comparability in a space of alternatives with utilities that
are dense in a connected subset of R. And it is not at all clear whether that
is the case. To compare utility differences in R (or a set that is dense in a
connected subset of it), I take it, our notion of the strength of attitudes would
itself have to involve some variable that varies on a real-valued scale. For
example, we would have to measure the strength of attitudes by the length
of time for which they are felt. However, time is not the only variable that
determines strength of attitudes. For example, a period of deep mourning
can intuitively be a stronger form of regret than a slightly longer period of the
comparatively unaffected thought ‘what a pity’. So we would need a second
variable for the intensity of regret. But as I just argued, it is doubtful whether
we have one – whether, say, we could measure intensity by the numbers of
neuron firings. And again, the richer the required truths about attitudes
become, the more dubious it arguably is that there could be truths of that
kind.31
It might be a valuable research project to explore the possible details of
strength-sensitive FA-accounts. But this project is beyond the scope of this
thesis. So I shall not rely on the assumption that we can explicate a cardinal
intertheoretic concept of value via fitting attitudes alone.
31One might argue that this is only a difficulty about precise comparisons, that we
certainly do have an understanding of rougher differences in attitude strength, and that
with respect to them, we should at least get rough cardinal comparisons. This would
require a formal theorem providing a cardinal structure from an incomplete ordering of
differences, and I am not aware of such a theorem. But more importantly, as I mentioned
on page 133, our general account of value should allow for the possibility that all options
and outcomes are fully comparable, and not have the substantial implication that there
must be incommensurability.
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However, it is worth mentioning a third proposal. Suppose that an FA-
account is true, and that axiologies imply certain facts about fitting strengths
of attitudes, but that they do so only in a very rough manner, which does
not directly provide a cardinal notion of strength, nor a relevant comparative
notion of strength rich enough to imply cardinality. For example, suppose
axiologies imply facts of the form ‘if y rather than x was brought about,
it is fitting to feel a mild form of regret’, or a ‘strong form of regret’, or a
‘very strong form of regret’. In that case, it will very often be indeterminate
whether a given instance of regret is fitting or not. But now suppose that
our axiologies nevertheless enter the u-value relation in a specific way, and
that this u-value relation satisfies the conditions of the Expected Value The-
orem. As far as I see, if the rough facts about attitudes are consistent with
the decision-theoretic explication – in a manner I shall spell out presently –
we could then explicate cardinal intertheoretic comparisons by means of the
decision-theoretic explication, even if an FA-account is true. We might then
say that it is facts about attitudes that explain why the u-value relation is not
radically incomplete, or that ultimately ‘ground’ intertheoretic comparisons;
but these comparisons nonetheless acquire their cardinal significance in the
context of weighing axiologies under uncertainty. We could use the decision-
theoretic explication as a kind of sharpening of the notion of value implied by
our intuitive notion of attitudes alone. Given the above-mentioned difficul-
ties of any richer FA-account, this might ultimately be the most promising
proposal.
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Fitting Attitudes and the Expected Value Theorem
In any case, if a fitting attitude account is true, and it is fitting attitudes
that ultimately ground intertheoretic comparisons, then the conditions of the
Expected Value Theorem are not enough to imply EVM. Whatever precisely
the structure and richness of the entailed attitudes: for all that the Expected
Value Theorem says, the facts about attitudes might not be consistent with
EVM. For example, suppose that the u-value relation is such that, according
to the decision-theoretic explication, the value difference between x and y,
according to Ti, is smaller than the value difference between z and t, according
to Tj, but that, if Ti is correct and y rather than x was brought about, it
is fitting to weep and mourn for ten days, and if Tj is correct and t rather
than z was brought about, it would be fitting to think briefly that that is
a pity. If it is fitting attitudes that ultimately explain why theories imply
facts about an intertheoretic scale, then that would would mean that EVM
is false and some form of weighted EVM is true (in which Tj is given more
weight than Ti). So if an FA-account is true, and we want to ensure on an
axiomatic basis that EVM rather than some form of weighted EVM is true,
we have to add additional conditions to the Expected Value Theorem.
Whatever precisely the structure and richness of the entailed attitudes are,
the following two principles will do. Let a0.5(i,x)+0.5(j,y) in Q be the option
that leads with equal probability to x while Ti is true, or to y while Tj is
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true:
a0.5(i,x)+0.5(j,y)(i, x) = 0.5,
a0.5(i,x)+0.5(j,y)(j, y) = 0.5. (3.2)
Let favouring attitudes for x over y be attitudes that are fitting if x is better
than y (such as hoping that x rather than y will be brought about). And let
favouring attitudes towards x be attitudes that are fitting if x is good (such
as taking pleasure in x), and disfavouring attitudes towards x be attitudes
that are fitting if x is bad (such as being sad about x). To secure consistency
with respect to unit comparisons, we could then state the
Dyadic Attitude Principle: Suppose that ax i ay and az j at. If
the favouring attitudes it is fitting to have for x over y if Ti is true are
stronger than the favouring attitudes it is fitting to have for z over t if Tj
is true, then a0.5(i,x)+0.5(j,t) U a0.5(i,y)+0.5(j,z); if they are equally strong,
then a0.5(i,x)+0.5(j,t) ∼U a0.5(i,y)+0.5(j,z).
Similarly, to secure consistency with respect to level comparisons, we could
state the
Monadic Attitude Principle: If the favouring attitudes it is fitting to
have towards x if Ti is true are stronger than the favouring attitudes it
is fitting to have towards y if Tj is true, or if the respective disfavouring
attitudes are weaker, then a(i,x) U a(j,y); if they are equally strong, then
a(i,x) ∼U a(j,y).
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We could add these two principles to the Expected Value Theorem. If we do,
and if the conditions of this extended theorem are true, facts about attitudes
cannot contradict EVM, whatever precisely their structure and richness.32
3.4.3 Non-Substantial Absolutism
In the previous two sections, I have explored what I called Substantial Ab-
solutism. FA-accounts give rise to Substantial Absolutism, because if a
strength-sensitive FA-account is true, there is something substantial, inde-
pendent of the u-value relation that determines value-facts on an intertheo-
retic scale – viz., facts about fitting attitudes. So as a final general proposal,
let me now elaborate on the idea of a non-substantial absolutist account.
The Idea of Non-Substantial Absolutism
Very roughly, the idea of Non-Substantial Absolutism is that everything is
like Substantial Absolutism says, except that there is nothing ‘substantial’,
32To see this, suppose we have a comparative notion of the strength of attitudes and a set
of outcomes that are rich enough so that our ability to make difference comparisons implies
unique crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons: that is, the relevant facts about
attitudes concerning outcomes imply a theory-dependent utility function u(·, ·), unique
up to positive affine transformation. As we know from the Expected Value Theorem, its
conditions will also imply a theory-dependent utility function v(·, ·), unique up to positive
affine transformation. Moreover, note that given the above principles, v must respect all
the unit and level comparisons that our facts about attitudes imply. So in effect, the
u-value relation between the options a0.5(i,x)+0.5(j,t) and a0.5(i,y)+0.5(j,z), and a(i,x) and
a(j,y), would be enough to determine v up to positive affine transformation, just as our
facts about attitudes are enough to determine u. And since the relevant difference and
level comparisons will be the same, v must be a positive affine transformation of u.
Suppose instead that we do not have a comparative notion of the strength of attitudes
rich enough to yield cardinal measurability. Then again, given the Attitude Principles,
the utility function v implied by the conditions of Expected Value Theorem must respect
all the difference and level comparisons that our facts about attitudes imply. So we could
use that function as a kind of sharpening of the notion of value implied by our intuitive
notion of attitudes.
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independent of the u-value relation, in which facts about the heights of value
levels or sizes of value differences are manifested. Intuitively, we replicate
all the claims of Substantial Absolutism, but without its extra substantial
baggage. So on Non-Substantial Absolutism – as on Substantial Absolutism
– an axiology not only says which prospects are better than which, but also
how good these prospects are, or how much better they are than others, on
an intertheoretic scale. Consequently, there are again infinitely many the-
ories corresponding to each ordering. For example, intuitively, there is the
view that only beauty has value, and that this value is important (on an in-
tertheoretic scale); and there is the different view that only beauty has value,
but that its value is comparatively insignificant (on an intertheoretic scale).
These axiologies weigh differently in the u-value relation. And indeed, on
Non-Substantial Absolutism, there are no other facts in which these facts
about the heights of value level and sizes of value differences would be man-
ifested, independently of the u-value relation. That the value of beauty is
important on one such axiology and unimportant on another, does not imply,
say, that certain attitudes are fitting according to one but not the other. It
only implies that these axiologies weigh differently in determining u-value.
This raises the question whether, understood non-substantively, Abso-
lutism collapses into Comparativism. As I introduced it, the distinction
between these two views is that under Comparativism, axiologies are merely
orderings and the facts about their comparisons are independent facts; under
Absolutism, axiologies themselves make claims about how they compare, and
there are infinitely many axiologies corresponding to each ordering.
However, suppose Comparativism is true. Then, in principle, there are
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infinitely many possible ways in which any of our axiological orderings might
compare to any other, just as there are infinitely many versions of each ax-
iological ordering if Absolutism is true. And even if one way of comparing
two axiologies is in some sense the true one, we might (or indeed should)
be uncertain about which that is. So once we take this kind of uncertainty
into account, then under Comparativism, there is ultimately not only the
question about which ordering is true, but also the question about how our
orderings weigh against each other to determine u-value, and possible un-
certainty about both. Moreover, note that if Non-Substantial Absolutism is
true, then there is ultimately no meaningful question outside the context of
axiological uncertainty that determines which version of an ordering is true.
In that sense, under Non-Substantial Absolutism too there is ultimately only
the question about which ordering is true, and the question about how these
orderings weigh against each other to determine u-value.
So in principle, once we take into account uncertainty about the true com-
parisons under Comparativism, everything that can be expressed in non-
substantial absolutist terms can also be expressed in comparativist terms,
and vice versa. For example, the (comparativist) view that axiological or-
derings enter the u-value relation by satisfying the Best/Worst Comparison
Principle could be expressed as the (non-substantial absolutist) view that if
you find T1 the most plausible version of total utilitarianism, you should have
credence only in versions of the other orderings on which the best and worst
conceivable outcomes are equally good and bad as they are on T1. Similarly,
the (non-substantial absolutist) view that if you find T1 the most plausible
version of total utilitarianism, you should find that version of anthropocentric
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utilitarianism most plausible on which the value of human wellbeing is the
same as on T1, could be expressed as the (comparativist) view that the total
and anthropocentric utilitarian orderings enter the u-value relation in such a
way that human wellbeing is given the same weight for both orderings.
However, if my previous considerations were sound, there does remain a
distinction. The comparativist and the absolutist way of thinking will have
different normative implications. As I mentioned in section 3.3.2, if we really
do think of comprehensive theories of value as being merely orderings, the
Idea of Equal Say seems plausible. If a comprehensive theory of the good only
says which options are better than which, and there is some independent fact
about how orderings enter the u-value relation, it seems plausible that this
fact is some general principle, on which (apart from their probabilities) all
orderings somehow get equal weight. But as I suggested in the last section, if
we think of a comprehensive theory of value as having to say something about
how important that value is, the idea of giving each ordering ‘equal say’ in
our credence distribution according to some general principle will become less
plausible. A more particularist view will seem more plausible. It will seem
reasonable to believe that if animal wellbeing in addition to human wellbeing
had value, that would not change the importance of human welfare. And it
will seem less reasonable to believe, say, that if animal wellbeing had value,
that would lessen the value of human welfare precisely to the extent so that
the best and worst conceivable outcomes become equally good and bad as
on anthropocentric utilitarianism.
I think that this distinction remains intact even under Non-Substantial
Absolutism, and hence that there remains a distinction even between Non-
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Substantial Absolutism and Comparativism. Even though, in principle, ev-
erything that can be expressed in non-substantial absolutist terms can also
be expressed in comparativist terms and vice versa, the two pictures seem to
have different normative implications.33
By the same token, I take it that the status of Completeness and Con-
tinuity under Non-Substantial Absolutism is the same as their status under
Substantial Absolutism. Even under Non-Substantial Absolutism, there will
be theories that are less than fully comparable – theories that do not en-
ter a complete u-value relation. And indeed, even under Non-Substantial
Absolutism, there should be possible axiologies that are fully incomparable,
and others that compare in a lexical way. The latter two sorts of axiologies
will again be very extreme, and comparatively implausible. But less than
fully comparable axiologies will not be implausible. So it remains important
to explore axiomatisations of the u-value relation without the Completeness
axiom, even under Non-Substantial Absolutism. Fortunately, however, with
regards to the theories that are fully comparable, the Expected Value The-
orem provides a perfect axiomatisation of Non-Substantial Absolutism. We
cannot make the theorem more informative (as with comparativist accounts),
nor do we have to insure consistency with independent facts about compar-
isons (as with substantial absolutist accounts).
33Of course, we could also simply introduce a new conceptual distinction, and distin-
guish the (normative) view that there is a general Equal-Say-principle by definition from
the (normative) view that there is no such principle. However, it seems to me that the
disagreement between those views is not simply a normative disagreement, perhaps like
that between Best/Worst Normalisation and Variance Normaliation; instead, it seems that
the Idea of Equal Say and the particularist view stem from fundamentally different ways
of thinking about intertheoretic comparisons and axiologies. I have tried to capture this
more fundamental distinction, which, I think, gives rise to these two different normative
views. So I shall stick to this terminology.
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The Plausibility of Non-Substantial Absolutism
Clearly, we can defend Non-Substantial Absolutism against MacAskill’s worry
and the arbitrariness objection by the same arguments that I gave in section
3.3. To that extent, it does not have a disadvantage over Comparativism.
Personally, I find Absolutism much more plausible than Comparativism.
I think the idea that the most plausible version of total utilitarianism posits
more value in the world than the most plausible version of anthropocentric
utilitarianism, with the value of human welfare being the same on both the-
ories, is very compelling. In fact, I think the Idea of Equal Say that seems
plausible conditional on Comparativism has very unfortunate implications.
Take total utilitarianism (TTU) and ethical egoism, the agent-relative view,
roughly, that (relative to me) a world is better than another if I am better off
in it (TE).
34 And consider the options of either inflicting a significant pain
on me, or inflicting the same pain on 100’000 people. Note that, compared
to the total number of sentient beings, the wellbeing of these 100’000 people
is vanishingly insignificant according to TTU ; but according to TE, my well-
being is all that matters. So under the Idea of Equal Say, my wellbeing (on
TE) matters enormously, as compared to the wellbeing of these people (on
TTU). Presumably, on any standard interpretation of the Idea of Equal Say,
even if the probability of TTU is 100’000, or a million times greater than that
of TE, it would be u-better to torture these people, if we take into account
only these two views. I find this implausible. And although we could also
34I thank William MacAskill for suggesting to use the example of ethical egoism in this
argument.
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accept Comparativism and a particularist view about the comparison-facts
to avoid this conclusion, it seems that this will be less plausible than simply
accepting Absolutism.
The obvious advantage of Non-Substantial Absolutism over Substantial
Absolutism is that it does not suffer from the problems arising for any spe-
cific version of Substantial Absolutism, such as the problems of the relevant
FA-accounts. So although I take both Comparativism and Substantial Ab-
solutism to be more plausible than the denial of the Minimal Thesis (E), I
think Non-Substantial Absolutism may ultimately be the most convincing
solution to the problem of intertheoretic comparisons. For this reason, in the
remainder of this thesis, I shall assume Non-Substantial Absolutism unless
otherwise indicated.
3.5 Further Explorations: Social Choice The-
ory
As I mentioned in section 3.2, some people believe that the u-value relation
may be complete even if not all axiologies are fully comparable. For example,
some people have endorsed My Favourite Theory on the basis of scepticism
about intertheoretic comparisons. I have argued that if intertheoretic com-
parisons are impossible, the u-value relation should be radically incomplete.
But the inference from scepticism to My Favourite Theory seems popular;
and clearly, I have not provided a knock-down argument against it. So as a
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further exploration beyond the theory I have been outlining, it is worth in-
vestigating their alternative view in some detail. Doing so will be something
of a digression from my main argument. But it will shed light on possible
relationships between claims about intertheoretic comparability on the one
hand, and claims about the u-value relation on the other. And so I think it
is worth pursuing.
This is particularly so because we can use an existing formal framework
to do this on an axiomatic basis. In this case, the framework is not from de-
cision theory but from social choice theory. As I mentioned on page 99, there
is a close analogue in social choice theory to the problem of intertheoretic
comparisons – viz., the question whether, or to what extent, the wellbeing
enjoyed by one person can be compared to that enjoyed by another. And
there are many results about how the social preference relation depends on
the measurability and comparability of wellbeing. So it is these results that I
shall use to explore the relationship between different theories of axiological
uncertainty and different accounts of intertheoretic comparability. Section
3.5.1 will set up the formal framework. Section 3.5.2 will then provide ax-
iomatisations of My Favourite Theory and of the view that an option is
u-better than another if it has the greater weighted value.
3.5.1 The Formal Framework
One standard framework for exploring measurability and comparability con-
straints in social choice theory is this. There is a set of individuals {1, ..., n}
and a set of options X . It is assumed that each individual i has a real-valued
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welfare function Wi(·), defined on X , representing the individual’s preference
ordering over X . An n-tuple {Wi} of personal welfare functions is called a
profile. A social welfare functional F is a function from the set of profiles
to the complete orderings on X . It specifies exactly one social preference
ordering R for a given profile, or n-tuple {Wi}:
RW = F ({Wi}). (3.3)
The basic question is about the form of the functional F .
In the obvious analogy with our context, individual welfare functions cor-
respond to value-functions of axiologies, and the social preference ordering
corresponds to the u-value ordering. But there is also an important disanal-
ogy. In social choice theory, it is most often assumed that an individual i
may have a number of different preference orderings. This is to assume that
the relevant functional is defined for multiple different profiles; so this gen-
eral approach is called the multi-profile approach. Indeed, the results I shall
employ assume that the domain of a social welfare functional is universal –
that the functional yields an ordering R for any possible profile. Intuitively,
this means that the functional is defined for any welfare function that any
individual i may have.
This interpretation makes conceptual sense because we can individuate
people independently of their preference ordering or welfare function. One
and the same individual may have different preference orderings, so we can
take the indexes i as referring to specific individuals. However, the same
is not true in our context. We cannot let an index i refer to a particular
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axiology, and assume that u-value relations are defined for any value ordering
or function that this very same axiology may imply. The reason is that one
and the same theory cannot imply different value-orderings. So we cannot
interpret the mathematical indexes i as referring to specific axiologies.
However, I think there is a different interpretation for this framework.
Instead of assuming that an index i refers to a specific theory, I shall assume
that it corresponds to a fixed probability. Just like each individual can have
different preference orderings, each probability can naturally be associated
with different value orderings. So this interpretation will make conceptual
sense. It means that our results will not concern a fixed, finite set of theories,
but instead a fixed, finite set of probabilities. In the first instance, they
will thus be results about one given probability distribution. But since the
specific underlying probability distribution will be irrelevant in our results,
they then generalise to results about any arbitrary probability distribution
over any arbitrary (finite) set of axiologies.35
To formalise these results, let X be a finite set of options, and P a finite
set of probabilities, labelled 1, ..., n. I shall assume that n ≥ 2, and that there
are at least three options, |X | ≥ 3. For each i, axiologies with the probability
35It might be worth mentioning that there is an alternative framework in social choice
theory, the so-called single-profile approach, where each individual is assumed to have
a single fixed preference ordering. If we apply this framework to our context, we can
simply replace individuals with axiologies. In that sense, it might be somewhat more
natural for our purposes than the multi-profile framework. However, to make up for
the loss of formal structure, this single profile approach has to make comparatively strong
assumptions about the set of options X . It is not clear to me which framework is ultimately
preferable for the theory of axiological uncertainty. Fortunately, there is a general method
for converting results from the multi-profile framework into the single-profile framework.
(Cf. particularly Roberts (1980b).) As far as I see, that would be possible for all results
that I state. But for reasons of space I shall not do that in this thesis. So since I find
the multi-profile framework viable, and since the multi-profile results will in any case be
necessary to establish their single-profile analogues, I state my results in this framework.
154
labelled i are represented by real-valued value-functions Vi(·), defined on X .
A u-value-functional F is a function from the set of all n-tuples {Vi} of
value-functions to the complete u-value orderings on X . It specifies exactly
one u-value ordering V for any given n-tuple {Vi} (given the probability
distribution at hand). I shall write
V = F ({Vi}), (3.4)
and similarlyV ′= F ({V ′i }) for the relation induced by some different n-tuple
of value-functions {V ′i }. The respective strict u-betterness relation, and the
equally-as-u-good relation, will be denoted by ‘V ’ and ‘∼V ’ respectively.
So put thus, the u-value relations V are relative to the underlying n-
tuples {Vi} of value-functions associated with the probabilities. But we can
generalise the u-value relation. To that end, let L be the set of all possi-
ble n-tuples of value-functions, and assume that the domain of our u-value-
functional is this entire set:
Unrestricted Domain (U): The domain of F is L.
This is certainly a desirable constraint. It would be unfortunate if there was
no plausible theory of axiological uncertainty that was general, in the sense
of being defined for any set of value-functions. Next, assume that if two
options are equally good according to all axiologies, they are equally u-good:
Pareto Indifference (PI): For any pair x, y and any n-tuple {Vi}, if
Vi(x) = Vi(y) for all i, then x ∼V y.
This too seems to be a very plausible assumption about u-value; in fact, the
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same idea was part of the Pareto Condition that I introduced in chapter 2.
Finally, suppose the u-value relation between any two options should depend
only on the values that these options have according to the axiologies under
consideration. The values of any other options should be irrelevant. That is:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (I): For any two n-tuples
{Vi} and {V ′i }, and for any pair x, y, if Vi(x) = V ′i (x) and Vi(y) = V ′i (y)
for all i, then x V y if and only if x V ′ y.
Though perhaps more controversial, I take it that this assumption too is at
least prima facie plausible. If all these conditions hold, then all the orderings
V can be represented by a single u-value relation  on Rn. That is, for
V (x) = (V1(x), ..., Vn(x)) we have
Theorem 3.1: If a u-value-functional F satisfies (U), then F satisfies
(PI) and (I) if and only if there exists an ordering  on Rn, such that for
all x and y in X , and for all n-tuples {Vi}, x V y ⇔ V (x)  V (y).
Moreover, if these conditions hold,  is unique.36
This means that, given (U), (PI) and (I), we need not restrict our attention to
the indexed relations V . Instead, we can focus on the more general relation
 on Rn. For the most part of this section, this is what I shall do.
So let me now introduce measurability and comparability assumptions into
this framework.37 The basic idea is simple: the specific extent to which value
is measurable or comparable determines a set of n-tuples {Vi} that are infor-
mationally equivalent. For example, suppose value is cardinally measurable
36This theorem is due to D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977, Lemma 3) and Hammond
(1979, Theorem 1).
37My exposition of these constraints closely follows Blackorby et al. (1984).
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on each axiology, and fully intertheoretically comparable. Then two n-tuples
{Vi} and {V ′i } reflect the same probability distribution over the same axi-
ologies if and only if one can be obtained from the other by subjecting each
Vi(·) to one and the same positive, affine transformation. If value is less
well measurable or comparable, the set of such informationally equivalent
n-tuples increases.
Our assumption will be that given cardinality and full comparability, say,
we can require that such informationally equivalent {Vi} and {V ′i } should
induce the same u-value ordering on X , i.e. that V ′ = V . Or rather, our
assumption will be that saying that value is cardinally measurable and fully
intertheoretically comparable means, perhaps among else, that such {Vi}
and {V ′i } induce the same u-value ordering. This is at least the underlying
assumption on this social choice approach. So we shall define a set Φ of in-
variance transformations φ = (φ1, ..., φn), from Rn to Rn, which specifies the
relationship between all informationally equivalent n-tuples: {Vi} and {V ′i }
are informationally equivalent if and only if they are related by an invariance
transformation in Φ – i.e. V (x) = φ(V ′(x)) = [φ1(V ′1(x)), ..., φn(V
′
n(x))] for
all x. And we shall require that all {Vi} and {V ′i } that are related by an
invariance transformation in Φ induce the same u-value relation. Specific
informational assumptions can then be expressed by defining the set Φ of
invariance transformation in specific ways. Again, the lesser the extent to
which value is measurable or comparable, the greater the set Φ, and thus the
grater the set of informationally equivalent {Vi} and {V ′i }.
In the presence of (U), (PI) and (I), such informational constraints will
impose structure on the general u-value relation . To see this, suppose {V ′}
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is obtained by applying the invariance transformation φ to {V }. If v = V (x)
and w = V (y), we have v′ = V ′(x) = φ(v) and w′ = V ′(y) = φ(w). Since
{V } and {V ′} are informationally equivalent, V and V ′ must rank x and
y in the same way. Thus the general u-value relation between v and w must
be identical with that between v′ and w′. We shall thus state the invariance
requirement formally as:
Invariance Requirement: For all v, v′, w, w′ ∈ Rn, if v′ = φ(v) and
w′ = φ(w) for some φ ∈ Φ, then v  w ⇔ v′  w′.
The constraint I have just characterised, of cardinally measurable and fully
comparable values, can now be specified as follows:
Cardinal Full Comparability (CF): φ ∈ Φ if and only if there are real
numbers a and b, b > 0, such that φi(t) = a+ bt for all i.
(CF) is an optimistic informational assumption; it renders the set of invari-
ance transformations comparatively small. In what follows, I shall consider
two more pessimistic assumptions than (CF). Our more pessimistic informa-
tional assumption will be
Cardinal Noncomparability (CN): φ ∈ Φ if and only if there are real
numbers ai and bi, bi > 0 for all i, such that φi(t) = ai + bit for all i.
If the set of invariance transformations is characterised by (CN), then value is
measurable cardinally within each axiology, and in no way comparable across
axiologies. This makes the set of invariance transformations relatively large.
Our more optimistic assumption will be that value is measurable cardinally
within each axiology, and unit-comparable across axiologies:
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Cardinal Unit-Comparability (CU):φ ∈ Φ if and only if there are real
numbers ai and b, b > 0, such that φi(t) = ai + bt for all i.
Many further constraints could be expressed in this manner. But for present
purposes this will do.
Before moving on, however, it might be worth emphasising the philosoph-
ical background assumptions of this framework. Note that we are assuming
that a u-value-functional F maps an n-tuple {Vi} to a complete binary rela-
tion on X . So in this framework, we are from the outset – irrespective of the
measurability and probability assumptions that we then impose – considering
only complete theories of u-value. We are simply assuming that the u-value
relation is complete. As I have argued, I find this assumption dubious. I
think that scepticism about intertheoretic comparisons should actually give
rise to incompleteness. But for the sake of argument, I am accepting this
alternative assumption now. So let me now turn to discussing how these
constraints vindicate different theories of axiological uncertainty.
3.5.2 My Favourite Theory and Weighted Value Max-
imisation
My Favourite Theory
To define My Favourite Theory for some credence distribution P , let M ⊂ P
refer to the set of maximal probabilities in P , i.e. the set of probabilities in
P that are at least as great as any other. This set may have more than one
member, if at least two theories both have maximal probability. For present
purposes, we shall define My Favourite Theory formally as
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My Favourite Theory: For some m ∈ M , and for all v, w ∈ Rn, if
vm > wm, then v  w.38
We shall derive this view from Cardinal Noncomparability. This will sub-
stantiate the abovementioned rationale behind My Favourite Theory, the ar-
gument from scepticism. The equivalent assumption in social choice theory
– i.e. the incomparability of wellbeing across people – figured prominently
in Kenneth Arrow’s (1963) impossibility result. And in fact, My Favourite
Theory is simply what Arrow called a ‘dictatorship’ – in our analogy, the dic-
tatorship of one probability. So to derive My Favourite Theory, we shall use
a version of Arrow’s (1963) impossibility result and turn it into a possibility
result for an Arrowian ‘dictatorship’.
As Arrow’s result showed, Noncomparability is a surprisingly strong as-
sumption. Only a few rather weak additional conditions are necessary to
derive a dictatorship from it. I have already introduced three of them, the
Unrestricted Domain condition, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and
Pareto Indifference. I now have to add a slightly different Pareto condition.
But it is again very weak and plausible:
Weak Pareto (WP): For all v, w ∈ Rn, if vi > wi for all i, then v  w.
Together with (U), (PI) and (I) and the relevant informational assumption,
(WP) suffices to imply the ‘dictatorship’ of one probability. So if we accept
all of these conditions, we have to accept that within each probability distri-
bution, there is one probability such that the axiology with that probability
38Note that, defined thus, My Favourite Theory is only a one-way implication; so the
present view is slightly different from how I understood ‘My Favourite Theory’ up to now.
But since the core idea is preserved, I shall refer to it with the same name.
160
comes to dominate u-value. So once we are thus far, a fairly weak final
assumption suffices to imply My Favourite Theory, viz.:
Anti-Improbabilism (AI): For all i ∈ P \M , there are v, w ∈ Rn, such
that wi > vi and v  w.
This condition requires that for each non-maximal probability, at least some
theory with that non-maximal probability does not always dominate u-value
against all other theories. So Anti-Improbabilism too is very plausible. The
only way to deny it is to assign to a non-maximal probability the kind of
dominance that My Favourite Theory assigns to the maximal probability.
This does not seem very attractive, and has never been suggested in the
literature. Given (AI), we can state
Theorem 3.2: If the u-value-functional F satisfies (U), (PI), and (I),
then the u-value relation  satisfies (WP), (AI) and (CN) if and only if
My Favourite Theory is true.39
This results spell out the formal relationship between scepticism about in-
tertheoretic comparisons and My Favourite Theory. It shows that, at least
given our framework, the transition from the former to the latter is indeed
compelling.
Note that, strictly speaking, we have now established this result only for
one underlying probability distribution P . But we have not made any as-
sumption about P . So our result naturally generalises to the whole set of
39Cf. Blackorby at al. (1984, Corollary 4.1) for the claim that, without (AI), the
conditions imply that for some i in H, if vi > wi, then v  w. (AI) straightforwardly
implies that this must be the case for some m ∈ M . In fact, Theorem 3.2 also holds if
we replace (CN) with Ordinal Noncomparability : φ ∈ Φ if and only if φi is an increasing
transformation for all i. Cf. Blackorby et al. (1984, Theorem 4.1).
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probability distributions over n axiologies: if u-value satisfies the axioms of
Theorem 3.2, then for any such probability distribution, My Favourite The-
ory is true. It is thus, then, generally true.
Weighted Value Maximisation
It is interesting to see the radical effects of introducing intertheoretic com-
parability. Consider now the type of view to which EVM belongs, viz.,
Weighted Value Maximisation: there is a vector a ∈ Rn+, with ai > 0
for some i, such that v  w if and only if ∑i aivi ≥∑i aiwi.
Note that My Favourite Theory is consistent with some forms of Weighted
Value Maximisation. More precisely, the borderline case in which only one
weight ai is strictly positive corresponds to My Favourite Theory. But the
family of weighted value maximising views is much broader. It also includes
views on which more than one theory is given a positive weight, and these are
important rivals to My Favourite Theory. In social choice theory, the equiv-
alent views are sometimes called ‘weighted’, or ‘generalised utilitarianism’.
They are forms of utilitarianism on which the welfare functions of different
individuals potentially have different weights.
If value is cardinally measurable and unit comparable, one additional con-
dition again suffices to axiomatise this family of theories. This condition is
a continuity axiom. Intuitively, it requires that, for any u, v and w in Rn, if
u  v, and v  w, any curve connecting u and w must cross the indifference
curve containing v; there are no sudden jumps from being u-better than v to
being u-worse than v. A formal way to require this is:
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Continuity (C): For all v ∈ Rn, {w ∈ Rn|w  v} and {w ∈ Rn|v  w}
are closed.
Given this axiom we can state
Theorem 3.3: If the u-value-functional F satisfies (U), (PI), and (I),
then the u-value relation  satisfies (WP), (C) and (CU) if and only if
Weighted Value Maximisation is true.40
Again, this result generalises over probability distributions, and the ax-
ioms imply that, for any probability distribution over axiologies, a form
of Weighted Value Maximisation must be true. So once unit comparisons
are allowed, these theories become very plausible. Note also that Weighted
Value Maximisation is consistent with (U), (PI), (I), (WP) and (AI). These
conditions, together with the relevant informational constraint, implied My
Favourite Theory. So in this sense, the difference between these views is im-
portantly a matter of our assumptions about the comparability of value.
Conclusion
In a sense, the theorems I have introduced were just examples. Many further
theorems could be proved in this way.41 Using the framework from social
choice theory, we can show formally how different theories of axiological un-
certainty can be derived from different assumptions about the measurability
and comparability of value.
40Cf. Blackorby et al. (1984, Theorem 7.1), also Roberts (1980a, Theorem 2).
41E.g., Blackorby et al. (1984) also derive a ‘lexicographic maximin rule’ from level
comparisons; this could be used to axiomatise a lexical form of risk aversion in our context.
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However, let me emphasise again that this entire section was premised on
an assumption that I ultimately find dubious. The present framework simply
assumed that the u-value relation is complete, irrespective of facts about
measurability and comparability. In contrast, I think that incomparability
should give rise to incompleteness. So even though the results in this section
explore an interesting space of possible views, in the next chapter, I shall
adopt my previous approach and framework again.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I first argued that there are at least some positive facts about
intertheoretic comparisons. I then explored two explanations of why these
facts hold.
According to comparativist accounts, axiologies are merely orderings, and
there are independent facts about how these orderings enter the u-value rela-
tion. I suggested that under this view, the Idea of Equal Say seems plausible,
and that this idea in turn plausibly implies that U satisfies Completeness
and Continuity. According to substantial or non-substantial absolutist ac-
counts, axiologies themselves make claims about the sizes of value differences
or heights of value levels on an intertheoretic scale. I suggested that under
this view, there should be theories that are less than fully comparable, as
well as theories that are fully incomparable or compare in a lexical way, even
though the latter two sorts of theories are extreme and comparatively im-
plausible. So ignoring these extreme theories, U will satisfy Continuity,
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but not Completeness. I outlined how specific comparativist and substantial
absolutist accounts could be axiomatised by extending the Expected Value







Before I go on to explore the possibility of an incomplete u-value relation,
there is another limitation of the Expected Value Theorem that I need to
address. In the Expected Value Theorem, the concept of a probability distri-
bution over axiologies figured as a primitive. More specifically, the options
over which the u-value relation ranges were defined as leading to particular
outcomes with particular probabilities, while different axiologies have par-
ticular, quantitatively specified probabilities of being true. So the concept
of a probability distribution over axiologies appeared as a primitive in the
very definition of these options: each option a in Q specifies an underlying
probability distribution over axiologies. Taking the concept of probabilities
for granted in this way was useful to focus on the other problems I have
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been discussing so far. Ultimately, however, it is unsatisfying. The theory
of axiological uncertainty should not take these probabilities as undefined
primitives. We need an account of what it means that an axiology has a par-
ticular probability. Or more precisely, we need an account of what it means
that an agent has a particular degree of belief in an axiology – or so I shall
argue. The present chapter addresses this problem. I shall call these degrees
of belief axiological credences, and shall speak of an axiological credence dis-
tribution accordingly. So the main question of this chapter is how can we
understand axiological credences for the purposes of EVM.
The nature of this question depends on what precisely axiologies are. If
an axiology is merely an ordering, the relevant question is how we can un-
derstand credences in orderings; if an axiology is an ordering together with
a claim about the heights of value levels or sizes of value differences on an
intertheoretic scale, the question is how we can understand credences in these
more complex theories. The answers to these questions might differ. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the problem of credences for each
account of axiologies. As I mentioned on page 150, I find the idea of Non-
Substantial Absolutism most plausible. Moreover, in a sense I shall explain
at the end of this chapter, the theory of Non-Substantial Absolutism is the
most general one, lending itself most readily to different interpretations and
specifications. So for most parts of this chapter, I shall ask this question
about credences specifically for Non-Substantial Absolutism.
To my knowledge, no author writing on normative uncertainty has ad-
dressed the problem of how to understand the relevant credences. Yet it is a
very important one. As it will emerge, our answer to it will have significant
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implications for the structure of our entire theory.
In line with my approach so far, I shall rely on a representation theorem to
understand axiological credences. In their heydays – culminating in Savage’s
Foundations of Statistics – the alleged ability of representation theorems to
provide a notion of credences may have been the pride of decision theory.
But recently, many philosophers have become very sceptical about these the-
orems. Many believe that representation theorems are neither necessary nor
sufficient for understanding credences – that we can understand the notion of
credences even without the help of these theorems, and that (even if we could
not) we could not understand them with the help of these theorems either.
In this chapter, I shall argue against both of these claims. I shall defend
the alternative view that representation theorems provide the best account
of credences, and thus that they can and should play an important role in
grounding EVM. In a way I shall explain, this in turn will have important
implications for the normative structure of EVM. So in sum, the primary
question of this chapter is what credences are. But at the core of it is an ar-
gument defending the use of representation theorems for understanding and
grounding EVM. And one of its most important upshots will be a conclusion
about the precise ways in which EVM can be normatively significant.
The chapter will proceed as follows. In section 4.1, I shall present some
alternative replies to the question of how to understand credences, and argue
that they are unsatisfying. This will provide a first motivation for looking at
representation theorems as a solution.
In section 4.2, I shall first give a brief general introduction into decision-
theoretic explications of credences. I shall then present an explication on the
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basis of a representation theorem from state-dependent utility theory, and
outline more fully than I have so far done, how – given this explication – my
theory of axiological uncertainty can be applied in real-life decision making.
In section 4.3, I discuss some objections to this explication. I shall ulti-
mately argue that representation theorems provide our best account of cre-
dences, and outline the implications of this claim for the normative signifi-
cance of EVM.
In section 4.4, I first briefly discuss how the problem of credences could
be addressed under alternative assumptions about what axiologies are – viz.,
Comparativism and Substantial Absolutism. And I then briefly examine
a conceptually simpler theory of axiological uncertainty that eschews the
concept of probability altogether – viz., Weighted Value Maximisation.
4.1 The Problem
What does it mean to say that you have a particular credence distribution
over axiologies; and why should we turn to representation theorems to un-
derstand this? A first, flat-footed response to the problem of understanding
credences would be to take the notion of an axiological credence distribution
as a primitive. In decision theory, some authors have recently advocated this
primitivism about credences more generally.1 If we accept it in the theory of
axiological uncertainty, then as far as the notion of probability is concerned,
we do not need to go beyond the Expected Value Theorem to axiomatise
1Cf. Eriksson and Ha´jek (2007); Paseau (ms, 25f.) even says: it ‘is by now relatively
familiar that degrees of belief are most plausibly construed as theoretical primitives’.
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EVM.
However, I think that primitivism about credences is very unsatisfying,
at least in the theory of axiological uncertainty. The case of credences is
parallel to that of intra- and intertheoretic comparisons of value. As I ar-
gued in chapter 2, we need an account of these comparisons because EVM
presupposes a quantitatively significant concept of value, and unless more is
said, we do not seem to understand that concept. The same holds for axio-
logical credences. EVM presupposes a quantitative concept of probabilities.
So to understand what ‘EVM’ means, we must know what it means to have a
particular, quantitatively specified credence distribution over axiologies – to
have, say, a 0.3 credence in some theory Ti. And we need an account of what
that means. Suppose you said ‘my credence in this form of utilitarianism was
once 0.3, but now it is 0.2’. Unless you give me some account of what you
mean by that, I would not understand what you meant – only that you chose
a slightly swaggering way of expressing that you thought utilitarianism fairly
likely, and now give it less credit, which I would also think if your numbers
were 0.4 and 0.3. So unless we give some account of credences, I take it,
it is simply unclear what it means for you to have a 0.3 credence in Ti, as
opposed, say, to a 0.35, or a 0.4 credence in that theory.
This problem becomes particularly evident if we realise how rich the no-
tion of an axiological credence distribution is. It is triply quantitative: speci-
fying quantitative subjective probabilities attached to intratheoretically car-
dinal axiologies among which cardinally significant comparisons hold. The
last point is particularly important. At least under Absolutism, there are in-
finitely many distinct axiologies corresponding to each axiological ordering.
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So it is not enough to know what it is for you to find a particular ordering
very plausible – or even to assign a 0.3 probability to that ordering. We need
to know what it means for you to have a particular credence in axiologies
that compare in a particular, cardinally significant way. Unless we know that,
we do not know what it means that one of your options has a higher expected
value than another, and thus what EVM means. And it is not plausible that
our intuitive understanding of such a rich notion goes very far.
Note also that this problem does not arise specifically because I have been
considering precise credences, as opposed to imprecise or fuzzy ones that
cannot be represented by single real numbers. Just as with precise credences,
we do not have an intuitive understanding of what it means to have a credence
of ‘roughly 0.3’ in Ti, as opposed to ‘roughly 0.4’, or ‘roughly 0.2’ – let alone
of what it means to have a particular credence interval (‘between 0.2 and
0.4’). Again: if you said ‘my credence in this version of utilitarianism was
once about 0.3, but now it is rather somewhere around 0.2’, I would not
understand what you meant. The general problem does not hinge on the
precision of the probabilities.
It might be that we can make important progress in some areas of epis-
temology or even decision theory while taking credences as primitives. But
ultimately, at least in the theory of axiological uncertainty, that is unsat-
isfying. If we want to defend EVM, we should be able to explain what it
says.
There would be a very simple explanation of what we mean by EVM.
Consider the
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Simple Explication: That your credence in Ti is pi means that when
you consider the set of theories T , consider how confident you feel about
each axiology upon reconsidering the evidence for and against it, and try
to associate a nonnegative number to each of them, such that the numbers
add up to 1 and reflect your confidence, then you associate with Ti the
number pi.
On this account, credences are given through mere introspection. I have often
encountered this idea in conversation (‘why are you making such a fuss about
credences; surely we have a fairly decent grasp of what they are!’). And at
least if we have a way of identifying the relevant axiologies,2 this may well
be a possible explication. If you say that your credence in Ti is 0.3, and that
you understand this statement in terms of the Simple Explication, I know
what you mean. You mean that you sat down with your list of axiologies,
tried to distribute numbers in accordance with your feelings of confidence,
and Ti ended up getting the number 0.3.
However, it seems implausible that our best theory of axiological uncer-
tainty is EVM as understood in terms of the Simple Explication. Suppose
that my list of axiologies features versions of total utilitarianism, and the
views that (in addition to wellbeing) beauty, biodiversity, friendship, auton-
omy, virtue or equality have value; suppose it features axiologies with differ-
ent conceptions of wellbeing; and suppose that it features multiple versions
of these axiological orderings too. If I had to, I could consult my feelings
of confidence and write down a respective set of numbers. And I would cer-
tainly have a grasp on some facts about how confident I am, such as that
2Cf. footnote 32 in this chapter (and the main text to this footnote) for this caveat.
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I am more confident in total than in average utilitarianism. But very soon,
this project of assigning numbers to axiologies will seem extremely arbitrary
and groundless to me. In other words, the problem with this explication is
that it does not seem to pick out something of ultimate normative impor-
tance. It would seem implausible and slightly reckless to claim that I should
ground the most important decisions in my life solely on this intuitive list
of numbers. If our theory of axiological uncertainty should guide us in our
decision making, we should find a more robust and important understanding
of credences.
A third response to our challenge would be that we should turn to sci-
entists and psychologist to explain our notion of credences. The concept
of ‘credences’ after all seems to be an empirical, psychological one. So one
might think that only serious empirical work will give us an adequate and
scientifically informed account of credences.3
However, I think that the most plausible way of integrating scientific or
psychological research into our account of credences still essentially makes
use of something like representation theorems. So let me now turn to repre-
sentation theorems. I shall come back to this idea of a scientifically informed
account of credences on page 198.
3Such a view is hinted at in Meacham and Weisberg (2011, 642; 661).
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4.2 Subjective Expected Value
In this section, I shall offer what I take to be the most promising account
of axiological credences. Section 4.2.1 provides a brief introduction into
decision-theoretic explications of subjective probabilities, and explains the
account I shall explore on an intuitive level. Section 4.2.2 outlines the formal
theorem on which my explication is based. And section 4.2.3 outlines how –
given this explication – my theory of axiological uncertainty can be applied
in real-life decision making.
4.2.1 De Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and the Struc-
ture of the Argument
The problem of explaining degrees of beliefs in non-normative propositions
has a long history in decision theory, and various different accounts have been
proposed. One of the first to address that problem was Bruno de Finetti
(1980), who suggested what is now standardly called a betting interpretation
of degrees of belief. De Finetti says:
Let us suppose that an individual is obliged to evaluate the rate p at which he
would be ready to exchange the possession of an arbitrary sum S (positive or
negative) dependent on the occurrence of a given event E, for the possession
of the sum pS; we will say by definition that this number p is the measure of
the degree of probability attributed by the individual considered to the event
E, or, more simply, that p is the probability of E (according to the individual
considered [...]). (1980, 62)
According to this interpretation, that you have a degree of belief of 0.25 in
the proposition that it will rain this afternoon means that you are indifferent
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between the bet that gives you £1 if it rains, and the sure thing gain of £0.25.
So de Finetti derives your credences from your preferences about monetary
lotteries. In effect, he takes quantities of money to represent what you care
about, and interprets you as maximising the expectation of that quantity.
This leads to an obvious problem – viz., that what you care about may
not adequately be represented by money. De Finetti’s account seems to mis-
represent your beliefs if money has diminishing marginal value for you. Even
if you have the same degree of belief in a coin’s landing heads or tails, you
might prefer a sure gain of £1 million to the bet that gives you £2 millions if
the coin lands tails (and nothing otherwise), because you care more about the
first than about any subsequent million.4 For this reason, the account given
by Frank Ramsey (1926) was arguably more promising. Ramsey introduced
a notion of ‘utility’ that need not conform linearly to any other quantity.
More generally, he derived both probabilities and utilities from preferences
alone. He provided a simple representation theorem showing that if your
preferences satisfy certain conditions you can be represented as maximising
expected utility with respect to a particular utility function (unique up to
positive affine transformation) and a (unique) probability function. Accord-
ing to Ramsey, this probability function can be interpreted as specifying your
degrees of belief.
Ramsey’s account was in turn further refined by Leondard Savage (1954),
who provided a more general and conceptually more sophisticated represen-
tation theorem. And ever since, decision theorists have worked on refining
4Cf. e.g. Eriksson and Ha´jek (2007) and Ha´jek (2012) for other famous objections
against De Finetti’s interpretation.
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Savage’s theorem still further – for example, in allowing for state-dependent
preferences and utilities.
The main tenet of all these decision-theoretic explications is, very roughly,
that to have a particular credence in a proposition is to give that proposition
a particular weight in your preferences under uncertainty. Representation
theorems show that if your preferences satisfy certain conditions, you can be
represented as maximising expected utility with respect to particular utility
and probability functions; and according to the proponents of these theo-
rems, you can then not only be represented as having these utilities and
probabilities, but you actually have them: the probability function specifies
your actual credences. The proposals have become more sophisticated in the
range of decisions or preferences they consider, and in the precise role they
require your belief to play in your decision making. But this rough core is
common to them all.
As various people have emphasised,5 proponents of representation theo-
rems thus need an account of why your being representable as having certain
utilities and probabilities should imply that you actually have them. There
are numerous different ways in which one might try to bridge this gap. For
example, one might say that it is an empirical truth of some sort that the
relevant probability function would specify our real credences if we satisfied
the axioms; or one might say that we take it to specify our credences as a
matter of brute stipulation.6 I cannot discuss all of these interpretations.
So as in chapter 2, I shall simply invoke the argument from representation
5Cf. e.g. Zynda (2000), Ha´jek (2008), Meacham and Weisberg (2011).
6Cf. Eriksson and Ha´jek (2007), Meacham and Weisberg (2011) or Buchak (2013, ch.1)
for overviews.
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theorems that I find most promising. On this interpretation, again, we use
representation theorems as an explication for credences. That is, the claim
is that the probabilities and utilities from representation theorems capture
what is useful about the folk notions of belief and value, and drop what is
problematic or undesirable about them. So that shall be my main claim in
what follows.
However, if we are to explain your axiological credences, we cannot simply
focus on your preferences. At least, I cannot see a convincing way of doing
that. The reason is that you may care about all sorts of things besides moral
value – your own self-interest, the welfare of your nearest and dearest, or
whatever – and you may or may not care very much about moral value. So
for example, if you give total utilitarianism only very little weight in your
ordinary preferences, that need not mean that you find it implausible as an
axiology. It may simply mean that you do not care very much about axiolog-
ical value in general, even though as an axiology, you find total utilitarianism
plausible.
So in order to define axiological credences, we somehow need to separate
your axiological and non-axiological concerns. One way to do so is to focus
not on which options you find preferable to which, but on which options you
find u-better than wich. In other words, instead of explicating credences in
terms of preferences, we can explicate them in terms of u-value judgments.
Very roughly, we might say that your credence pi in an axiology Ti is the
weight you give that axiology in your u-value judgments. There might be
other ways of separating axiological and non-axiological concerns, and I shall
briefly explore some alternatives in section 4.3.3. But I take this to be the
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most promising account, and so it is this idea that I shall now develop at some
length. I shall refer to this explication as the judgmement-based explication
of axiological credences, and to a form of EVM understood in terms of it as
judgment-based EVM. So what I shall look for is a set of conditions C such
that, if your u-value judgments satisfy conditions C, you can be represented
as making u-value judgments in accordance with EVM. And I shall treat it
as a matter of explication that you then are satisfying EVM.
Note that this conditional is not a normative claim. Its consequent says
that you do satisfy EVM, not that you should do so. To establish that
conclusion, we need an extra normative premise, saying that your u-value
judgments should satisfy the relevant conditions C. So the structure of the
overall argument for judgment-based EVM is as follows:
(A) Your u-value judgments should satisfy conditions C;
(B) as a matter of logical equivalence, your u-value judgments satisfy
conditions C if and only if you are following EVM; therefore
(C) you should follow EVM; EVM is true.
I shall discuss the overall form and significance of such an argument in section
4.3.2. First, let me now provide a set of conditions C that can fill this scheme.
4.2.2 The Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem
I shall again take a theorem from state-dependent utility theory, extend it
slightly and apply it to our context. As I mentioned on page 167, I shall
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intend this theorem as an account of credences under Non-Substantial Ab-
solutism. I shall come back to the question of how to understand credences
under alternative assumptions about axiologies in section 4.4.1.
To explicate probabilities, we need a theory that is based on a slightly
different formal framework than I have so far been using, such that the
main binary relation does not range on options in Q. So let me introduce
a new set, K, defined as K = {a : Z → R+ |
∑
x∈X a(i, x) = 1 ∀i ∈
I}.7 I shall use lower case Fraktur-letters, a, b, c... to refer to members
of K, and shall for simplicity again call them ‘options’. Options in K differ
from options in Q:8 in an option in K, the numbers assigned to outcomes
sum to 1 within each axiology, not across axiologies. So an option in K
does not specify an underlying probability distribution over axiologies. It
does, however, specify an underlying probability distribution over outcomes
(relative to each axiology). In this sense, in considering options in K, I am
still taking non-normative probabilities as given primitives. In principle,
this is problematic – for exactly the same reasons as it was problematic to
take axiological credences as a primitive. However, my main concern is with
axiological uncertainty. That problem is complicated enough. So to simplify
my treatment of it, I shall just assume non-normative probabilities as given
primitives throughout this thesis.
We can again define pa + (1− p)b ∈ K as the option that leads to a with
probability p, and to b with probability (1− p), hence (pa+ (1− p)b)(i, x) =
pa(i, x) + (1 − p)b(i, x) for all (i, x) in Z. And again, even though options
7As a reminder, Z was defined as Z = {(i, x) | i ∈ I, x ∈ X}, I being the index set of
axiologies, and X the set of outcomes.
8Q was defined as Q = {a : Z → R+ |
∑
(i,x)∈Z a(i, x) = 1}.
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like a, b, and c (in K) are formally distinct from options like a, b and c
(in O9), and I said that axiologies order the latter, I shall sometimes say
that a is at least as good as b according to an axiology Ti. By this I shall
mean, intuitively, that the prospect represented by a, given Ti, is at least as
good according to Ti as the prospect represented by b, given Ti. To define
this concept formally, define for each axiology Ti a function Ki : K → O;
a 7→ Ki(a), such that
Ki(a)(x) = a(i, x). (4.1)
The mapping Ki thus formally turns an option a into the prospect that a
represents, given Ti. So for some a and b, I shall say that a is at least as
good as b according to Ti if Ki(a) i Ki(b) – and similarly for ‘better’ and
‘equally good’, and (when I am making a descriptive claim) for the fact that
you judge a u-better than b according to some theory.
It depends on your axiological credence distribution whether an option a
is u-better than an option b. If a is better than b according to some theory
Ti, and you are certain that Ti is true, a will be u-better for you, now. If
instead you are certain that some theory Tj is true, and according to this
theory b is better than a, then b will be u-better for you, now. So there is no
uniquely correct u-value relation on K. Different people can make different u-
value judgments about K, and these can all be correct as u-value judmgents.
There are only correct u-value relations relative to a particular agent at a
particular time – or more specifically, relative to her credence distribution.
9O was defined as O = {a : X → R+|
∑
x∈X a(x) = 1}.
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So if I were precise, I would index u-value relations on K to agents and times.
To avoid inconvenient notation, I shall not do that. I shall simply denote
the u-value relation on K by ‘˙U ’ (or ‘˙U ’ and ‘∼˙U ’) – using a little dot to
distinguish it from the relation U on Q. It is important to bear in mind
that this relation is always relative to a particular agent at a particular time.
For that reason I shall sometimes speak of ‘your ˙U ’. When I am making
a descriptive claim, ˙U stands for what your (well-considered)10 u-value
judgments actually are. When I am making a normative claim, ˙U stands
for what your u-value judgments should be. And that normative claim about
your judgments is equivalent to a claim about value: that you should judge
a ˙U b simply means that a is u-better than b, relative to your credence
distribution. I shall use ‘pi’ to represent your credence in Ti.
For any binary relation ˙ onK, we can define the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms and the term ‘vNM-conformable’ – just as I defined them for relations
on Q and O:
TransitivityK: if a ˙ b and b ˙ c, then a ˙ c;
CompletenessK: for any a and b ∈ K, a ˙ b or b ˙ a;
IndependenceK: if a ˙ b and p ∈]0, 1[ then pa+ (1− p)c ˙ pb+ (1− p)c
for any c ∈ K;
ContinuityK: if a ˙ b and b ˙ c then there exist p and q ∈]0, 1[, s.t.
pa + (1− p)c ˙ b and b ˙ qa + (1− q)c.
10The notion of ‘well-considered’ here is intended to rule out obvious misrepresentations
of your credences – say, as when you consistently miscalculate the implications of some
axiology, but accidentally nonetheless make vNM-conformable judgments.
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However, we need more than these conditions to provide a judgment-based
explication of credences. That your u-value judgments are vNM-conformable
does not imply that there is a unique probability distribution over axiologies,
with respect to which you are maximising expected value. Suppose that in
making vNM-conformable u-value judgments you give considerable weight
to the total utilitarian ordering. At least under Absolutism, this can be
explained in two ways: it might be that you have a relatively high credence
in total utilitarianism; or it might be that you have credence in a version
with a very inflated value-function – that is, a version on which choosing the
best option matters very much. So in order to provide a unique separation
of your probability and your value-functions, we have to add some further
conditions.
There is a debate in state-dependent utility theory about how best to
achieve this.11 I shall not enter that formal debate. Instead, I shall again
simply use a framework and theorem that serve my purposes. And as in chap-
ter 2, it is a theorem due to Edi Karni and David Schmeidler (1980).12 The
basic strategy behind this theorem (as put in terms of u-value judgments) is
to consider not only your u-value judgments about K, but also your judg-
ments about options in which the probability distribution over axiologies is
given – that is, judgments of the form ‘If the probability distribution over
theories was P , I would judge...’, or judgments about Q. Assuming that your
judgments about K and Q are both vNM-conformable and consistent – that
is, that they are induced by the same utilities and the difference between them
11Cf. e.g. the discussion in Karni and Mongin (2000).
12The theorem and proof (with a slight obvious typing error in part ‘(ii)’) is reproduced
in Karni (1985, 17); cf. also Karni et al. (1983) and Karni and Mongin (2000) for discussion.
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is explained fully by the different underlying probability distributions – we
can then derive from your judgments relevantly unique utility and probability
functions. This is not surprising. By considering your conditional judgments
(‘If the probability distribution over theories was P , I would judge...’), we can
first detect your values: the function representing these judgments is a pure
reflection of values, since the probabilities are already given in the options.
And knowing your values, we can then detect your probability distribution
by considering your ordinary judgments (‘Actually, I judge...’).
However, this means that in our explication of axiological credences, we
have to presuppose some understanding of axiological probabilities as prim-
itive. We cannot eschew primitivism altogether. But I do not think that
this renders our account inadequate, or circular. What I am explicating is a
subjective notion of probabilities. I have not said anything explicitly about
the notion of probability that Q presupposes. We could understand that
notion objectively. And there seem to be contexts in which we could under-
stand an objective notion of axiological probabilities. For example, suppose
God has determined the true axiology at the beginning of days; since he had
as yet no criterion to make a good choice, he did so by way of a perfect
randomising device (based, e.g., on a random subatomic phenomenon whose
unpredictability is due to quantum mechanics). Though highly unnatural,
this story does not seem to be conceptually incoherent. If it is not, and
if we intuitively understand the objective probabilities involved in certain
randomising devices, then there is a way in which we could understand the
options in Q, even without understanding axiological credences. Judgments
like ‘If the probability distribution over theories was P , I would judge...’
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could be understood as meaning: ‘Supposing God had set his randomising
device in such a way that the probability distribution was P , I would judge...’.
This adds another complexity to my framework. But I think it is only that:
an extra complexity. That my explication presupposes Q does not make it
circular, or incoherent, or overly primitivist.
Actually, we shall restrict our attention to those options in Q, on which
all axiologies have a positive probability. That is, we shall consider Q+ ⊂ Q,
with Q+ = {a : Z → R+ |
∑
(i,x)∈Z a(i, x) = 1 and
∑
x∈X a(i, x) > 0 ∀i ∈
I}. For some i in I, and binary relations ˙ and  on K and Q, say that a and
b in K agree outside i if for all j in I, j 6= i, and all x in X, a(j, x) = b(j, x);
and similarly for a and b in Q+. Say that i is obviously null if: (i) for all a
and b in K that agree outside i, a ∼˙ b, and (ii) there exist a and b in Q+ that
agree outside i such that a  b. Say that i is obviously non-null if there are
a and b in K that agree outside i such that a ˙ b. Finally, define a function
L : Q+ → K; a 7→ L(a), such that for each i in I,




L scrapes out the probabilities from a, an option in Q+, thus turning it into
an option in K. With this in mind, we can define the
Consistency Axiom: For all i ∈ I and all a and b in Q+ that agree
outside i: if L(a) ˙L(b), then a  b; and if i is obviously non-null and
a  b, then L(a) ˙L(b).
Finally, say that i is non-uniform under  if for some a and b that agree
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outside i, a  b. And say that ˙ is non-uniform if there are a and b in K
such that a ˙ b. Given that, Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 9) state
Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem 2: Suppose that a reflexive binary
relation  on Q is vNM-conformable, that a reflexive binary relation ˙
on K is vNM-conformable and non-uniform, and that they jointly satisfy
the Consistency Axiom. Then (i) there exists a state-dependent utility
function u : Z → R and a probability distribution P over I such that, for
all a and b in K,
a ˙ b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
P (i)u(i, x)a(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
P (i)u(i, x)b(i, x), (4.3)
and for all a and b in Q,
a  b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)a(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)b(i, x). (4.4)
(ii) If v is another function for which (i) is true, then v is a positive affine
transformation of u. (iii) If i is obviously null, P (i) = 0, if i is obviously
non-null, P (i) > 0, and if each i is non-uniform under , then there is no
other probability distribution Q 6= P for which (i) is true.
To turn this into a result about u-value, I have to express more formally the
assumption behind the judgment-based explication. On page 177, I expressed
it very roughly as saying that your credence in an axiology is the weight
you give that axiology in your u-value judgments. Let me state this more
precisely.
I shall assume that besides judgments about the u-value relation, you
also make judgments about which options are better than which, accord-
ing to your axiologies. That is, I assume that for each theory Ti you also
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make judgments i about O, that all these i are vNM-conformable and
non-uniform, and that your u-value judgments U on Q satisfy the Pareto
Condition (from page 59) with respect to these judgments. Furthermore,
I shall again assume that if a utility function u represents one of your i
ordinally, it also represents it cardinally – where this means that the cardi-
nal intratheoretic comparisons between certain outcomes, according to your
theory Ti, are the same as the ratios among the utility differences between
these outcomes. Now let u(·, ·) be a theory-dependent utility function from
I×X to R, and P a probability distribution over theories. I shall say that u
represents each of your axiologies cardinally if for each of your axiologies Ti,
the utility function u(i, ·) represents that axiology cardinally. And I shall say
that u jointly represents your axiologies cardinally if the crosscutting cardi-
nal intertheoretic comparisons, according to your axiologies, are the same as
the respective intertheoretic utility difference ratios according to u. Further-
more, I shall say that the pair (u, P ) represents your u-value judgments about
K ordinally, if your ˙U is such that (4.3) holds for u and P , for all a and b
in K. Similarly, I shall say that u represents your u-value judgments about
Q ordinally, if your U is such that (4.4) holds for u, for all a and b in Q.
Finally, suppose that you have the credence distribution P over theories that
are jointly represented cardinally by u. I shall then say that the pair (u, P )
represents your axiological beliefs cardinally. My assumption is that, if there
is a pair (u, P ), with P being unique and u being unique up to positive affine
transformation, such that u represents your u-value judgments about Q or-
dinally, the pair (u, P ) represents your u-value judgments about K ordinally,
and u represents each of your axiologies cardinally, then (u, P ) represents
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your axiological beliefs cardinally. Hence if that is so, we can assume, say,
that P (Ti) represents your credence pi in the theory that is represented by
the function Gi(·) = u(i, ·). More briefly, I shall express this assumption, or
explication, by saying that your credences acquire their cardinal significance
in the context of your weighing axiologies under uncertainty.
Since I am now only interested in your u-value relation about K, let me
simplify Karni and Schmeidler’s theorem slightly in applying it to our con-
text. Given our explications, and the assumption that each of your i is
vNM-conformable and non-uniform, the following theorem holds:
Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem: If your ˙U and U are vNM-
conformable and jointly satisfy the Consistency Axiom, if your ˙U is non-
uniform and your U satisfies the Pareto Condition with respect to your
i, then for all a and b in K,







Again, I understand this theorem as a non-normative claim. It says that if
your u-value judgments satisfy the relevant conditions, you are as a matter
of fact following (4.5) – and that is, EVM.
Clearly, the converse is also true: if there exist a probability distribution
P , and functions Gi that represent your axiologies cardinally, and your judg-
ments satisfy (4.5) (and its equivalent regarding Q) with respect to them,
then your judgments will satisfy the relevant conditions. So we can turn this
into an argument for the normative truth of (4.5) by the argument-scheme set
out on page 178. Denote the conditions of the Subjectivist Expected Value
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Theorem by ‘CS’. And let me say that you satisfy CS, or that your judgments
are CS-conformable if your u-value judgments satisfy these conditions. If all
your axiologies are vNM-conformable and non-uniform, we might then give
the following argument for EVM: your u-value judgments should satisfy CS; if
and only if they do, you are following EVM; so you should follow EVM. This
is the main argument for a form of EVM based on the Subjectivist Expected
Value Theorem. In the next chapter, I shall weaken the conditions CS by
allowing for incompleteness in your u-value judgments. But apart from that,
this is the main argument for the theory of axiological uncertainty defended
in this thesis; it – or its equivalent in the next chapter – is the main argument
of the thesis.
Most of the conditions of the Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem are
familiar from the Expected Value Theorem. So my discussion of these condi-
tions in section 2.3 clarifies how plausible they are as normative constraints
on your u-value judgments. It is worth mentioning, however, that in the
context of the relation ˙U on K, there is an additional problem with Com-
pleteness. Obviously, the problem of intertheoretic comparisons carries over
to the present context: your ˙U need not necessarily satisfy Completeness,
because some of your axiologies may be less than fully comparable. But per-
haps there is another reason for why your judgments need not be complete.
To assume that your ˙U should satisfy Completeness is to assume that your
credences ought to be fully precise – i.e., that they ought to be representable
by a single real number. If your credences can justifiably be ‘fuzzy’ – less
than fully precise – then your ˙U arguably need not be complete; and this
is so even if all your axiologies are complete and fully comparable.
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There are indeed strong arguments to the effect that your non-normative
credences need not be precise,13 and these plausibly carry over to the axiolog-
ical case. But the Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem rules out any fuzzy
credences. Actually, to simplify my results, and since the problem of fuzzy
credences is not specific to axiological uncertainty, I shall be ruling out fuzzy
credences throughout this entire dissertation. So this is another important
restriction of this thesis. It is plausible that your axiological credences can
justifiably be fuzzy, but I shall ignore this.
4.2.3 Applying Judgment-Based EVM in Practice
Before I discuss objections to the argument I have just outlined, it might
be worth to take stock and provide a brief summary of how, roughly, the
theory of axiological uncertainty based on the Subjectivist Expected Value
Theorem and the judgment-based explication of credences can be applied in
real life cases. Note that, in principle, the theory itself is silent on this. As I
mentioned on page 18, I am advocating judgment-based EVM as a criterion
of u-betterness, not as a decision procedure, or practical method that we
consciously have to apply to make choices. And in principle, it might be
that we best satisfy this criterion of u-betterness by always doing what some
good friend tells us, or by avoiding any though of u-value altogether. But it
will nonetheless be helpful to outline a possible way of applying judgment-
based EVM – the way that comes closest to taking the theory actually as a
decision procedure, and that I find most promising.
13Cf. e.g. Joyce (2005; 2010); cf. e.g. Elga (2010) and White (2010) for arguments that
subjective probabilities should be sharp.
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So as an example, suppose you consider becoming a vegan. You believe
that becoming a vegan increases animal welfare, but costs you resources (time
and money) that you are now using to produce half as much human welfare.
Suppose you are uncertain about the value of animal welfare, and want to
know how your axiological uncertainty affects the u-value of your becoming
a vegan. For simplicity, I shall focus on just two orderings: a version of
standard total utilitarianism, and a version of total utilitarianism on which
animal welfare has some weight, but less than human welfare. I shall call the
latter species-weighted utilitarianism. I shall refer to your favourite version of
standard total utilitarianism as TSU , and to your favourite version of species-
weighted utilitarianism as TWU .
So how do you determine how your uncertainty between TSU and TWU
affects the u-value of your becoming a vegan? First of all, you have to decide
what weight TWU assigns to animal welfare; that is, you have to determine
the precise ordering that TWU implies. Suppose you do that, and believe that
on the most plausible form of species-weighted utilitarianism, human welfare
counts twice as much as animal welfare in determining value. (Suppose also
that we understand what that means.)
So now you have to decide how these two theories compare interthereti-
cally, and how much credence you assign to them. To decide on intertheoretic
comparisons, you have to consider your u-value judgments about options in
Q – i.e., options with given objective probability distributions over theories.
This will be easiest with unnatural toy examples like the following:
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ax bx
TSU TWU TSU TWU
pSU = x pWU = (1− x) pSU = x pWU = (1− x)
Red killed status quo status quo Red killed
Table 4.1
If you choose ax then Red will be killed if TSU is true, and nothing happens
if TWU is correct. If you choose bx then Red will be killed if TWU is true, and
nothing happens if TSU is correct. Now, if you judged that a2/3 ∼U b2/3, say,
you would think that killing Red was twice as bad on TWU as on TSU . But
suppose you believe that, most plausibly, the value of human welfare is the
same on both theories; that is, most plausibly, ax and bx would be equally
u-good if both TSU and TWU have equal probability – i.e. a1/2 ∼U b1/2.
So next, you need to determine what credence you have in those theories.
To that end, you have to consider your u-value judgments about options in K.
This might again be easiest with unnatural toy examples like the following:
an bm
TSU TWU TSU TWU
n people killed status quo status quo m people killed
Table 4.2
If you choose an then n people will be killed if TSU is true, and nothing
happens if TWU is correct. If you choose bm then m people will be killed
if TWU is true, and nothing happens if TSU is correct. Let us suppose that
all these people would otherwise have the same level of wellbeing. If you
believe that a1 ∼˙U b1 you find it equally u-good (or u-bad) to risk the death
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of a person on TSU as on TWU . So according to the explication I’ve given,
you assign both TSU and TWU the same probability; that will be probability
0.5 if you do not have credence in any other theory, and less than 0.5 if
you do. If you believe that a2 ∼˙U b1 you find it equally u-good to risk the
death two people on TSU as the death of one person on TWU . So you assign
TSU a probability that is half as large as the probability you assign to TWU .
Suppose that is what you do: you find species-weighted utilitarianism twice
as likely as standard utilitarianism.
So your judgments about these fairly simple toy examples imply precisely
how your favourite versions of standard and species-weighted utilitarianism
compare, and how much credence you have in them. As a parenthesis, let me
note that the ability to construct unnatural but simple examples like ax, bx,
an and bm seems actually very helpful in thinking about these questions. So
as I indicated briefly on page 47, I think that the slightly unnatural aspects
of my framework may in fact be an advantage.
In any case, you can now use those probabilities and values to determine
how your uncertainty between TSU and TWU affects the u-value of your be-
coming a vegan. We were assuming that, according to your non-normative
beliefs, becoming a vegan increases animal welfare (by some amount w > 0,
say), but costs you resources that you are now using to produce half as much
human welfare (w/2). That is:
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Becoming a vegan Not becoming a vegan
TSU TWU TSU TWU
animal welfare +w, animal welfare +w,
human welfare −w/2 human welfare −w/2
status quo status quo
Table 4.3
In this case, and as far as these two theories are concerned, it is u-better
for you to become a vegan. To see this, we can assume (without loss of
generality) that the value of the status quo is 0 on both theories, that the
disvalue of decreasing human welfare by w/2 is −w/2, and that these are the
only theories you have credence in. The expected value of the status quo is













w > 0. (4.6)
So relative to your credences and the comparisons you are making, and as
far as these two theories are concerned, it is u-better for you to become a
vegan.
This is at least the beginning of a fully worked out answer to the question
whether you should become a vegan; and the beginning of the full story of
how our theory can help you – in Savage’s terms – to ‘police [your] own
decisions for consistency and, when possible, to make complicated decisions
depend on simpler ones’ (1954, 20). Of course, you might have credence in
other versions of these theories which compare slightly differently; or you
might have credence in other forms of species-weighted utilitarianism which
imply a slightly different ordering; or you might have still other views that
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affect this decision. On the whole, your calculation of the expected value of
your options will be more accurate the more of these alternatives you take
into account. Moreover, it might be that you have an intuition concerning
the u-value of becoming a vegan. If your intuition is that it is u-better for you
not to become a vegan, then your u-value judgments cannot all be correct. So
you need to revise some of these judgments – plausibly, until you attain some
kind of reflective equilibrium in which your u-value judgments satisfy all our
constraints. What is important for now is that the procedure I specified in
this section is no more – but no less – than the beginning of how to apply
the theory of axiological uncertainty I am outlining in this thesis to real life
questions.
4.3 Objections and Implications
It is time to address some objections. My argument in section 4.2.2 again as-
sumed that representation theorems can serve the two foundational purposes
that I outlined in section 2.1: that of clarifying our quantitative concepts, and
that of justifying EVM. But as I mentioned on page 168, many philosophers
have become very sceptical of the significance of representation theorems,
particularly with respect to the notion of credences. For example, Christo-
pher Meacham and Jonathan Weisberg claim that ‘representation theorems
cannot serve either of these foundational purposes’, and that, ‘we should [...]
lay the foundations of decision theory on firmer ground’ than that provided
by representation theorems (2011, 641). So in section 4.3.1, I shall discuss
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objections to the effect that my technical notion of axiological credences dif-
fers too much from our intuitive concept. In section 4.3.2, I shall discuss
objections against the normative relevance of judgment-based EVM. And
in section 4.3.3, I shall again examine whether there are better alternative
explications of axiological credences.
In most cases, I shall respond to objections that have been levelled against
preference-based representation theorems in decision theory, and that apply
mutatis mutandis to my judgment-based theorem. However, in my responses,
I shall only be concerned with the role of representation theorems in the
theory of axiological uncertainty. I shall ultimately claim that the judgment-
based explication is the best explication of axiological credences. But I shall
not claim that preference-based representation theorems can serve these same
foundational purposes in decision theory or epistemology more generally.
That is another question.14 Moreover, I shall again not claim that something
like the judgment-based explication is the best explication under all accounts
of axiologies. I will again simply presuppose Non-Substantial Absolutism.
4.3.1 Relationship to the Intuitive Concept
A technically explicated concept may in some respects diverge from the orig-
inal, intuitive one: it should be more precise, but it may arguably also shift
the original meaning slightly. However, if the technical concept is to be an
14In particular, I shall ignore the debate about probabilism, the view that our credences
should satisfy the axioms of probability theory. According to the judgment-based expli-
cation and my main argument, probabilism is true. But I do not understand it as an
argument for probabilism and against rivals to probabilism; instead, I understand it as
an argument for how your credences and values should interact to determine the u-value
relation.
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explication – rather than a stipulative definition of a completely new term –
it should not deviate too much from the explicandum. In decision theory, ex-
plications along the lines of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage have come under
criticism in this respect, and some of these worries carry over to our context.
A first worry is this. According to our intuitive notion of confidence,
most of us have varying degrees of belief in different axiologies: many of us
find some axiologies plausible, and others very implausible. Yet we gener-
ally do not satisfy the conditions CS; so we can rarely be ascribed degrees of
belief as defined by our explication. Hence in this sense, our technical no-
tion diverges radically from its explicandum. Among others, Meacham and
Weisberg (2011) raised this objection against preference-based definitions of
credences in decision theory.15 Referring to the technical, explicated notions
of utilities and degrees and belief as ‘utilities∗’ and ‘degrees of belief ∗’, they
say: ‘If people don’t have degrees of belief∗ and utilities∗, these terms will
not apply to most of the same cases as the original concepts’ (2011, 653).
And they argue that these technical terms therefore ‘cannot play a useful
role in descriptive accounts of our mental states, predictive accounts of our
behaviour’, nor even in ‘prescriptive accounts of what our behaviour ought
to be’ (2011, 653):
To make degrees of belief* and utilities* relevant to epistemology and normative
decision theory, these states must be linked to the states that are the topic of
our normative theorizing in these domains. And since agents like us generally
don’t have degrees of belief* and utilities*, it’s hard to see how they’re relevant.
(2011, 655)
The same worry applies mutatis mutandis in our context.
15Eriksson and Ha´jek (2007, 200f.; 203f.) and Zynda (2000, 62) make the same point.
196
However, this worry is misguided. It may well be true that my technical
concept cannot play a useful role in descriptive or predictive accounts of our
mental states or behaviour. But I am not giving such an account. I am giving
a normative account about what your u-value judgments should be. And it
is not clear why our generally not having credences (in the technical sense)
should be relevant for that. ‘The states that are the topic of our normative
theorizing’ are credences, so my explication should be similar to our intuitive
understanding of credences, for sure. But I am not interested in what your
credences are, or how we could describe them quantitatively, if you do not
satisfy the axioms. All that my argument requires is that you should satisfy
the axioms, and that if you do, your credences are such that you satisfy
EVM. For this argument, it is enough if the judgment-based explication
comes near to our intuitive concept – to the states that are the topic of
our normative theorizing – when you satisfy the axioms. And Meacham and
Weisberg’s argument does absolutely nothing to challenge that. Against
normative interpretations of EVM, their argument is simply a non-starter.16
So if the judgment-based explication is to be challenged, it must be ques-
16Strangely, Meacham and Weisberg seem to recognise this. They say: ‘[a normative
interpretation of EVM] is not concerned with what your degrees of belief and utilities are
when [the axioms are] not satisfied, since it is concerned only with the case where you do
what you ought to do, i.e. where you satisfy [the axioms]. So [a normative interpretation
of EVM] only needs it to be the case that the [...] representation is the correct one when
it exists’ (2011, 655). However, as far as I see, all the arguments that they level against a
normative explication-based interpretation of EVM depend on this fact that we usually do
not have degrees of belief* and utilities* – as is blatantly explicit in the last quote above.
Perhaps they believe that some of the objections they raise against other interpretations
also affect a normative explication-based interpretation of EVM. Or perhaps they see their
claim that ‘adopting degrees of belief* and utilities* trivializes normative decision theory’
(2011, 653) as independent from their claim that degrees of belief* and utilities* are too
unconnected to our intuitive concepts. I shall come back to their trivialising-objection on
page 208, and shall show that these two claims are not independent.
197
tioned whether my explication is adequate when your u-value judgments are
CS-conformable. But this may indeed be questioned. One relevant worry is
that our ordinary concept of degree of belief is much richer than the notion I
have introduced. Among others, David Christensen (2001) has stressed this
point with regards to decision theory.17 He argues that ‘the preference-based
definition leaves out important parts of our pretheoretic notion’ of degrees of
belief (2001, 361). For one thing, ‘a person’s beliefs [...] affect the way she
behaves in countless ways that have nothing directly to do with the decision
theorist’s paradigm of cost-benefit calculation’ (2001, 361); for another thing,
degrees of belief not only help to explain behaviour, but also ‘other psycho-
logical states and processes’ (2001, 361). For example, your self-deprecating
beliefs may explain why you are performing poorly in a competition, or why
you are being sad or afraid, or why you release stress hormones or are physi-
cally unhealthy. Beliefs are involved in a plethora of explanatory connections,
even when our preferences satisfy the axioms. This being so, Christensen
points out, ‘the move of settling on just one of these connections – even an
important one – as definitional comes to look highly suspicious’ (2001, 362).
And this worry carries over to our context. Your axiological beliefs arguably
play a much richer role than just determining your u-value judgments: they
may explain your behaviour, your immediate reactions or attitudes, your
emotions, and so on.
This is a more pertinent worry. But again I think it can be answered.
17The same point is endorsed by Eriksson and Ha´jek (2007, 208). Meacham and Weis-
berg (2011, 646) also highlight the rich explanatory connections of beliefs (though not as
an objection against what they call the ‘Explicative View’, and what is basically the view
I suggested); cf. also Ha´jek (2008, 803ff.).
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Christensen focuses on Patrick Maher’s (1993) understanding of probabilities
and utilities, according to which
an attribution of probabilities and utilities is correct just in case it is part of an
overall interpretation of the person’s preferences that makes sufficiently good
sense of them and better sense than any competing interpretation does. (1993,
9)
Accordingly, Christensen says:
a given interpretation of an agent’s degrees of belief might maximize expected-
utility fit with the agent’s preferences while a different interpretation might fit
much better with other psychological-explanatory principles. In such cases of
conflict, where no interpretation makes all the connections come out ideally,
there is no guarantee that the best interpretation will be the one on which the
agent’s preferences accord perfectly with maximizing [expected utility]. (2001,
362)
However, Maher’s understanding of representation theorems – or what Chris-
tensen interprets as Maher’s understanding – differs from mine. If we assume
that there always is a best overall interpretation of an agent, it may indeed
presuppose an implausible cosmic accident to assume that it always coincides
with the judgment-based explication. But I have not offered that explica-
tion as the unequivocally best overall interpretation of an agent. At least if
‘best’ means ‘descriptively’ or ‘empirically best’ (as opposed to ‘best for our
purposes’), I think it is dubious to assume that there generally is an overall
best interpretation of an agent.
Suppose that according to the judgment-based explication, I have much
more credence in standard than in anthropocentric utilitarianism. But sup-
pose that I in various ways react more strongly to the suffering of humans
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than to the suffering of animals, and so my behaviour, my emotional reac-
tions, my implicit attitudes and hormone levels all suggest that I have more
credence in anthropocentric than in standard utilitarianism. In which theory
do I then have a higher degree of belief? Do my reactions and behaviour
show that I do not really have a much higher credence in standard utilitar-
ianism and that I actually have anthropocentric credences; or do I act and
react against my true credences, due to akrasia or biases or whatever? Very
plausibly, our intuitive concept of credence is not precise enough to generally
imply anything definitive in such cases. In other words, it seems dubious to
assume that there generally is a ‘best interpretation’.18
That is why I introduced the judgment-based definition as an explication
of our intuitive concept, rather than an analysis. It spells out what it might
mean (at least under certain conditions), that your degree of belief in an
axiology is the weight you give that axiology under uncertainty. This is not
the only role that axiological degrees of belief play. But it is undeniably a
major one. And if you satisfy the conditions CS and thus give each axiology
a constant weight under uncertainty, I think it is not outright wrong or
completely misleading to call the relevant weights your ‘credences’.
Yet even if that is conceded, one might perhaps wonder why – of all
possible connections – we should focus precisely and exclusively on u-value
judgments to explicate credences. But I think there are several reasons to do
so. First of all, it is important to bear in mind what role these credences play
18There is a literature on whether, if one professes to believe that p but acts contrary to
that professed belief, one truly believes that p (cf. e.g. Schwitzgebel (2010) for an overview,
and a position similar to the one expressed above); I am not aware of a discussion of such
cases with regards to a graded notion of belief.
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in judgment-based EVM. What I am ultimately claiming is that you should
satisfy EVM with respect to them. So we need a notion of ‘credences’ that
picks out something that should be relevant in your decision making. But
many aspects that Christensen emphasises do not seem to be normatively
very relevant. For example, a growing literature in psychology shows that
people have implicit attitudes and biases that contradict what they overtly
claim to believe and what they (presumably) take to reflect their evidence –
often even sexist or racist attitudes.19 Many of us will not have the moral
emotions that we take to be fitting.20 And presumably, many of us fail to act
in accordance with what we take to be morally appropriate.21 This is not
surprising, given that explicit beliefs can change very quickly upon receiving
new evidence, whereas our behaviour, emotions and implicit attitudes are
much more resistant to changes. But even if in some encompassing sense,
most people therefore do have slightly sexist or racist beliefs, or often do not
really have the ‘beliefs’ implicit in their u-value judgments, that does not
seem to be very relevant for the theory of axiological uncertainty. Surely,
you should not perforce satisfy EVM with respect to your most deep and
subconscious attitudes and biases, simply because these may in a broad sense
reflect your true credences. You should satisfy EVM with respect to the
‘credences’ that you take to be epistemically appropriate. And it seems that
in focusing on your judgments, the judgment-based explication does indeed
19Cf. e.g. Greenwald and Banaji (1995), Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) and Dovidio
and Gaertner (2000) for relatively early works; Strohminger et al. (2014) for a recent
methodological survey about implicit moral attitudes.
20Cf. e.g. Greene et al. (2001, 2107) on ‘participants who judge in spite of their emo-
tions’.
21Cf. e.g. the findings of Schwitzgebel and Rust (2014) and Schwitzgebel (2014), sug-
gesting that more stringent moral views do not imply more stringent moral behaviour.
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pick out such credences.
Furthermore, as I shall argue in the next section, the main reason why
we should be interested in whether or not the weights in our representation
theorems can be called ‘credences’ is that we want to establish a connection
between the theory of axiological uncertainty on the one hand, and axiological
epistemology on the other. We want these weights to reflect the entities that
are relevant to epistemology. But at least prima facie, it does not seem that
you are making an epistemological mistake if your u-value judgments reflect
reasonable credences, but you do not have the emotions, attitudes, hormone
levels or the behaviour that accord with these judgments. Plausibly, you are
then weak-willed, or emotionally biased, or whatever. So it does not seem
that if we want to make a connection to epistemology, we necessarily have
to invoke a richer account of credences.
Finally, it is not clear whether it is even possible to provide a much richer
and scientifically more informed explication of credences, while still guaran-
teeing their quantitative significance. One might perhaps attempt to find
some quantitative empirical state that allows for a pertinent explication of
credences – numbers of neuron-firings, or numbers of hormones, or whatever.
But – for reasons similar to those I gave to the parallel idea concerning car-
dinal strengths of attitudes in section 3.4.2 – I very much doubt that this is
possible. So the most promising way to do get an empirically richer explica-
tion, I take it, might be via representation theorems that feature conditions
on other aspects of beliefs.22 For example, we could introduce conditions
22The following proposal is the theorem-based scientifically informed account that I
alluded to on page 173.
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of the sort: ‘if you have a favouring attitude for a over b, then for any
c in K and any p ∈]0, 1[, you have a favouring attitude for pa + (1 − p)c
over pb + (1 − p)c’. These conditions may then imply an attitude-relative-
‘credence’-function. Perhaps we could do the same for your behaviour, your
hormone level, and so on. And we could then take some weighted average
of these various relativized ‘credence’-functions to get your overall credence-
function. Or we could assume bridging-principles of the form ‘if you judge
that a is u-better than b, you have a favouring attitude for a over b’, guaran-
teeing that all these credence functions are the same. No one has done this,
and it would certainly involve serious difficulties.23 But even if that were
possible, the complexity of such an account of credences would be a major
drawback. I cannot see why, on the whole, anything should be gained by it.
In sum, Christensen’s argument does neither show that the judgment-
based explication – understood as an explication – is inadequate, nor does
it point to a more promising account of credences. On the contrary, for our
purposes, it would be unfortunate to adopt a much richer notion: it would
grant weight to aspects that should not be normatively relevant, aspects that
are not necessarily the business of epistemology, and it would clearly render
our theory much more complex.
However, there is a third, related worry. One might worry not only that
there are additional connections between our credences and our mental or
physical states, but that sometimes the presumed connections with our u-
value judgments do not even exist. As an analogue in decision theory, con-
23For example, as I pointed out on page 139, different people seem to react differently to
the belief that one option is u-better than another; no such reaction might be a necessary
condition for that belief, and the choice of any one might be somewhat arbitrary.
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sider an objection by Lina Eriksson and Alan Ha´jek (2007):
At the core of [decision-theoretic explications] is the idea that credences should
somehow be defined or understood in terms of preferences. But credences and
preferences are certainly separable in thought, and sometimes in practice. Imag-
ine a Zen Buddhist monk who has credences but no preferences [i.e., ‘is indif-
ferent among all things’]. [...] If the monk is conceptually possible, then any
account that conceptually ties credences to preferences is refuted. [...] Or con-
sider a chronic apathetic who has lost all his desires, but who has kept all his
credences. To be sure, these characters are not recognizably like us, although
some of us may approximate them over certain domains, and to the extent that
we do, bets and preferences more generally ill-reflect our true credences. (2007,
194)
Others have provided similar arguments.24 And a similar point seems to
apply in our context: axiological credences and u-value judgments are ‘sep-
arable in thought’, it seems, since we can imagine someone who has various
axiological beliefs but for some reason does not make any u-value judgments.
But what precisely is the argument here? It is worth saying that, pace
Eriksson and Ha´jek, mere ‘approximation’ of monk-like apathy does not seem
to distort preference-based explications. As far as I see, it will simply re-
sult in an attenuated utility function, and this seems precisely appropriate.
Morevoer, it is important to note that our theorem will simply not apply to
perfect monk-like agents. Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem 2 explicitly as-
sumes that you have strict preferences; and the Subjectivist Expected Value
Theorem presupposes that you do make (non-uniform) u-value judgments.
So in this straightforward sense at least – and quite like Meacham and Weis-
berg’s worry – the case of the monk cannot show that the explication is
24Cf. Christensen (2001, 363).
204
flawed when it applies.25
However, Eriksson and Ha´jek do seem to claim this, and they seem to
raise a deeper worry. As applied to our context, their argument seems to
be that the mere possibility for axiological credences and u-value judgments
to come apart shows that any definition of the former in terms of the latter
must be flawed. If they can come apart, the thought seems to be, then any
connection between them will at best be a contingent matter and cannot be a
matter of definition: ‘if the monk is conceptually possible, then any account
that conceptually ties credences to preferences is refuted’.
However, that axiological credences are possible even without u-value
judgments does not show that there cannot be a conceptual connection be-
tween credences and u-value judgments in cases where the latter are present.
That is simply a non-sequitur. A condition may be sufficient but not neces-
sary for the application of a concept, and that might be a conceptual truth.
For example, it may be a conceptual truth that if you have the ability re-
peatedly to perform the first prelude from the Well-Tempered Clavier, then
you know how to perform it – even if you can also know how to perform it
without having that ability (e.g., when your arms are broken). Our explica-
tion only says that if your u-value judgments are CS-conformable, you have
the credences that make you satisfy EVM. For all that Eriksson and Ha´jek
25True, there is arguably a difference between the monk and someone with, say, in-
transitive preferences: the latter is (presumably) making some sort of mistake, whereas
the monk need not make any mistake. So the monk shows that Karni and Schmeidler’s
Theorem 2 cannot ground a fully general normative theory. But I have already admit-
ted that many constraints in the Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem are too strong as
normative constraints, and are only plausible given certain restrictions or simplifications
(e.g., the assumption that all axiologies are vNM-conformable, or fully comparable, or
non-uniform).
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say, that may well be a conceptual truth. Their worry may illustrate that
we do have alternative criteria for ascribing beliefs, other than preferences
or u-value judgments. But that was Christensen’s point, and I have argued
that it does not render our explication false or inadequate. And Eriksson
and Ha´jek’s worry does not show that preferences or u-value judgments are
no conceptual criterion for ascribing beliefs.
It may be that Eriksson and Ha´jek have in mind yet another argument.
Perhaps their thought is something like this: (i) we in any case need an
explication of the perfect monk’s credences; (ii) that explication cannot be
preference based; (iii) whatever explication we give for the monk would also
apply to all other agents; and therefore the preference based explication
becomes redundant. However, for reasons I have outlined, it seems dubious
to me that we can give an adequate explication of someone’s axiological
credences if he does not make any u-value judgments. And I also do not see
why we should truly need that. It is true that our explication is restricted
in application, and that it would be preferable to have a more general one.
But unless these restrictions are too severe, and unless we have a better
proposal, it seems unreasonable to dismiss our theory simply because it is
less than fully general. So to turn the present Eriksson-Ha´jek-type worry
into a full objection, one would have to argue more thoroughly for why we
need an explication that does not presuppose u-value judgments. I shall turn
to some such considerations in the next section. But as it stands, the present
worry does again not ‘refute’ our explication.26
26There are other objections against preference-based explications in decision theory;
Eriksson and Ha´jek (2007) offer an overview. Another worry that carries over to our
context is that explicating credences in terms of preferences gets the order of explanation
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4.3.2 Normative Relevance
Let me now address a different set of worries about the judgment-based ex-
plication. These worries concern what we may call the ‘normative relevance’
of the resulting theory.
A first such worry is that judgment-based EVM becomes trivial. A theory
of axiological uncertainty should arguably be able to positively guide you in
your decision making, and hence to constrain your judgments about what is
u-best. But my argument seems to take your u-value judgments simply as
given to define your credences and values. So it may seem that judgment-
based EVM would always simply guarantee that your u-value judgments are
correct, and thus cannot guide you in your decision making at all.27
However, this would be a misunderstanding. Judgment-based EVM does
put firm constraints on you. These constraints are simply the axioms. In
the version I have outlined, it is the conditions CS that constrain you, and
your u-value judgments cannot be true if they violate these conditions. By
the same token, you may use these conditions to guide your decision mak-
ing. Judgment-based EVM does not simply guarantee that your u-value
wrong (cf. Eriksson and Ha´jek (2007, 207f.)). I have replied to the equivalent objection
concerning value on page 89; a similar reply could be given concerning credences. As
far as I see, the remaining objections do not apply to my explication of axiological cre-
dences. In particular, a prominent objection against explicating degrees of belief in terms
of preferences is that this explication is overly ‘pragmatic’, reducing a doxastic attitude
(credence) to a conative one (preferences) (cf. Joyce (1999, 89ff.) and Eriksson and Ha´jek
(2007, 194)). However, my explication reduces a doxastic attitude (axiological credences)
to another doxastic attitude (u-value judgments). So this objection does not apply.
27Sepielli (2010, 169) raised this objection against preference-based explications in de-
cision theory: ‘The standard way of assigning credences and utilities in decision theory
assigns them in such a way that the agent’s preferences will necessarily come out as maxi-
mizing expected utility. Since the going assumption in decision theory is that maximizing
expected utility is necessarily rational, this means that agents will necessarily have fully
rational preferences.’ This is ‘highly counterintuitive’ (2010, 168), he says.
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judgments are correct.
What is true is that – as far as the correctness of your u-value judgments
as u-value judgments is concerned – these axioms are all that judgment-
based EVM implies. Normatively speaking, the version of judgment-based
EVM I have outlined reduces to the conditions CS. Moreover, the conditions
CS only rule out particular sets of u-value judgments; they do not rule out
any individual judgment considered by itself. Following Ramsey (1926, 41)
and Savage (1954, 20), we might say they are only ‘consistency constraints’.
But I think that this would be somewhat misleading, since it is not straight-
forwardly inconsistent to violate our conditions CS. I shall thus call them
global constraints. So normatively speaking – and as far as the correctness of
your u-value judgments as u-value judgments is concerned – judgment-based
EVM reduces to a set of global constraints. This does not mean that any
set of judgments satisfying CS is as good as any other in all respects. Pre-
sumably, some such judgments will reflect inadequate credences and thus be
epistemically problematic. But if judgment-based EVM is true, then any set
of u-value judgments satisfying CS is correct as u-value judgments, relative
to some set of credences. When we are trying to form u-value judgments,
relative to our credences, we ultimately only have our global constraints CS.
Even if that is not outright trivial, perhaps some people will still find it
disappointing. Meacham and Weisberg apparently do. They say that ex-
pected utility maximization* – the view that one ought to maximise the
expectation of utility* relative to one’s degrees of belief* (in the technical,
representation-theorem-based senses of these terms) – is ‘prescriptively use-
less’ (2011, 656):
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adopting degrees of belief* and utilities* trivializes normative decision theory.
Normative decision theory applies only to agents who have degrees of belief and
utilities. But agents who have degrees of belief* and utilities* are automatically
[...] expected utility maximizers with respect to them. If we take the ‘degrees
of belief’ and ‘utilities’ that appear in normative decision theory to be degrees
of belief* and utilities*, it will be true by definition that all agents subject to
the norms of decision theory satisfy them. (2011, 653)
This passage is slightly misleading. On one reading, it is again simply false
that ‘normative decision theory’ becomes ‘useless’ and ‘trivialised’ by adopt-
ing these explications. But Meacham and Weisberg are careful to note that
only agents who have degrees of belief* and utilities* – i.e., satisfy the axioms
of decision theory – are expected utility* maximisers. So presumably, their
main claim (which they also make repeatedly), must be that a reduction to
global constraints somehow makes decision theory ‘uninteresting’ (2011, 642;
645; 655; 661), if not outright trivial.
But it is not clear why a reduction to global constraints should make deci-
sion theory uninteresting, and unfortunately, Meacham and Weisberg do not
say anything about why it should.28 It is worth noting that the shift from an
understanding of EVM on which it implies local constraints to one on which
28In a footnote, they consider the view that ‘we should understand normative decision
theory as the injunction to have degrees of belief and utilities’, i.e. to satisfy the relevant
conditions. But all they say in response is that ‘this proposal represents a substantive shift
in the content of normative decision theory. We’re no longer dealing with the same norms,
and these replacements can’t do the same work as the originals. For example, normative
decision theory is supposed to say which of an agent’s options she ought to take. But the
injunction to have degrees of belief and utilities will be silent on this, since every option
will maximize expected utility relative to some pair of probability and utility functions’
(2011, 648, n.15). This is merely to say that if we believed that EVM could imply local
constraints, judgment-based EVM constitutes a shift in our understanding. But it still
does not show why that should make it uninteresting, or why we thus have to ‘lay the
foundations of decision theory on firmer ground’ than that provided by representation
theorems.
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it implies global constraints is much less significant than it may at first seem.
On the one hand, at least if we accept a reflective-equilibrium view of how
we ought to form judgments in ethics, we should be familiar with the idea
that we ultimately only have some sort of global constraints. For example,
suppose we understand EVM in terms of the Simple Explication, on which
credences are given through mere introspection and which thus allows EVM
to imply local constraints. And suppose your introspective list of numbers
implies a set of u-value judgments that you find extremely implausible (e.g.,
giving far too much weight to average utilitarianism). Presumably, we would
then not say that you should stick slavishly to these judgments. Rather, we
would say that you have to adjust your ‘credences’ until they come into a
reflective equilibrium with a set of judgments that you find plausible. So
we would in any case, ultimately, embed EVM in something like global con-
straints. It is only that in judgment-based EVM this reduction to global
constraints is, as it were, internal to the theory. But it is not clear why that
should be problematic.29
On the other hand, nothing in the judgment-based explication implies that
you may not also, say, consult your feelings of confidence about axiologies
when determining a set of u-value judgments. For example, suppose that
when trying to form a CS-conformable set of u-value judgments, you start
with an intuitive list of numbers – the probability distribution P – that you
take to reflect your credences. Surely, judgment-based EVM does not pro-
29In fact, at least in the present case, I think it is preferable to have the global constraints
built into the theory. Note that according EVM understood in terms of the Simple Expli-
cation, your first (extremely implausible seeming) u-value judgments were true as u-value
judgments. That seems to show that, in itself, this theory is of little practical significance.
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hibit you to satisfy EVM with respect to these numbers. On the contrary, at
least given something like Lewis’s (1980) Principal Principle – roughly, the
principle that your subjective probabilities conditional on objective chances
should equal the objective chances – judgment-based EVM actually requires
you to (at least initially) satisfy EVM with respect to P . On pain of in-
consistency, your ˙U must then be equivalent to your U about QP ; and
if it is, then according to the judgment-based explication, you are satisfy-
ing EVM with respect to P . If these intuitive numbers P lead you to a set
of CS-conformable u-value judgments that you find plausible, there is noth-
ing wrong with that. Judgment-based EVM will agree that these are your
credences, and that your judgments are correct. So the reduction to global
constraints does not prohibit the use of local constraints in practice.
But perhaps there is a more specific worry about why judgment-based
EVM is ‘uninteresting’. One might worry that we cannot make any u-value
judgments without prior theoretic guidance. Indeed, this – one might argue –
is why we need a theory of axiological uncertainty in the first place: without
such theoretical guidance, we do not know how to make u-value judgments.
So it may seem that a theory of axiological uncertainty must be able to con-
strain or guide us without presupposing that we can make any independent
u-value judgments – otherwise the theory presupposes that we know already
precisely what it was supposed to tell us.30 But I do not think this presuppo-
sition of u-value judgments is very problematic. It is simply not true that we
have no intuitions about u-value. On the contrary, at least after a moment
of reflection, we are perfectly able to make intuitive u-value judgments even
30This is argued in Hedden (forthcoming, 13).
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without relying or even knowing any philosophical theory about it – quite as
we are able to make intuitive value judgments without relying on any theory.
I said in chapter 1 that we need a theory of u-value. But I did not mean to
suggest that we would be at complete loss about the u-value relation without
such a theory. We would not. Global constraints may well provide us with
all the guidance that we need.
One might also worry that a reduction to global constraints somehow
makes EVM too permissive – that it is simply wrong that any judgments that
satisfy something like ‘consistency’ constraints will be correct. But recall that
I am only claiming that such judgments are correct as u-value judgments.
They might of course still reflect unreasonable credence distributions, and
then they might involve some epistemic mistake. In fact, note that on any
theory of axiological uncertainty relying on subjective probabilities, your u-
best option depends on your credences. So any such theory will not imply a
local u-value judgment unless something about your credence-distribution is
known. And in that sense, any such theory will reduce to ‘global constraints’
between your credences and the u-value relation. The difference is merely
that judgment-based EVM takes the further information – about what your
credences are – from your u-value judgments, rather than from your brute
introspection, say. But again, it is not clear why that should be problematic.
So let me address a final objection about judgment-based EVM. If the
normative implications of our view of axiological uncertainty boil down to
the conditions CS, one may wonder why it should even matter whether we
can interpret your u-value judgments in this way or another. As I myself
seem to have admitted, whether or not we can interpret CS-conformable u-
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value judgments as satisfying EVM is purely a matter of description. So why
should we even care about that interpretation, and thus the relevant repre-
sentation theorem and the bulk of my argument in this chapter? It seems
that judgment-based EVM makes the formula for EVM entirely redundant.
I have some sympathy with this worry. As far as the truth of your u-
value judgments as u-value judgments is concerned, I think the formula for
EVM does indeed not add an additional norm; in principle, we could reduce
our theory to the conditions CS. But again, even if no CS-conformable set
of judgments violates norms of the theory of axiological uncertainty, some
of them arguably do violate epistemic norms. Representation theorems are
relevant because they allow us – or at least, promise to allow us – to express
this connection between the theory of axiological uncertainty on the one
hand, and axiological epistemology on the other, in a very neat way.
Most importantly, without representation theorems, it is not perspicuous
from the axioms alone what precise means we have for stating that some CS-
conformable sets of judgments are inadequate in light of our evidence. For
example, it may be true that in light of our evidence concerning speciesism,
judging that it is equally u-good to keep animals in species-appropriate con-
ditions or not, or u-better to benefit people significantly more than animals,
would be epistemically unreasonable. But it is not perspicuous how we can
capture such facts in a more principled and unified way. Representation
theorems show that if your judgments are CS-conformable, then to each axi-
ology you attach a constant weight. So representation theorems – and only
they – show that the talk of giving ‘weights’ to axiologies really does make
sense. They allow us to say not only that you should not make this or that
213
u-value judgment concerning animal welfare, but more simply and generally,
that you should not give much weight to speciesism. Or again, they at least
promise to do so. We do not currently have any general principles about
which evidence justifies which distribution of weights. But in some cases,
we at least know that given this or that objection to theory Ti, one should
give more weight to theory Tj than to theory Ti. And, given representation
theorems, we know that we can translate such principled facts into claims
about u-value judgments.
In principle, it is a matter of words whether or not we call these weights
your ‘credences’. We could have a theory that says simply that you should
give each theory some weight, and that these weights should reflect our evi-
dence in a particular way. But if we can interpret them as credences, that is
a very natural and congenial way to establish the connection between norms
of the theory of axiological uncertainty on the one hand, and epistemic norms
on the other. If nothing else, it provides some flesh to an otherwise abstract
claim about ‘weights’, and thus becomes explanatorily more powerful. It does
justice to the intuitive idea that some axiologies are more likely than oth-
ers, and that these likelihoods should be relevant in determining the u-value
relation. And it allows us to say that the normative relationship between
our evidence and these weights is one between evidence and a doxastic state,
which may provide more unity to our overall picture of what an epistemic
norm is, or what norms there exist.
In conclusion, even if the formula of EVM as the result of representation
theorems does not add any additional constraints on your u-value judgments
as u-value judgments, this does not show that such theorems, or the truth of
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the formula for EVM, are irrelevant. Judgment-based EVM is neither trivial,
nor uninteresting, nor redundant.31
4.3.3 Alternative Explications of Credences
Even if my arguments in the previous sections were sound, perhaps all other
things being equal, some people might still find it preferable to have a the-
ory of u-value that implies local constraints and is not judgment-based. So
to round off the case for judgment-based EVM, let me briefly investigate
again whether there are alternative explications. More specifically, let me
reconsider the idea of a preference-based explication of axiological credences.
I have suggested in section 4.2.1 that in order to explicate axiological
credences, we need to separate your axiological and non-axiological concerns.
To see this with a concrete proposal, consider the following explication, along
the lines of de Finetti (1980):
First Preference Explication: That your credence in Ti is pi means
that you are indifferent between £pi and a bet that gives you £1 if Ti is
true.
Let me ignore the general problems of betting interpretations (such as the
diminishing marginal value of money), and focus on the fact that this ex-
plication is preference-based. The explication is flawed if you care about
axiological value, because the value of £1 is theory-dependent. Consider a
31We may note an additional point against the redundancy of representation theorems.
In practice, instead of working with the axioms alone, it will often be easier to derive
one’s (provisional) probabilities and values from certain simple cases, and then apply the
formula for EVM to see what the axioms imply in other cases. This is what I did in section
4.2.3. In this respect, representation theorems are also helpful for practical purposes.
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uniform axiology on which all outcomes are equally good, and some utilitar-
ian theory. If the uniform theory is true, then it does not matter morally
whether or not you get the prize, but if the utilitarian theory is true, you
may well do some extra good with the money. So insofar as you care about
moral value, you will prefer a £1-bet on utilitarianism to a £1-bet on the
uniform theory, no matter what your credences are (as long as you have
some nonzero credence in the former). And the same general problem arises
among non-uniform axiologies. So insofar as you care about moral value, its
theory-dependence will distort this First Preference Explication.
But instead of bracketing your non-axiological concerns and focusing on
your u-value judgments, let us now try to bracket your concern for moral
value and focus on your prudential concerns specifically. We might thus
suggest something like the
Second Preference Explication: That your credence in Ti is pi means
that you are indifferent between £pi and a £1-bet on Ti, insofar as you
are concerned only with the prudential value of these bets for you.
However, this account still suffers from the problem of theory-dependence:
even the prudential value of £1 can depend on the true axiology. This will be
the case, at least, for axiologies on which your wellbeing has value. All these
theories come in different forms, depending on what theory of wellbeing they
presuppose. They may either presuppose an objective list theory of wellbeing,
or hedonism, or a desire-based theory – or perhaps some still other view. And
the prudential value of £1 might differ on these theories, say, because you can
easily buy some pleasure with that money but not true, valuable friendship.
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To the extent that the prudential value of outcomes depends on the true
axiology, the Second Preference Explication is distorted.
To remedy this problem, we might try to bracket this theory-dependence
of value. We might suggest something along the lines of the
Third Preference Explication: That your credence in Ti is pi means
that you are indifferent between £pi and a £1-bet on Ti, insofar as you
are concerned only with the prudential value of these bets for you, and
assume that the prudential value of money is the same regardless of which
axiology is true.
This proposal would in principle overcome the worry about theory-dependent
value. What is slightly unfortunate is that it reintroduces preferences of the
kind we encountered with Savage’s theory in section 2.2.1. Savage’s theory
presupposed that you have preferences about an act that leads to a perfectly
sunny hike even when the state of nature is ‘rain’; it presupposes that you
have preferences about impossible state-outcome combinations. The same is
true of the present account. Prudential value is axiology-dependent, but – on
the Third Preference Explication – you must assume that it is not; you need
to have preferences about impossible theory-outcome combinations. And
this is not just a technical assumption, but features as the very core of the
proposal.
But there is another, and more fundamental problem with any of these
alternative explications. The problem is how we individuate the relevant the-
ory ‘Ti’ – how we determine which theory we are referring to when explicating
your credence in theory ‘Ti’. At least under Non-Substantial Absolutism, we
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cannot simply ask how much you would bet, say, on ‘utilitarianism’, because
there are infinitely many axiologies corresponding to each ordering. This
means that we need a criterion for how the theories you have credence in
compare to one another. Unless we have such a criterion, we do not have
an explication of credences that allows us to determine the expected value
of your options. But under Non-Substantial Absolutism, we can individuate
an axiology only by how it enters the u-value relation. And consequently,
even this preference-based explication would presuppose that we can make
u-value judgments – at least, u-value judgments about Q.32 So I cannot
see why it should be preferable to explicate credences via preferences among
highly counterfactual bets, in line with the Third Preference Explication,
rather than – much more straightforwardly – via u-value judgments.
Conclusion
Let me draw a conclusion. As I mentioned on page 195, I have been pre-
supposing Non-Substantial Absolutism throughout this discussion. Under
that assumption, for the reasons I gave in this last section, I conjecture that
we cannot provide a preference-based explication of axiological credences
that comes close to the simplicity of the judgment-based explication and
would be preferable to it. For the reasons I outlined in previous sections,
I am sceptical about taking axiological credences as primitives, obtaining
them through pure introspection, or about providing an empirically much
richer or scientifically more informed explication of credences. To that ex-
tent, I am more sceptical than the representation-theorem-sceptics may be
32Note that the same individuation-problem arises for the Simple Explication.
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about alternatives to the judgment-based explication. I also argued that
the judgment-based explication is indeed a possible and good explication:
it is not somehow wrong or purely stipulative, and it does neither trivialise
EVM, nor make it uninteresting or redundant. So I am less sceptical than
the representation-theorem-sceptics may be about the judgment-based expli-
cation itself. Whether representation theorems can ground EVM is a large
question, and I cannot claim to have proved their ultimate significance be-
yond doubt. But I hope I have done enough to show that at least in the theory
of axiological uncertainty, we should be much less quick in dismissing the sig-
nificance of representation theorems than some recent sceptics have been. At
least under the assumption of Non-Substantial Absolutism, judgment-based
EVM may be the best form of EVM that there is.
4.4 Further Explorations: Alternative Expli-
cations and Eschewing Credences
To end this chapter, let me again add some notes that go beyond the main
theory I have been exploring. One major open question is that of how to
explicate credences under alternative accounts of intertheoretic comparisons.
I shall consider this question in section 4.4.1. In section 4.4.2, I shall outline
an axiomatisation of a view that eschews the concept of credences altogether.
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4.4.1 Credences under Alternative Accounts of Axi-
ologies
How could we explicate axiological credences under accounts of intertheoretic
comparisons other than Non-Substantial Absolutism? In an interesting sense,
the theory of Non-Substantial Absolutism is the most general theory, as it
can easily be extended to cover alternative accounts. More specifically, to
explicate credences under alternative accounts of intertheoretic comparisons,
we could simply extend the Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem in the
ways in which I have extended the Expected Value Theorem in chapter 3.
For example, on page 124 I introduced the
Best/Worst Comparison Principle: For all Ti and Tj, a[Ti,awi ] ∼U
a[Tj ,awj ] and a[Ti,abi ] ∼U a[Tj ,abj ].
This principle will make the Expected Value Theorem imply EVM with a
given comparativist view about how axiologies compare. I stated other such
principles, as well as principles that will make the Expected Value Theorem
imply EVM under a strength-sensitive FA-account (viz., the Dyadic Attitude
Principle and the Monadic Attitude Principle).
These principles could straightforwardly be introduced into the Subjec-
tivist Expected Value Theorem, as conditions on your u-value judgments
about Q. They would ensure that the value-functions that you assign to
your theories satisfy whatever constraints we think they should satisfy –
e.g., the Best/Worst Normalisation principle, or the constraint that value-
facts correspond to pertinent facts about attitudes. If we do add them to
the Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem, that extended theorem will al-
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low us to give a judgment-based explication of credences, and thus defend
judgment-based EVM, even for these alternative accounts of intertheoretic
comparisons.
However, under alternative accounts of intertheoretic comparisons, alter-
natives to the judgment-based explication may be somewhat more promising.
Consider again the Third Preference Explication from page 217. The main
problem with this explication was that in order to individuate Ti, we would
again have to refer to the u-value relation and so it would not have any clear
advantage over the judgment-based explication.
However, under alternative accounts of what axiologies are, this may not
be so. For example, suppose Comparativism is true, and axiologies are merely
orderings. In that case, we can individuate Ti simply by the ordering it im-
plies. So we might give the Third Preference Explication or another, slightly
more sophisticated preference-based explication that avoids its more familiar
problems (like the diminishing marginal value of money). If we have a spe-
cific comparison principle, we might then be able to tell you which of your
options is u-best without presupposing that you make any u-value judgments.
Something similar might be true with respect to forms of Absolutism based
on FA-accounts. If intertheoretic comparisons are grounded in facts about
fitting attitudes, we might individuate a theory Ti as ‘the theory that im-
plies the ordering Oi and the set Ai of facts about attitudes’. We might then
give something like the Third Preference Explication to explicate your cre-
dences, and thus be able to tell you which of your options is u-best without
presupposing that you make any u-value judgments.
221
However, it is not at all clear to me whether that would be preferable.
If we use something like the Third Preference Explication, we have to pre-
suppose that you have preferences about counterfactual bets on axiological
orderings, or that you have beliefs about fitting strengths of attitudes, as well
as preferences concerning counterfactual bets involving them. I am not at
all convinced that this would be preferable to a judgment-based explication.
On the contrary, it seems more common for people to have beliefs about
u-value relations rather than, say, about precisely which attitudes would be
fitting. And if my arguments from section 4.3 were sound, the reduction of
judgment-based EVM to global constraints is much less problematic than
people have suggested. So I am inclined to think that even under alternative
accounts of intertheoretic comparisons, judgment-based EVM might be the
best form of EVM.
4.4.2 Weighted Value Maximisation
I have argued that, ceteris paribus, it is preferable to interpret the weights
that axiologies have in determining the u-value relation as probabilities or
credences. By the same token, I think it is preferable to distinguish be-
tween the probability we assign to an axiology, and the value-function of this
axiology – although both ultimately appear simply as the weight that this
axiology has in determining the u-value relation. If we can make this dis-
tinction, I take it, that makes our theory explanatorily more powerful. We
can then give a more specific explanation of what these ‘weights’ are. As I
said, that explanation does justice to the intuitively plausible idea that some
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axiologies are more likely than others and that these likelihoods should be
relevant in determining the u-value relation; and it also does justice to the
idea – which I also take to be intuitively plausible – that different axiolgies
assign different values to outcomes, and that these values too should be rel-
evant in determining the u-value relation. I have also argued that we can
indeed make that distinction, both on a technical and on a conceptual level.
However, I have not claimed that my arguments to that effect were ab-
solutely conclusive. So now that we have the formal framework in place,
it is worth mentioning briefly that the alternative view, which eschews the
distinction between probabilities and values altogether, can be axiomatised
straightforwardly in that framework. We can do that with a precise ana-
logue of the Expected Value Theorem, concerning K instead of Q. So let me
introduce the
Pareto Condition for K: If for some a and b in K, Ki(a) ∼i Ki(b) for
all Ti, then a ∼˙U b; and if Ki(a) i Ki(b) for all Ti, and Kj(a) j Kj(b)
for some Tj, then a ˙U b .
For two functions u : Z → R and v : Z → R, say that v is a positive unit-
comparable transformation of u if there is an s ∈ R, s > 0, and a function
t : I → R, such that v(i, x) = su(i, x)+t(i) for all i in I and x in X. Given the
assumption that each of your i is vNM-conformable, the following theorem
holds:
Subjectivist Weighted Value Theorem: If your ˙U is vNM-conformable
and satisfies the Pareto Condition for K with respect to your i, there is a
theory-dependent utility function u : Z → R that represents each axiology
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cardinally, and is unique up to positive unit-comparable transformation,
such that for all a and b in K,
a ˙U b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)u(i, x). (4.7)
This theorem is put in terms of a theory-dependent utility function. It does
not say that we can treat the respective functions u(i, ·) as products piGi of
your credence in Ti with Ti’s value-function. So (4.7) does not express EVM.
I thus say it expresses Weighted Value Maximisation. What the Subjectivist
Weighted Value Theorem says is that, if your u-value judgments satisfy the
von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and the Pareto Condition for K, then to
each axiology you are attaching a constant weight, in the form of a utility
function.
Again, this theorem is a non-normative claim. It says that if your u-
value judgments satisfy the relevant conditions, then you are, as a matter of
fact, following (4.7). We can turn this into an argument for the normative
truth of (4.7) by claiming that your u-value judgments ought to satisfy these
conditions. However, that your ˙U should satisfy the Pareto Condition for
K is only plausible if you do not rule out the truth of any axiology under
consideration completely – or intuitively, if you assign ‘nonzero credence’
to all axiologies. If there is some Tj whose truth you rule out completely,
then the second clause of the condition is implausible with regards to that
theory. So to ground a normative argument on the Subjectivist Weighted
Value Theorem, we would have to assume that the set of theories under
consideration is such that you do not completely rule out the truth of any of
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them. The obvious way to do so would be to restrict the theories to those
for which your ˙U does, as a matter of fact, satisfy the Pareto Condition for
K.
This is a genuine theory of axiological uncertainty. To my knowledge, no
one has defended that theory so far. Philosophers writing on axiological or
normative uncertainty have always focused on expected value maximisation.
For the reasons I mentioned, I think that if we can establish it, EVM is
preferable to Weighted Value Maximisation. But once we acknowledge that
the question of what credences are is not entirely unproblematic, Weighted
Value Maximisation becomes a relevant alternative.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the question of how to understand axiological
credences. I argued that we should not take such credences as undefined
primitives, suggested that we should not accept an explication based on pure
introspection, and expressed doubts about empirically very rich explications
or explications on the basis of preferences. As an alternative, and based
on a representation theorem by Karni and Schmeidler, I then suggested the
judgment-based explication. According to this explication, your credence in
an axiology is the weight you give this axiology in your u-value judgments.
I argued that this explication is not somehow wrong or purely stipulative,
and that it does neither trivialise EVM, nor make it uninteresting or redun-
dant. If I am right, judgment-based EVM may be the best form of EVM that
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there is – at least, but perhaps not only, on Non-Substantial Absolutism.
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Chapter 5
The Problem of Incompleteness
Introduction
I have argued in chapter 2 that – barring the problem of intertehoretic com-
parisons and taking axiological probabilities as primitives – representation
theorems from decision theory can help us formulate and defend EVM. In
chapter 3, I have argued that intertheoretic comparisons are generally possi-
ble but that, at least given Absolutism, some plausible axiologies are not fully
comparable and the u-value relation is not complete if it ranges over them.
In the last chapter, I have argued that we cannot take axiological credences
as a primitive and provided an explication for them. The present chapter
makes some steps towards bringing together the upshots from the last three
chapters. That is, it extends the Expected Value Theorem by dropping the
completeness assumption and the presupposition of axiological probabilities
as given primitives.
Unfortunately, although there are numerous results in expected utility
227
theory without the completeness assumption, and numerous results in state-
dependent expected utility theory, there is – as far as I see – no pertinent
existing result that combines these two fields: no representation theorem
implying a unique separation of subjective probabilities and utilities for in-
complete, state-dependent preferences.1 So in the present chapter, I shall
need some space to develop a result that at least goes in this direction. This
is what I shall do in section 5.1. The emerging theorem will be the most
encompassing result of this thesis.
Having dropped the Completeness Condition, we will then be in a better
position to assess the prospects of understanding EVM as a general theory of
moral uncertainty – rather than simply a theory of axiological uncertainty.
So in section 5.2, I shall explore whether we can extend the framework of this
thesis to cover moral uncertainty generally. I will conclude that the prospects
of this extension look rather bleak.
Section 5.3 will then draw a conclusion. It will briefly summarise the main
positive and negative upshots of this thesis, and indicate some possible paths
for further research.
5.1 Axiomatising Incomplete U-Value Rela-
tions
In this section, I will first introduce a representation theorem due to Robert
Nau (2006). I shall do that in section 5.1.1. Nau axiomatised incomplete
1I thank Edi Karni for confirming this to me (as of fall 2013).
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preferences by use of state-dependent utility functions. However, Nau’s the-
orem does not imply a unique separation of utilities and probabilities, and
since the overall argument I intend to give depends on such a separation,
I have to supplement that result with additional assumptions. So in sec-
tion 5.1.2, I shall again simply assume probabilities as primitives, and turn
Nau’s result into an axiomatisation of an incomplete u-value relation with
given axiological probabilities. Building on that, in section 5.1.3, I introduce
an additional axiom and state a representation theorem that implies unique
subjective probabilities and a relevantly unique set of state-dependent utility
functions.
5.1.1 Nau’s Theorem
For simplicity (and as I have done with Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem 2),
I shall simply state Nau’s result with respect to the sets of options I have
already introduced, rather than defining new options that explicitly refer to
‘states’ as opposed to axiologies. His result again concerns prospects that do
not presuppose an implicit probability distribution over states; it concerns
the set K. Let ax denote the constant act that yields consequence x with
probability 1 for every i – that is, ax(i, y) = 1 if y = x, and ax(i, y) = 0
if y 6= x, for all i. We shall assume that X contains a worst and a best
outcome, labeled x and x respectively; and we shall assume slightly different
independence- and continuity constraints from those we have been using so
far. That is, our axioms for a reflexive binary relation ˙ on K are defined as
follows:
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TransitivityK: If a ˙ b and b ˙ c, then a ˙ c;
Mixture-IndependenceK: a ˙ b if and only if pa + (1 − p)c ˙ pb +
(1− p)c, for all p ∈]0, 1[ and all c in K;
Sequence-ContinuityK: if {an} and {bn} are convergent sequences such
that an ˙ bn for all n, then lim(an) ˙ lim(bn);
Existence of Best and WorstK: For all x ∈ X r {x, x}, ax ˙ ax, and
ax ˙ ax;
Non-TrivialityK: ax ˙ ax (i.e., not ax ˙ ax).
For simplicity, I shall use the term ‘N-conformable’ for all reflexive binary
relations on K that satisfy these axioms (for some x and x in X). Note that
Existence of Best and Worst implies that ˙ cannot be totally incomplete.
But apart from this assumption (and from what follows from it together with
the other axioms), these conditions do not assume that ˙ is complete. I shall
briefly comment on these axioms when we apply them to the u-value relation.
But let me first state Nau’s theorem.
Instead of defining a uniqueness criterion for our utility functions – which
is somewhat more complicated if we are dealing with incomplete relations2 –
we shall simply introduce a normalisation for these functions, and then focus
on normalised functions only. So define a normalized set of state-dependent
2Cf. Nau (2006) for a fully spelt out uniqueness criterion.
230
utility functions
W* = {w : Z → R | w(i, x) = 0 ∀i ∈ I; 0 ≤
∑
i∈I
w(i, x) ≤ 1
∀ x ∈ X r {x, x};
∑
i∈I
w(i, x) = 1}. (5.1)
Call a collection of preferences {an ˙ bn} a basis for ˙ under an axiom system
if every preference a ˙ b can be deduced from {an ˙ bn} by application
of these axioms. Finally, for simplicity, for some state-dependent utility




a(i, x)w(i, x). (5.2)
Given these definitions, Nau (2006, Theorem 2) proves
Nau’s Theorem: If a reflexive binary relation ˙ on K is N-conformable,
there exists a nonempty closed convex set W ⊂ W* of state-dependent
utility functions, such that for all a and b in K,
a ˙ b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
a(i, x)w(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)w(i, x) ∀w ∈ W. (5.3)
In particular, if {an ˙ bn} is a basis for ˙ under these axioms, then W is
the set of w ∈ W* satisfying {Uw(an) ≥ Uw(bn)}.
(5.3) is a representation in terms of a set of utility functions. This straight-
forwardly allows for incompleteness in ˙: neither a ˙ b nor b ˙ a are true
if there are u and v in W with Uu(a) > Uu(b) and Uv(b) > Uv(a).
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However, note that in this result, the function w is not separated into a
probability and a utility function. So the representation in (5.3) is not an
expected utility representation; additional assumptions are required to assure
that (5.3) can take the form of an expected utility representation with rele-
vantly unique probabilities and utilities. Nau (2006) proceeds to introducing
an assumption that guarantees the state-independence of preferences. Such
an assumption is unfortunate for our purposes. So let me proceed differently.
5.1.2 The Expected Value Theorem for Incomplete-
ness
To apply Nau’s result to our context, I shall first turn it into a theorem that
assumes probabilities as given primitives, as the Expected Value Theorem
did. To that end, let me again consider the set Q, and suppose  is a
reflexive binary relation on Q. We shall now assume that Z contains a best
and a worst state-outcome pair, labeled (i, x) and (i, x) respectively. Given
this assumption, we can define a normalised set of utility functions
U* = {u : Z → R | u(i, x) = 0; 0 ≤ u(i, x) ≤ 1 ∀ (i, x) ∈ Z r {(i, x),
(i, x)}; u(i, x) = 1}. (5.4)




a(i, x)w(i, x). (5.5)
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With the option a(i,x) as defined on page 124,
3 we shall define the relevant
axioms governing  as follows:
TransitivityQ: if a  b and b  c, then a  c;
Mixture-IndependenceQ: a  b if and only if pa + (1 − p)c  pb +
(1− p)c, for all p ∈]0, 1[ and all c in Q;
Sequence-ContinuityQ: if {an} and {bn} are convergent sequences such
that an  bn for all n, then lim(an)  lim(bn);
Existence of Best and WorstQ: For all (i, x) ∈ Z r {(i, x), (i, x)},
a(i,x)  a(i,x), and a(i,x)  a(i,x);
Non-TrivialityQ: a(i,x)  a(i,x) (i.e., not a(i,x)  a(i,x)).
For simplicity, I shall again use the term ‘N-conformable’ for all reflexive
binary relations on Q that satisfy these axioms (for some (i, x) and (i, x) in
Z). Nau’s Theorem then implies
Theorem 5.1: If a reflexive binary relation  on Q is N-conformable,
there exists a nonempty closed convex set U ⊂ U* of state-dependent-
utility functions, such that for all a and b in Q,
a  b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U. (5.6)
In particular, if {an  bn} is a basis for  under these axioms, then U is
the set of u ∈ U* satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}.
This is a fairly immediate implication of Nau’s Theorem. The proof is given
in appendix 6.3.
3a(i,x)(i, x) = 1.
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To apply this theorem to the context of axiological uncertainty, I shall
now assume that all axiologies under consideration satisfy the following con-
ditions:
TransitivityO: if a  b and b  c, then a  c;
Mixture-IndependenceO: a  b if and only if pa+(1−p)c  pb+(1−p)c,
for all p ∈]0, 1[ and all c in O;
Sequence-ContinuityO: if {an} and {bn} are convergent sequences such
that an  bn for all n, then lim(an)  lim(bn).
If a binary relation on O satisfies these conditions, I shall say it is N*-
conformable.
If we want to represent an axiology on which outcomes are less than fully
comparable, we cannot interpret it as implying determinate value difference
ratios of the form ‘the value difference between x and y is n times as great
as the value difference between z and t’. Similarly, if we want to represent
two axiologies that are not fully comparable, we cannot interpret them as
implying determinate intertheoretic value difference ratios of the form ‘the
value difference between x and y, according to Ti, is n times as great as the
value difference between z and t, according to Tj’. Instead, I take it, as far
as intratheoretic comparisons are concerned we are interested in judgments
like
(A) according to Ti, the value difference between x and y is at least (or
at most) n times as great as the value difference between z and t.
I shall call such judgments rough cardinal intratheoretic comparisons (of
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value). As far as intertheoretic comparisons are concerned, we are interested
in judgments like
(B) the value difference between x and y, according to Ti, is at least (or
at most) n times as great as the value difference between z and t,
according to Tj.
Again, our theorem guarantees that we can explicate level-comparisons too.
That is, we can actually explicate more general statements like
(C) the difference between the value of x, according to Ti, and the value
of y, according to Tj, is at least (or at most) n times as great as the
difference between the value of z, according to Th, and the value of
t, according to Tk.
I shall call such statements rough crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic com-
parisons (of value). To state my explications, let U be a nonempty closed
convex set of utility functions u : X → R. Suppose that for some axiology
Ti, and for all a and b in O,






b(x)u(x) ∀u ∈ U. (5.7)
I shall then say that U represents Ti ordinally. And I shall use equivalent,
self-explanatory definitions for the claims that some nonempty closed convex
set U of theory-dependent utility functions represents the u-value relation
U ordinally, or (in the next section) that some pair (U, P ) represents your
u-value relation ˙U ordinally. Now suppose that for some nonempty closed
convex set U of utility functions, and some axiology Ti, the rough cardinal
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intratheoretic comparisons between certain outcomes are true according to
Ti if and only if they are true for all functions in U . I shall then say that U
represents Ti cardinally. According to my explication, if a nonempty closed
convex set U ⊂ U* of utility functions represents an axiology ordinally, then
it also represents it cardinally. Similarly, suppose that some nonempty closed
convex set U of theory-dependent utility functions is such that, for each
axiology Ti, the set Ui = {u(i, ·) | u ∈ U} represents that axiology cardinally.
I shall then say that U represents each axiology cardinally. Suppose that for
some nonempty closed convex set U of theory-dependent utility functions, the
rough crosscutting cardinal intertheoretic comparisons are true, according to
our theories, if and only if they are true for all functions in U . I shall
then say that U jointly represents all axiologies cardinally. According to my
explication, if a nonempty closed convex set U ⊂ U* of theory-dependent
utility functions represents the u-value relation ordinally, and represents each
axiology cardinally, then it jointly represents all axiologies cardinally. If that
is so, we can assume, say, that our theories are represented by the set of
value-functions G = {G : Z → R | G = u, u ∈ U} of theory-dependent utility
functions, and accordingly, that each theory Ti is represented by the set of
value-functions Gi = {Gi : X → R | Gi = G(i, ·) = u(i, ·), u ∈ U}.
To apply these explications, let me add a third clause to the Pareto con-
dition I introduced in chapter 2, and state the
Strong Pareto Condition: For any probability distribution P on I, and
for all a and b in QP , if Hi(a) ∼i Hi(b) for all Ti with P (i) > 0, then
a ∼U b; if Hi(a) i Hi(b) for all Ti with P (i) > 0 and Hj(a) j Hj(b) for
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some Tj with P (j) > 0, then a U b; and if for some Tj with P (j) > 0,
Hi(a) ∼i Hi(b) for all Ti 6= Tj with P (i) > 0, then a U b only if
Hj(a) j Hj(b).
The third clause of this condition guarantees that the value-functions in our
representation will not represent sharpenings of our axiologies.
Given our explications, and the assumption that all axiologies under con-
sideration are N*-conformable, the following theorem holds:
Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness: If the u-value relation
U is N-conformable and satisfies the Strong Pareto Condition, then for
all a and b in Q,






b(i, x)Gi(x) ∀G ∈ G. (5.8)
Note that Existence of Best and Worst implies that our axiologies cannot be
fully incomparable. Sequence-Continuity implies that they cannot compare
in a lexical way. So as I indicated in section 3.4.2, this theorem cannot apply
to axiologies that are comparable or incomparable in such ways. But again,
I take it that such theories are extreme and comparatively very implausible;
and to that extent at least, this is a much less severe restriction than that
imposed by Completeness.
What is important is that the theory expressed in (5.8) can range over
axiologies that are only roughly comparable. In fact, it allows us to represent
both (non-radical) intra- and intertheoretic incomparability. If a theory Ti
features some intratheoretic incomparability, then some two functions in Gi
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are not positive affine transformations of each other. If no axiology under
consideration features intratheoretic incomparability, then for all i in I, all
functions in Gi are positive affine transformations of each other. There may
then still be intertheoretic incomparability. In that case, for at least some
theory Ti, not all functions in Gi are the same – that is, some of the functions
in Gi are nontrivial positive affine transformations of each other. This is a
significant advantage over the Expected Value Theorem.
5.1.3 The Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem for
Incompleteness
Let me now make some first steps towards axiomatising incomplete u-value
relations without given probabilities. First, I have to reemphasise a point I
noted on page 188. There are two reasons for why the u-value relation relative
to your credences may be incomplete. You may have credence in theories that
give rise to incomparability in values (either intra- or intertheoretically); or
you may have fuzzy credences. As I mentioned there, I shall ignore the latter
case. Fuzzy credences present a general problem that has nothing to do with
axiological credences specifically. So for simplicity, I shall simply be assuming
that your credences are sharp, and that the incompleteness of your u-value
relation is entirely due to an incomparability in your values.
To model this, say that a probability distribution P over I is positive if
P (i) > 0 for all i in I. Using the function L : Q+ → K (from page 184), I
shall assume the
Reduction Axiom: there is a positive probability distribution P over I
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such that, if a and b in QP , a  b if and only if L(a) ˙ L(b).
If your preferences on K satisfy the Reduction Axiom, they are exactly equal
to your preferences on options conditional upon the probability distribution
P . I am not aware that this axiom has been used in the literature for reducing
incompleteness in preferences to incompleteness in values. Similar axioms
have been used, but the ones I know of all depend on the assumption of state-
independent preferences.4 It is undoubtedly very strong. It not only rules
out fuzzy credences, but also basically gives us the required probabilities.
But at least as a first step towards bringing together the two branches of
expected utility theory, it will nonetheless be interesting to see what this
assumptions implies.
To state the relevant uniqueness condition, say that i is strictly non-
uniform under  if there are xi, x˜i,
˜
xi, xi in X such that a(i,xi)  a(i,x˜i) 
a(i,
˜
xi)  a(i,xi). Given this definition, we can state
Theorem 5.2: Suppose a reflexive binary relation onQ is N-conformable,
and there is a reflexive binary relation ˙ on K, such that  and ˙ jointly
satisfy the Reduction Axiom for some positive probability distribution P
on I. Then (i) there exists a nonempty closed convex set U ⊂ U* of
state-dependent utility functions such that for all a and b in K,
a ˙ b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
P (i)u(i, x)a(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
P (i)u(i, x)b(i, x) ∀u ∈ U,
(5.9)
4Cf. e.g. the eponymic ‘Reduction Axiom’ in Ok et al. (2012).
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and for all a and b in Q,
a  b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)a(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)b(i, x) ∀u ∈ U. (5.10)
(ii) If {an  bn} is a basis for  under these axioms, then U is the set of
u ∈ U* satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}. And (iii) if each i is strictly non-
uniform under , then there is no other probability distribution Q 6= P
for which (i) is true.
To apply this theorem to our context, we can expand my explication from
chapter 4. Let U be a nonempty closed convex set of theory-dependent util-
ity functions, and P a probability distribution over theories. Suppose you
have the credence distribution P over theories that are jointly represented
cardinally by U . I shall then say that the pair (U, P ) represents your axi-
ological beliefs cardinally. My assumption is that, if there is a unique pair
(U ∈ U*, P ), such that U represents your u-value judgments about Q ordi-
nally, the pair (U, P ) represents your u-value judgments about K ordinally,
and U represents each of your axiologies cardinally, then (U, P ) represents
your axiological beliefs cardinally. Hence if that is so, we can assume, say,
that P (i) represents your credence pi in the theory that is represented by the
functions Gi = {Gi : X → R | Gi = u(i, ·), u ∈ U}.
So given our explications, and the assumption that each of your i is
N*-conformable and strictly non-uniform,5 the following theorem holds:
Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness: If your
U is N-conformable and satisfies the Strong Pareto Condition with re-
5Say that i is strictly non-uniform if for some xi, x˜i,
˜





spect to your i, and if your U and ˙U jointly satisfy the Reduction
Axiom for some positive probability distribution P on I, then for all a
and b in K,






b(i, x)piGi(x) ∀G ∈ G. (5.11)
This is the most encompassing theorem of this thesis. Again, it does not
allow us to represent fully incomparable theories, or theories that compare
in a lexical way. Moreover, that yourU and ˙U should satisfy the Reduction
Axiom is only plausible if you do not rule out the truth of any axiology under
consideration completely – or intuitively, if you assign nonzero credence to
all axiologies. So to ground a normative argument on this theorem, we would
have to restrict the set of axiologies under consideration accordingly. And
even apart from that, the Reduction Axiom is ultimately unduly strong.
But I take this to be an interesting first result in the relevant direction. It
could again be extended to incorporate different accounts of intertheoretic
comparisons, but I shall not pursue this here.
5.2 Further Explorations: General Moral Un-
certainty
Now that we have a theory of axiological uncertainty that can allow for
incompleteness, we are in a better position to explore a final major question
that goes beyond the theory I have defended so far. More precisely, we are
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now well-equipped to ask whether the account I have been outlining could
serve as a general theory of moral uncertainty, rather than simply a theory
of axiological uncertainty. So this is what I shall examine in the present
section. For simplicity, I shall not introduce new labels. So in this section,
when I speak of ‘EVM’, I shall not mean the theory of axiological uncertainty
that I have been calling EVM so far. Instead, I shall mean the rough idea of
expected value maximisation. My question is whether this idea, EVM, can
be applied to moral uncertainty generally.
If EVM should function as a general theory of moral uncertainty, it cannot
range merely over betterness-relations. Instead, we have to assume that
there is some more general relation between options that all moral theories
are concerned with. I shall take ‘(weakly) morally preferable’ to be such a
relation. So in this section, I shall understand ‘’ as referring to the reflexive
part of this relation, and the labels ‘T1’, ‘T2’, ‘T3’,... accordingly as referring
to theories about moral preferability. ‘a i b’ thus means that a is weakly
morally preferable to b, according to the moral theory Ti; ‘a i b’ and ‘a ∼i b’
are understood as usual, and denote that according to theory Ti, a is strictly
morally preferable to b, or that a and b are equally morally preferable.6
There are various problems and questions with applying EVM to moral
uncertainty generally.7 In what follows, I shall focus on one issue only – viz.,
6In applying EVM to moral uncertainty, some authors have taken moral theories to
imply ‘moral choice-worthiness’ relations (cf. MacAskill (2014)), or moral ‘value’ relations
(where that is somehow understood more broadly than axiological value; cf. Sepielli (2010)
and Ross (2006b)). However, both ‘more choice-worthy than’ and ‘more valuable than’ are,
as a matter of meaning, transitive. So these interpretations rule out intransitive theories
from the outset.
7One important problem is the possibility of supererogation, which most standard
deontological theories allow. According to these theories, there are options a and b such
that a is morally preferable to b, but it is not the case that you ought to choose a.
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the question whether all, or at least most moral theories satisfy the relevant
axioms of decision theory. If moral theories do not satisfy the axioms of de-
cision theory, that raises two problems for EVM, which are both familiar by
now. First, a theory may fail to satisfy these axioms because according to
that theory, it is not the case that we ought to maximise expected value with
regards to ordinary non-normative uncertainty. But then, if we have at least
some credence in such theories, it is implausible that EVM can function as
a general theory of moral and non-normative uncertainty. So such theories
raise the question whether EVM is plausible. Secondly and more funda-
mentally, in order to explain what ‘EVM’ means and represent our theories
with (something like) value-functions, we have to explicate what cardinal
intratheoretic comparisons of value mean. Decision theory provides such an
explication, but this explication presupposes that the relevant theory satisfies
the axioms of decision theory. So if moral theories fail to satisfy the relevant
axioms, this raises the question whether EVM can even be formulated as a
general theory of moral uncerainty.
This second problem at least is quite generally acknowledged, even by peo-
ple who endorse EVM as a general theory of moral uncertainty. However, my
sense is that the limitations of the decision-theoretic explication are greatly
underestimated. For example, in response to the worry that deontological
theories do not assign cardinal values to outcomes, Jacob Ross says:
Any theory that can serve as an adequate basis for action must tell us what
to do in cases in which the outcomes of our actions are uncertain. [...] And
it follows from Ramsey’s representation theorem that for any theory that tells
This raises the problem how moral preferability and the moral ‘ought’ are weighed under
uncertainty. Cf. e.g. Sepielli (2010, ch.6) for a discussion.
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us what to do in such cases of uncertainty and that satisfies certain minimal
coherence conditions, we can construct a value function that indicates not just
the ordinal values of one’s options, but also ratios among the value intervals
between them. (2006a, 25; cf. 2006b, 754f.)
By ‘minimal coherence conditions’, Ross must mean some axioms of decision
theory. So he suggests that any minimally coherent theory that can serve as
an ‘adequate basis for action’ will be representable by a value-function.8
But unfortunately, when it comes to moral theories, each of these axioms
is extremely problematic. Moral theories can be perfectly coherent, and
provide a perfectly ‘adequate basis for action’ even if they violate them. At
least, this is what I shall argue in what follows. In my discussion, I shall
focus on the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, as introduced in chapter 2;
section 5.2.1 discusses Transitivity, section 5.2.2 addresses Continuity, and
section 5.2.3 elaborates on Independence. However, my general arguments
do not depend on this precise formulation of the axioms. As far as I see, they
equally apply to all standard formulations of transitivity, independence and
continuity constraints. The conclusion of my discussion will be that, strictly
speaking, very many standard moral theories do not satisfy these axioms.
I shall show that we can extend, or revise these theories such that they do
accord with our constraints; and in some cases at least, that may be the best
we can do for now in practice. But, as I shall argue, that does not present
a convincing theoretical solution to the core problem. Strictly speaking,
8Sepielli (2010, ch.5) also suggests the same method for cardinalisation. However, he
does not even mention that a theory has to satisfy certain conditions for this method to
be applicable. MacAskill (2014) also suggests the same method, and does mention that
moral theories have to satisfy certain axioms for that method to work, but he does not
discuss whether they generally do so.
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many standard moral theories do not satisfy the axioms, and understanding
EVM as a general theory of moral uncertainty is more problematic than its
proponents have assumed.
Since there are representation theorems that do not assume Completeness,
the incompleteness of many moral theories does not present a problem. It
may be worth mentioning, however, that dropping Completeness – even at
the level of first-order theories – is absolutely vital if EVM should be any-
thing like a general theory of moral uncertainty. Among non-consequentialist
moral theories, incompleteness abounds. For example, on one plausible in-
terpretation at least, the classic deontological view of Ross (1930) is highly
incomplete, in cases where ‘prima facie duties’ conflict. More generally, many
pluralist views of ethics are incomplete. On such views, what is morally most
preferable depends on a range of different considerations – such as special
obligations, rights as side constraints, impersonal goodness, perfectionist val-
ues and commitments to personal projects, say. On many such views, there
may not be precise facts about how these considerations weigh against each
other, and thus they give rise to incompleteness.9 Views that allow for moral
dilemmas are also plausibly construed as incomplete.10 And there are nu-
merous other deontological views with similar incompleteness. So it is very
important that we have a theory that does not presuppose Completeness.
9Such a pluralist theory, explicitly implying incompleteness, is defended in Nagel (1979).
10Cf. e.g. Richardson (1994, 115ff.).
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5.2.1 Transitivity
How about Transitivity? Unfortunately, there are many moral theories that
prima facie violate that axiom. (I shall explain the ‘prima facie’-caveat
shortly.)
Consider, for example, the following person-affecting view of population
ethics: if one has a choice among bringing about two worlds, it is preferable to
bring about the world in which the total wellbeing of all the people that exist
in both worlds is greater; if this total wellbeing is equal in both worlds, or
there is no one that exists in both worlds, the worlds are equally preferable.11
To see the intransitivity this view implies, suppose that we have some cardinal
concept of wellbeing, and consider the following five worlds – where the first
number in brackets refers to Brown’s level of wellbeing in the respective
world, the second number refers to White’s level of wellbeing in that world,
and ‘Ω’ indicates that the person does not exist in the world:
a : (2,Ω), b : (1, 3), c : (Ω, 2), d : (3, 1), and e : (2,Ω).
Let a to e represent the options of bringing about these worlds. Then ac-
cording to the person-affecting view, a  b, b  c, c  d and d  e. Since a
and e seem to be the same options, this set of judgments is – at least prima
facie – intransitive.12
Note that the intransitivity arises because, according to our view, whether
the wellbeing of a person in a world matters depends on whether that person
exists in the world we compare it with. More generally, according to this
view, the moral worth of an option depends on its alternative. I shall say
11For a defence of such a view, cf. e.g. Roberts (2003).
12I thank John Broome for this example.
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that this view features alternative-dependency. Alternative-dependency very
easily leads to intransitivities of the above sort.
Unfortunately, as Tim Willenken (2012) has shown, common sense moral-
ity is full of such dependency. Consider, for example, the following three
principles:
Numbers: If faced with a pairwise choice between saving a lesser number
of people from some harm and a greater number of people from that same
harm, it is morally preferable to save the greater number.
Dominance: If faced with a pairwise choice between two options a and
b, where each individual is at least as well off if you choose a rather than
b and someone is much better off, it is morally preferable to choose a.
No Pushing: If faced with a pairwise choice between pushing one person
off a bridge to his death in order to block a trolley and letting several
other people get killed by that trolley, it is morally preferable to let the
greater number get killed.
As Willenken has shown, these three principles generate a prima facie deontic
cycle.13 Or consider
Promises: If faced with a pairwise choice between saving someone you
have promised to save from death and saving one stranger from death and
a second stranger from moderate injury, it is morally preferable to save
the person that you have promised to save.
13Cf. Willenken (2012, 546) for an example.
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No Killing for Promises: If faced with a pairwise choice between letting
die someone you have promised to save from death and killing one stranger,
it is morally preferable to let the person die.
Together with Dominance, these principles again yield a prima facie deontic
cycle.14 And such examples could be multiplied with ease. Since common
sense morality is full of alternative-dependency, it is full of such prima facie
violations of Transitivity.
However, the case is not as simple. All these examples raise the question
how options, or outcomes, should be individuated. Suppose that a theory
seems to imply that a  b, b  c, and c  a, on grounds of alternative-
dependency. One might argue that, in that case, this theory treats a-when-
b-was-the-alternative (ab) as different from a-when-c-was-the-alternative (ac);
after all, our theory features alternative-dependency and thus takes the rel-
evant alternatives really to matter. More concretely, consider again the
person-affecting view of population ethics. It does indeed seem plausible
that this theory treats (2,Ω)(3,1) as distinct from (2,Ω)(1,3). If we bring about
(2,Ω) by rejecting (3, 1), we made Brown worse off than she could have been.
But there is no one whom we made worse off than she could have been if
we bring about (2,Ω) by rejecting (1, 3). Since this theory is particularly
concerned with these kinds of harms, it may be natural for it to individuate
these outcomes more fine-grainedly than I first did. And if we do individuate
outcomes more fine-grainedly, our theories no longer violate Transitivity. If
a theory says that a  b, b  c, and c  a, and we reindividuate outcomes
via their alternatives, our theory implies that ab  ba, bc  cb, and ca  ac.
14Cf. Willenken (2012, 551) for an example.
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This is perfectly consistent with Transitivity. So there is a general strategy
by which we can render theories that seem to violate that axiom consistent
with it.
However, there is a downside to this strategy. Many theories that are
complete under a coarse-grained individuation of outcomes will become very
incomplete under a more fine-grained one. Consider the person-affecting
view of population ethics. If we individuate outcomes only by the people
who exist in them and their level of wellbeing, the theory explicitly tells us,
for any two outcomes, which of them is preferable (or that they are equally
preferable). This is not the case if we individuate outcomes more finely. For
example, the theory does not imply any ordering of the worlds (2,Ω)(3,1) and
(1, 3)(2,Ω). Brown could have been better off in both (2,Ω)(3,1) and (1, 3)(2,Ω).
But are these worlds equally preferable because the harm is the same (1 unit
of wellbeing); or is (2,Ω)(3,1) preferable because in this world Brown is better
off than in (1, 3)(2,Ω)? As it stands, the theory is simply silent on this. It is
not designed to order outcomes of this more complex kind.
And it is clear why the theory is silent. It is logically impossible that
you may face a choice between (2,Ω)(3,1) and (1, 3)(2,Ω). In such a choice,
you could either choose (1, 3) by rejecting world (2,Ω), or choose (2,Ω) by
rejecting the different world (3, 1). But you can never face these two options
at once. I shall thus call this an impractical choice. Individuation of out-
comes in terms of their alternatives will always lead to impractical choices.
But deontological theories are designed to guide your decision-making – and
they can perfectly well guide your decision-making while being silent on all
impractical choices. To use Ross’s phrase, a theory can be a perfectly ‘ade-
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quate basis for action’ even if it does not order options in choices that you
can never face. We should not expect deontological views to give advice in
impractical choices; there is no reason why they should.
In fact there is a difference here between axiologies and non-consequentialist
moral theories, which will become important later on. They have a funda-
mentally different structure. Axiologies are claims about what is valuable in
the world. But actual outcomes and prospects are, so to speak, indefinitely
fine-grained: for each actual outcome or prospect, we can provide an in-
finitely long description of it, which distinguishes it from any other one. And
for each aspect or property of outcomes, an axiology should imply whether
that property is relevant in determining value. So in principle, an axiology is
fragmentary, not fully specified or well-defined, if it is silent on how certain
very fine-grained outcomes or prospects are ordered. This is not to say that
a fully specified axiology should be ‘complete’ in my technical sense – that
it should imply that any two outcomes or prospects are comparable. But
– however fine-grainedly we individuate outcomes or prospects – it should
imply for any two of them, either that they are equally good, or that one is
better, or that they are incomparable. If it simply remains silent on how,
or whether, two options compare, then to at least one of them it has not as-
signed a (precise or rough) value, which by its nature it should. The verdict
of an absence (of precise value-comparisons) does not make it underspecified;
but the absence of a verdict does.
Accordingly, axiologies should imply a verdict on impractical choices. Like
any other, an impractical choice is simply a comparison among two outcomes
or prospects, and an axiology should assign each of them a value. Whether we
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can face a choice between them is completely irrelevant from an axiological
point of view.
But again, non-consequentialist theories are designed to guide your decision-
making – they tell you not to lie and steal, or not to behave cowardly, and
so on. They are simply not – at least not ultimately – in the business of
saying what is valuable about outcomes, and how valuable it is. So there is
no reason why they should imply a verdict on impractical choices. By a non-
consequentialist standard, there is nothing fragmentary or underspecified if
a theory is silent on them.
As far as I see, this difference has so far been ignored in the recent debate
about whether all moral theories can be ‘consequentialised’ – i.e. under-
stood as identical or equivalent to a form of consequentialism. Some authors
have endorsed the view that ‘every moral view is consequentialist’ (Dreier
(1993, 24)), or that ‘every plausible moral view is a mere notational variant
of a consequentialist view’ (Dreier (2011, 98)).15 For the reason I have out-
lined, I think this is strictly speaking false. I take it that consequentialist
theories necessarily satisfy Transitivity. If we are to guarantee that non-
consequentialist theories do so as well, we have to individuate outcomes in a
sufficiently fine-grained way. But then, a non-consequentialist theory, unlike
a consequentialist one, may be fully specified and yet completely silent on
certain choices.
What exactly does that mean for our present purposes? Fortunately, from
the point of view of Completeness and Transitivity, I think this difference does
not matter much. There are representation theorems that allow for incom-
15Cf. also Louise (2004, 519).
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pleteness, and if the other conditions of these theorems could be satisfied
even under a fine-grained individuation of outcomes, I think these theorems
would serve their purpose. If for some two options a and b, a theory neither
implies that a  b nor that b  a, nothing in these formal theorems requires
that this must be because of an explicit verdict of incomparability. So for
the purposes of representation, we could treat the absence of a verdict and
the verdict of absence in the same way. To be precise, we would have to bear
this difference in mind. If the expectation with the relevant set of utility
functions yields an incompleteness, in some cases (of non-consequentialist
theories) that would indicate the absence of a verdict; in other cases (of con-
sequantialist or perhaps non-consequentialist theories) it would indicate the
verdict of absence. On a formal level, that difference would be lost. But we
could bear it in mind, and no great harm would be done.
So given that we have theorems allowing for incompleteness, Transitivity
and the incompleteness emerging from reindividuation would not in them-
selves present a problem. Let me thus turn to Continuity and Independence.
5.2.2 Continuity
As far as I see, questions of continuity are unfortunately rarely discussed
in deontological ethics. But as with Transitivity, it seems that many stan-
dard deontological theories prima facie violate Continuity. This is because,
prima facie, many deontological constraints are best captured in terms of
probability-thresholds.
For example, consider the question whether or not a certain action violates
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someone’s rights and is therefore ruled out by a constraint. Presumably, you
can respect a person’s rights even if you take some risk of killing her for
the sake of a minor pleasure of yours – driving past her on your way to a
restaurant, say. However, you presumably violate a person’s rights if you
take a considerable risk of killing her for the sake of that minor pleasure.
When does the constraint that we ought to respect people’s rights apply?
One answer that seems congenial to deontology is that there is a probability
threshold. But unsurprisingly, such threshold-views lead to violations of
Continuity. To see this, suppose you violate a person’s rights if you take
a risk of more than 1% of killing her for the sake of a minor pleasure; and
suppose that there is thus a constraint against taking such a risk, but not
against taking a risk of 1% or less. Furthermore, suppose that it is always
morally preferable not to violate anyone’s rights than to violate someone’s
rights, and that if you do not violate anyone’s rights it is ceteris paribus
preferable to risk killing fewer people rather than more. Now consider:
a killing Brown with 100% probability;
b killing White and Blue with 1% probability;
c killing Brown with 1% probability.
Our view implies that c  b  a. However, there is no probability p ∈]0, 1[
such that pa + (1 − p)c  b: for any p > 0, pa + (1 − p)c involves a risk of
more than 1% of killing Brown, thus violates her rights, and b will be morally
preferable to it.
Again, it is not difficult to find other examples where such thresholds
seem congenial to deontological theorising. For example, consider the ques-
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tion whether it is permissible to kill someone for the sake of saving others.
Suppose that whether or not it is depends on whether or not that person for-
feited her right not to be killed by you – say, by intending to kill the people
you could save. Presumably, you do not need to be absolutely certain that
that person forfeited her rights, otherwise the forfeiture-proviso would be ir-
relevant in practice. So suppose again that there is some relevant threshold,
and you can permissibly kill someone for the sake of saving ten others only if
the probability that she is innocent is no more than this threshold. Let that
threshold be 5%. And suppose again that it is always preferable not to kill
anyone impermissibly rather than to kill someone impermissibly, and that,
ceteris paribus, it is preferable to permissibly kill fewer people rather than
more in order to save others. Consider:
d killing Blue, where Blue has a 10% probability of being innocent;
e killing Brown and White, where Brown and White both have a 5%
probability of being innocent;
f killing Blue, where Blue has a 5% probability of being innocent.
Our view implies that f  e  d. However, there is again no probability
p ∈]0, 1[ such that pd + (1 − p)f  e: for any p > 0, pd + (1 − p)f involves
killing someone who has a probability of more than 5% of being innocent, is
thus impermissible, and e will be morally preferable to it.16
Or relatedly, consider the question about when we impermissibly use an
innocent person as a means. On standard deontological views, it is impermis-
sible to kill an innocent person as a means to save other people’s lives. And
16This example is taken from Jackson and Smith (2006); the threshold view is accepted
by Aboodi et al. (2008).
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on many views, this constraint is ‘patient-centred’: it has to do with a kind
of respect that we owe to that subject, and is independent of the number of
lives saved. So it is impermissible to kill someone as as a means to save 50,
or 100, or 300 others. Yet presumably, you can permissibly use an innocent
person as a means to save someone else’s life if doing so does not harm that
person. For example, you may arguably push Red into a button if doing so
is the only way to save Blue’s life, and Red will not be harmed at all by your
pushing her. On some views, this may be an infringement of Red’s rights,
and you might afterwards be under an obligation to apologise to Red for us-
ing her. But if it is an infringement of her rights, it is arguably a permissible
one.17 But what if it is uncertain whether the person will be killed by your
using her as a means? Again, it seems natural for deontological views to
accept a threshold for when we stop treating others as ends in themselves,
and impermissibly use them as means. So suppose you impermissibly use an
innocent person as a means to save others if you thereby take a risk of more
than 2% of killing her; and suppose that there is thus a constraint against
taking such a risk, but not against taking a risk of 2% or less. Furthermore,
suppose that if you do not use anyone impermissibly as a means it is ceteris
paribus preferable to save more people rather than fewer. Now consider:
g using Red as a means to save Blue and Brown, thereby killing Red
with 100% probability;
h using White as a means to save Black, thereby killing White with
2% probability;
17For the view that one can sometimes permissibly infringe someone else’s rights, cf.
e.g. Thomson (1990, ch.6), Fabre (2012, ch.2).
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k using Red as a means to save Blue and Brown, thereby killing Red
with 2% probability.
Our view implies that k  h  g. However, there is no probability p ∈]0, 1[
such that pg + (1 − p)k  h: for any p > 0, pg + (1 − p)k involves a risk of
more than 2% of killing Red, and thus there will be a constraint against it.
So for any p > 0, h will be morally preferable to pg + (1− p)k.
More examples could be given – for example, concerning the distinction
between having and not having promised, between another person’s being or
not being judicious and autonomous, and many other deontological concerns.
Prima facie, many standard deontological theories violate Continuity.
Is there a strategy to resist this appearance? At first, it might seem that
reindividuating outcomes should again prove helpful. Consider again our
example of risking Brown’s death for the sake of some minor pleasure; take
two outcomes, in both of which you killed Brown, and suppose that in the
first one, your actions had a probability of less than 1%, while in the second
one they had a probability of more than 1% of killing her. According to our
theory, there was an important difference between your actions, in that only
one of them constituted a violation of rights. So it seems that our theory
treats these outcomes as distinct – implying, say, that Brown is suffering an
accidental harm in the first, and a disrespectful rights-violation in the second
outcome. More generally, for all views that involve a probability threshold,
there seems to be a categorical distinction between an outcome that had
more and one that had less than this threshold-probability of coming about.
So again, it may be natural for such theories to individuate outcomes more
256
fine-grainedly than I did.
However, the case of Continuity is importantly different from that of Tran-
sitivity. Reindividuating outcomes does not help to make our theories satisfy
Continuity. Take our example again. Option a consisted of killing Brown
with a probability of 100%, option c involved killing her with a probabil-
ity of 1%. If we individuate outcomes by the probability with which they
came about, the outcome of a will be ‘Brown is dead, killed as a result of
a rights-violation’, and one possible outcome of c will be ‘Brown is dead,
killed as a result of an unlucky accident’ (or ‘Brown is dead, and the prob-
ability of this happening was 1%’, or something similar). This will again
lead to impracticalities. Consider the option ‘pa + (1 − p)c’, with p ∈]0, 1[.
One possible outcome of this option is that Brown was killed as a result of
a rights-violation, and another possible outcome is that she was killed as a
result of an unlucky accident. But, at least on any standard view of rights,
you cannot face such an option in practice: whatever you did, your actions
either did or did not ex ante violate Brown’s rights. Whether or not they did
should not differ from outcome to outcome. So if we individuate outcomes
via the probability with which they came about, you cannot face an option
like ‘pa+(1−p)c’. In fact, this option not only contributes to an impractical
choice, together with some other option. It is impractical in itself, all by its
own. We might say it is an impractical option.
Again, moral theories will generally not give advice in choices involving
such impractical options. There is no reason why they should. So they
will generally not imply any judgments of the form ‘pa + (1 − p)c  b’, or
‘b  pa + (1− p)c’. But this is precisely what Continuity would require. So
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reindividuating outcomes will not help to make theories satisfy that axiom.
Roughly, the relevant difference between Continuity and Transitivity is
this. In either case, the pertinent reindividuation will lead to impracticalities,
and thus to widespread incompleteness. This is a problem with Continuity,
because Continuity itself features what we might call a conditional minimal
completeness constraint. It requires that, if a theory implies that a  b
and b  c, it must also make some third judgment involving pa + (1 − p)c
(viz., that pa + (1 − p)c  b for some p ∈]0, 1[), and thus cannot be fully
incomplete with respect to pa + (1 − p)c. Moreover, even under a fine-
grained individuation of outcomes via their probabilities, there will be many
(standard, practical) options for which moral theories imply the first two
judgments, and thus satisfy the antecedent of the conditional completeness
constraint. So then Continuity will require at least minimal completeness
with respect to pa + (1 − p)c, which the theories will not satisfy with fine-
grained outcomes.
Transitivity also features a conditional minimal completeness constraint.
It requires that, if a theory implies that a  b and b  c, it must also make
some third judgment involving a and c (viz., that a  c), and thus be mini-
mally complete in that respect. However, under a fine-grained individuation
of outcomes via their alternatives, there will not be any options for which
our theories imply the first two judgments, and thus satisfy the antecedent
of the conditional minimal completeness constraint. So the relevant minimal
completeness constraint never becomes effective. Even if theories do not im-
ply judgments of the form ab  cb, that is no problem, because Transitivity
will not require them to do so.
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Is there another strategy to resist the prima facie violations of Continuity?
One might argue that we should simply understand standard deontological
theories differently than I have suggested above. Violations of Continuity
arise only if there are sharp thresholds – intuitively, if there are sudden leaps
in the graph that designates the moral worth of options. But perhaps we
can capture the basic deontological ideas in ways that do not involve such
leaps. Consider again our view of rights. Instead of saying that a risk of 1%
marks a sudden cut-off point at which people’s rights are violated, we could
assume that, at a risk of 1%, the moral worth of our action decreases very
drastically, but continuously. More generally, and graphically illustrated,
we could assume that deontological functions of moral worth have drastic























Continuous Function Discontinuous Function
Figure 5.1.
One might argue that this still leads to recognisably deontological views.
Indeed, one might even argue that this is a more charitable interpretation of
these views, since discontinuities of any sort are implausible (one might say).
However, I am sceptical about this move. In many cases, discontinuities
and thresholds do seem to be congenial to deontological views, as deontolog-
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ical views operate with all-or-nothing concepts. For example, on standard
deontological views, there is an important qualitative difference in whether
or not you violate my rights. Your actions are perfectly permissible as long
as you almost, but not quite, violate my rights; and they are impermissible if
you do. There is no way in which you could violate my rights a little bit. Of
course, there can be more and less important rights, and so not all violations
of rights have to be equally grievous. But even the less important rights will
either be violated or not, and that will be a qualitative difference – a matter
of all or nothing. All-or-nothing concepts are at the heart of deontology, and
in the face of uncertainty many of them will have to be captured by proba-
bility thresholds. If we reinterpret such views as continuous, we may produce
extensionally similar cousins of them. And working with these cousins may
be the best we can do for now, in practice. But that does not present a
convincing theoretical solution to our problem.
Moreover, as we shall see in the next section, even if we render our deon-
tological views continuous, this will not help to make them satisfy Indepen-
dence. So even if we accept this strategy in the face of Continuity, that will
not solve the general problem that we are concerned with.
There is a final strategy that one could propose; but I do not think that
that strategy will be more promising. It will also be a possible candidate
concerning Independence; so let me discuss it in that context, and turn to
this final axiom now.
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5.2.3 Independence
If what I’ve said so far was correct, the case of Independence is even more
problematic. As with the other axioms, many standard moral theories prima
facie violate this condition.
Consider, for example, a view according to which a distribution of goods
is fair if and only if, in it, people’s claims are satisfied in proportion to the
strength of these claims. And suppose that, on this view, if a good cannot
be divided, the fairest thing to do is to put on a lottery in which people’s
chances to receive the good are in proportion to the strength of their claims.18
Now suppose two people, Brown and White, both have a claim to a certain
indivisible good G, but Brown’s is twice as strong as White’s. Suppose you
are faced with the options
a Brown gets G, and
b White gets G.
On the present theory, a  b, since this distribution comes closer to a distri-
bution in which everyone’s claims are satisfied in proportion to their strength.
However, suppose you have a biased coin that lands tails 2/3 of the time,
and you can choose among the following lotteries
c Brown gets G both if the coin lands heads and if it lands tails, and
d White gets G if the coin lands heads, and Brown if it lands tails.
We now have d  c; d is actually the fairest option, given that the good is
indivisible. However, since c seems to be the same option as 1/3a + 2/3a,
18For a defence of such a view, cf. e.g. Broome (1990).
261
and d the same as 1/3b+ 2/3a, this theory seems to violate Independence.19
It is clear why it does. According to this theory, what matters about
an outcome is not only what actually happens in that outcome. It is also
what could have happened, and with what probability, if that outcome did
not come about. So according to this view, we cannot evaluate the possible
outcomes of our actions independently of one another. This is why it violates
the Independence condition.
For the same reason the view from the previous section, on which you
violate someone’s rights if you take too great a risk of killing her for the
sake of a pleasure of yours, will also fail to satisfy Independence. On this
view too, what matters is not only what actually happened in a particular
outcome, but also what could have happened, and with what probability, if
that outcome did not come about. Suppose again that you violate someone’s
rights if you take a risk of more than 1% of killing her for the sake of a minor
pleasure, but not if the risk is 1% or less; and consider our options
e killing Brown with 100% probability;
f killing White and Blue with 1% probability;
g killing Brown with 1% probability.
The theory implies that g  f . But for p = 0.99, it implies that pf+(1−p)e 
pg + (1− p)e – since the latter but not the former option violates someone’s
rights.
The same holds for the view I considered about impermissibly using some-
one as a means. As is easy to see, that view will also violate Independence.
19Cf. Diamond (1967) for a similar example.
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So prima facie, violations of Independence are again extremely common in
standard deontology. Unfortunately, however, neither of the two strategies
we encountered with Transitivity and Continuity works with Independence.
First, violations of Independence do not presuppose any precise probability-
thresholds, or sharp cut-off points. Even if we interpret our theories as im-
plying continuous drops instead of discontinuous leaps, the fact remains that
what matters, according to them, is not only what actually happened in
a particular outcome, but also what could have happened if that outcome
did not come about. This very general fact causes violations of Indepen-
dence, and we do not avoid it by rendering our theories continuous. For
example, consider our view about rights-violations again. Suppose that the
moral worth of options decreases drastically but continuously when we take
a risk of more than 1% of killing someone. Then adding an additional risk of
killing Brown will decrease the worth of the option ‘killing White and Blue
with 1% probability’ less than it will decrease the worth of the option ‘killing
Brown with 1% probability’. And this phenomenon will lead to violations of
Independence. So even if we assume that this strategy allows us to avoid
violations of Continuity, it does not help with Independence. Whatever we
think about interpreting deontological views as continuous, doing so does not
help to solve the general problem that we are concerned with.
Secondly, the problem with reindividuating outcomes via the probability
with which they came about is exactly the same as with Continuity. Indepen-
dence also features a conditional minimal completeness constraint. It requires
that, if a theory implies that a  b, it must also make judgments involving
some compound option pa+ (1− p)c (viz., that pa+ (1− p)c  pb+ (1− p)c
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for all c). Moreover, even under a fine-grained individuation of outcomes via
their probabilities, there will be many standard, practical options for which
moral theories imply the first judgment, and thus satisfy the antecedent of
the conditional completeness constraint. So then Independence will require
minimal completeness with respect to pa + (1− p)c. With fine-grained out-
comes, however, theories will not even be minimally complete with respect
to pa+ (1− p)c, because this will be an impractical option, and theories will
thus remain silent on it.
As I mentioned briefly on page 260, there is a final move in response
to violations of Independence, which could also be made with respect to
Continuity. This move builds on the strategy of reindivudating outcomes.
As I have shown, in these two cases, reindividuating outcomes will render
our theories too incomplete even to satisfy the respective axioms (Continuity
and Independence). This is because reindividuating outcomes will produce
impractical options, and our theories are not designed to order such options.
So what we could do is this. We could extend our theories and make them
imply verdicts on impractical options; and we could do that in ways that
accord with the relevant constraints in Continuity and Independence. As far
as I see, that would be possible. Moreover, as far as first-order judgments
of moral preferability are concerned, it would not alter these views in any
way that is practically relevant. After all, we would keep all their verdicts
on practically possible choices, and only extend them with respect to choices
that you cannot possibly face in practice. So one might argue that this kind of
extension would be innocuous, and not distort our views in any problematic
respect.
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However, that would not be a good move, I think. For one thing, by
so extending our views, we would turn them into different theories – indeed,
theories of a different kind. As I said on page 250, non-consequentialist moral
theories have a specific nature, and that is fundamentally different from the
nature of axiologies. Only from an axiological point of view is it irrelevant
whether options can figure in practical choice. By a non-consequentialist
standard, there is nothing fragmentary or underspecified if a theory is silent
on impractical pairs of options. In fact, since non-consequentialist theories
are not in the business of saying what is valuable about outcomes and how
valuable it is, there will often be no basis within these views on which they
could imply verdicts on impractical choices or options. Hence by making our
moral theories order impractical options, we would not somehow finish them,
complement them where otherwise they would be fragmentary. We would
change their very nature. We would basically turn them into axiologies.
Moreover, even though our extensions would have no practical implica-
tions as far as first-order judgments of moral preferability are concerned, they
would have practical implications under uncertainty. Consider again the op-
tions of killing Brown with 100% probability (e), killing White and Blue with
1% probability (f), and killing Brown with 1% probability (g). And suppose
we reindividuate outcomes and supplement our theories with verdicts such
that, for some p and q in ]0, 1[, pe+ (1− p)g  f and f  qe+ (1− q)g. The
precise verdicts will determine where on the value scale between e and g the
value of f lies. And that in turn will determine how important it is to choose
f rather than e, according to our theory. And while this may be irrelevant if
we are certain of this theory and face a choice between e and f , it is not irrel-
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evant if we have to weigh it against a theory according to which e is morally
preferable to f . So there would be no basis within the deontological views
to make these extensions, and yet they would have significant implications
under uncertainty. Hence even if these extensions would for now be the best
we could work with in practice, they would not, I think, present a convincing
theoretical solution to our problem. If we present a theory of uncertainty
about these extended cousins of our deontological views, we would not be
presenting a theory of uncertainty about these deontological views.
Finally, this last strategy threatens to render our overall theory useless in
practice. As I have argued in section 4.2.4, our theory is useful in practice
because it allows us to make complicated decisions depend on simpler ones.
If we individuate outcomes such that each outcome can, in practice, figure in
only one option and choice, that will become very difficult. To check whether
our judgments satisfy the axioms, we would have to consider these complex,
entirely impractical options. And it is dubious whether we have any firm
intuitions or judgments about such options. So by individuating outcomes
very fine-grainedly and extending our theories so that they satisfy our ax-
ioms, we make it more and more difficult to use EVM in practice.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I think a great number of non-consequentialist views do not
satisfy the standard axioms of decision theory, and there is no ultimately
successful way in which we can interpret them as doing so. So I am sceptical
about whether it is possible to understand the theory I have been developing
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as a general theory of moral uncertainty.
I have conceded that it is not even a general theory of axiological uncer-
tainty. I have conceded that there are axiologies that violate the necessary
axioms, and that my theory does not apply to them. So I have presented
it as a theory of uncertainty about those axiologies that satisfy the relevant
conditions – ultimately, the theories that are N*-conformable. One might
perhaps do the same with respect to moral theories. Perhaps one might un-
derstand my theory as a theory of uncertainty about N*-conformable moral
theories. However, my sense is that most standard axiologies do satisfy our
conditions, and that the axiologies I ultimately exclude are comparatively
rare and atypical. So the remaining theory can still count as a ‘(restricted)
theory of axiological uncertainty’ in some interesting sense. In contrast, as I
have shown, it seems that standard deontological views will violate our ax-
ioms, and if there are deontological views that satisfy them, then these will
be comparatively rare and atypical. So the remaining account would not be a
‘theory of moral uncertainty’ in any interesting sense. Moreover, I have now
addressed only one problem with understanding EVM as a general theory of
moral uncertainty. There remain other problems – for example, the question
of how to accommodate supererogation.20 Even disregarding the question I
have discussed, these other problems would still need to be addressed.
So I think that understanding EVM as a general theory of moral uncer-
tainty is more problematic than some authors have claimed. I have thus
restricted the topic of this thesis to axiological uncertainty.
20Cf. footnote 7 in this chapter.
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5.3 Conclusion
In this thesis, I have tried to explore an axiomatic approach to the prob-
lem of axiological uncertainty, and to the idea of Expected Value Maximi-
sation in particular. In chapter 2, I outlined one of the most basic results
from state-dependent utility theory, and argued that – at least within cer-
tain restrictions, and modulo the problem of intertheortic comparisons – that
theorem can be applied to axiological uncertainty to formulate and defend
EVM. In chapter 3, I then argued that intertheoretic comparisons are pos-
sible, and outlined how various accounts of intertheoretic comparisons could
be axiomatised by the theorem from chapter 2. In chapter 4, I furnished the
overall theory with an account of axiological credences, and thus paved the
way for applying it in real life cases. In chapter 5, I extended the theorem so
as to make it applicable to incomplete axiologies and to axiologies that are
less than fully comparable.
Naturally, there remain many open problems for further research. On
the one hand, there are further philosophical questions. For instance, in
discussing the axioms, I have restricted myself to comparing their plausibility
in our context with their status in other contexts. To make a more complete
case for EVM, it would be necessary to say more in their defence. Similarly,
the problem of intertheoretic comparions is still very underexplored, and my
discussion of it was somewhat speculative in many respects. That problem
certainly merits much further attention. And most urgently perhaps, this last
chapter raised problems for the theory of moral uncertainty, and it would be
important to make positive progress on these problems.
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On the other hand, there remain many open technical problems. It may
be worthwhile to seek theorems for incomplete orderings that yield unique
separations of subjective probabilities and state-dependent utilities and that
do not rely on the strong Reduction Axiom. It ultimately seems important to
explore results for state-dependent utilities that allow for incomparability in
values as well as fuzzy credences – so-called multi-prior multi-utility axioma-
tisations. And since there are infinitely many axiologies, it would certainly
be desirable to extend the results of this thesis to a framework that allows
for an infinite state-space.
As so often in moral philosophy, I cannot be certain that all my arguments
were sound. But I hope that this thesis has at least shed a new light on
some problems and difficulties in the theory of normative uncertainty. In
particular, I hope I have shown that EVM is a plausible theory, and that the
axiomatic approach to axiological uncertainty is worth pursuing. And I hope




6.1 Appendices to Chapter 2
The Expected Value Theorem
To prove the Expected Value Theorem, suppose U is vNM-conformable.
Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem then immediately implies that there is a
function u : Z → R, unique up to positive affine transformation, such that
for all a and b in Q,
a U b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)u(i, x). (6.1)
Now for some theory Ti, consider the set of options in which the probabil-
ity of Ti is 1, Qip=1 = {a ∈ Q |
∑
x∈X a(i, x) = 1}. According to (6.1),
u(i, ·) constitutes a utility function on X, which represents the relation U
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restricted to Qip=1. That is, for all a and b in Qip=1,
a U b iff
∑
x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x). (6.2)
Since i is complete, the Pareto Condition immediately implies that for all
a and b in Qip=1, a U b if and only if Hi(a) i Hi(b). Clearly, this
is consistent with the assumption that i is vNM-conformable. Moreover,
u(i, ·) thus constitutes a utility function on X that represents Ti ordinally,
in the sense of (2.4). Given that goodness is expectational, it also represents
Ti cardinally. The same argument applies to all i in I. So u represents the
u-value relation ordinally, and represents each axiology cardinally. So given
the decision-theoretic explication of intertheoretic comparisons, it also jointly
represents the axiologies cardinally. We can thus interpret all functions u(i, ·)
in (6.1) as value-functions Gi. 
6.2 Appendices to Chapter 4
The Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem
By basically the same reasoning as in the derivation of the Expected Value
Theorem, the Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem follows immediately
from Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem 2. 
The Subjectivist Weighted Value Theorem
Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 7) state the following theorem:
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Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem 3: If a reflexive binary relation ˙
on K is vNM-conformable, there is a utility function u : Z → R, unique
up to positive unit-comparable transformation, such that for all a and b
in K,
a ˙ b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)u(i, x). (6.3)
This theorem immediately implies that if the u-value relation ˙U is vNM-
conformable, there is a utility function u such that
a ˙U b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)u(i, x). (6.4)
Now for some theory Ti and some outcome y, consider the set Kiy = {a ∈
K | a(j, y) = 1 ∀j 6= i}. Kiy ⊂ K is the set of options that if Ti is false
certainly lead to y. We then have, for all a and b in Kiy,
a ˙U b iff
∑
x∈X
a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
x∈X
b(i, x)u(i, x). (6.5)
Since all i are reflexive and complete, the Pareto Condition immediately
implies that for all a and b in Kiy, a ˙U b if and only if Ki(a) i Ki(b). So
u(i, ·) actually constitutes a utility function on X that represents Ti ordi-
nally. Given that goodness is expectational, it also represents Ti cardinally.
The same argument applies to all i in I. The uniqueness condition follows
immediately from Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem 3. 
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6.3 Appendices to Chapter 5
Theorem 5.1
Let I again be our finite (index) set of theories, and X our a finite set of out-
comes, with Z = {(i, x) | i ∈ I, x ∈ X} andQ = {a : Z → R+ |
∑
(i,x)∈Z a(i, x) =
1}. Note that Nau’s Theorem holds for any finite sets of states and outcomes.
So let S ′ be the singleton {k}, let X ′ be a set of |X| · |I| outcomes, and define
Z ′ = {(k, x) |x ∈ X ′}, and K′ = {a : Z ′ → R+ |
∑
x∈X′ a(k, x) = 1}. Accord-
ing to Nau’s Theorem, if a reflexive relation ˙ on K′ is N-conformable, there
is a nonempty closed convex set W ⊂ W* of functions representing it in the
sense of (5.3). Since there is a simple bijection between Q and K′ (and to
each constant act a(i,x) in Q there corresponds a constant act ax in K′), this
implies Theorem 5.1.
I shall spell this out in some detail. To see the bijection between Q and
K′, label the outcomes in X by X = {x1, x2, ..., xk}, and the outcomes in X ′
by:
X ′ = {x11, x12, ..., x1k,
x21, x22, ..., x2k,
...,
xn1, xn2, ..., xnk}









a(k, x) = 1. (6.6)
273
So with each a ∈ Q we can associate an act a ∈ K′ which is such that
a(k, xij) = a(i, xj), and vice versa. More formally, we can define a bijection
M : K′ → Q,
M : a 7→M(a), M(a)(i, xj) = a(k, xij), with
M−1 : a 7→M−1(a), M−1(a)(k, xij) = a(i, xj). (6.7)
For some best and worst outcomes x and x in X ′, we can define
W* = {w : Z ′ → R | w(k, x) = 0; 0 ≤ w(k, x) ≤ 1 ∀ x ∈ X r {x, x};
w(k, x) = 1}. (6.8)
For some reflexive binary relation  on Q, define a binary relation ˙ on K′
such that a ˙ b if and only if M(a) M(b). Then if  is N-conformable (for
(i, x) = (m,xn) and (i, x) = (p, xq)), ˙ is N-conformable (for x = xmn and
x = xpq). From Nau’s Theorem, we know that if the latter is true, there is
a nonempty closed convex set W ⊂ W* of state-dependent utility functions,
such that for all a and b in K′,
a ˙ b iff
∑
x∈X′
a(k, x)w(k, x) ≥
∑
x∈X′
b(k, x)w(k, x) ∀w ∈ W. (6.9)
For any w ∈ W , define a corresponding function u : Z → R, such that
u(i, xj) = w(k, xij), and let U be the set of all such u. Since W is nonempty
closed and convex, and W ⊂ W*, U is nonempty closed and convex, and
U ⊂ U*. Now take any a and b, and focus on the corresponding a = M−1(a)
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and b = M−1(b). Given (6.9), we have




a(k, x)w(k, x) ≥
∑
x∈X′




M(a)(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z




a(i, x)u(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
b(i, x)u(i, x) ∀u ∈ U. (6.10)
So if there is a nonempty closed convex set W ⊂ W* of state-dependent
utility functions representing ˙ in the sense of (6.9), then there is a nonempty
closed convex set U ⊂ U* of state-dependent utility functions representing
 in the sense of (6.10). So this must be true if  is N-conformable.
Similarly, if {an  bn} is a basis for under our axioms, then {M−1(an) ˙
M−1(bn)} is a basis for ˙; so by Nau’s Theorem, W is the set of w ∈ W*
satisfying {Uw(M−1(an)) ≥ Uw(M−1(bn))}. So U must be the set of func-
tions satisfying {Uu(an) ≥ Uu(bn)}. 
The Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness
Theorem 5.1 implies that if U is N-conformable, there exists a nonempty
closed convex set U ⊂ U* of theory-dependent utility functions, such that
for all a and b ∈ Q,
a U b iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)a(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)b(i, x) ∀u ∈ U. (6.11)
Now for some theory Ti, consider the setQip=1 = {a ∈ Q |
∑
x∈X a(i, x) = 1}.
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The Strong Pareto Condition immediately implies that for all a and b in
Qip=1, a U b if and only if Hi(a) i Hi(b). So Ui = {u(i, ·) | u ∈ U}
actually constitutes a closed convex set of utility function on X that rep-
resents Ti ordinally. Given my explication of intratheoretic comparisons, it
also represents Ti cardinally. The same argument applies to all i in I. So
given my explication of intertheoretic comparisons, U jointly represents all
axiologies cardinally. 
Theorem 5.2
(i). From Theorem 5.1, we know that there must be a nonempty closed
convex set U ⊂ U* of theory-dependent utility functions that represents 
in the sense of (5.10). To see that ˙ can be represented as an expectation
of P and the same set of functions U , take some a and b in K, and focus on
aP and bP in Q, with aP (i, x) = P (i)a(i, x), and bP (i, x) = P (i)b(i, x) for
all (i, x) ∈ Z. We know that
aP  bP iff
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)aP (i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)bP (i, x) ∀u ∈ U.
(6.12)
Since aP and bP ∈ QP , and a = L(aP ), b = L(bP ), the Reduction Axiom
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implies that




u(i, x)aP (i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z




P (i)u(i, x)a(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
P (i)u(i, x)b(i, x) ∀u ∈ U.
(6.13)
So this relation must hold for any a and b in K.
(ii). This claim follows immediately from the relevant claim in Theorem
5.1.
(iii). By way of negation, suppose we had a different probability distri-
bution Q 6= P for which (i) is true. Then there must be some h and k
in I with P (h) > Q(h) and P (k) < Q(k). We define lotteries in QP and
K that contradict this assumption. So suppose that each i is strictly non-
uniform under , i.e. that for each i, there are xi, x˜i,
˜
xi, xi in X such that
a(i,xi)  a(i,x˜i)  a(i,
˜
xi)
 a(i,xi). Now for any r ∈ [0, 1], define ar and
br ∈ QP by
ar(h, xh) = r · P (h), br(k, xk) = r · P (k),
ar(h, xh) = (1− r) · P (h), br(k, xk) = (1− r) · P (k),
ar(k, xk) = P (k), br(h, xh) = P (h),
and assume that ar and br agree outside h and k (i.e. that ar(i, x) = br(i, x)
for all x ∈ X, i ∈ I r {h, k}). Similarly, define ar and br ∈ K by
ar(h, xh) = r, br(k, xk) = r,
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ar(h, xh) = (1− r), br(k, xk) = (1− r),
ar(k, xk) = 1, br(h, xh) = 1,
and assume that ar and br agree outside h and k.
Since ar = L(ar), and br = L(br), the Reduction Axiom implies that
ar  br if and only if ar ˙ br for any r ∈ [0, 1]. So if (i) is true for Q, then
for any r ∈ [0, 1],
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)ar(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
u(i, x)br(i, x) ∀u ∈ U ⇔
∑
(i,x)∈Z
Q(i)u(i, x)ar(i, x) ≥
∑
(i,x)∈Z
Q(i)u(i, x)br(i, x) ∀u ∈ U. (6.14)
The left-hand side of the biconditional (6.14) is equivalent to
rP (h)u(h, xh) + (1− r)P (h)u(h, xh) + P (k)u(k, xk) ≥
rP (k)u(k, xk) + (1− r)P (k)u(k, xk) + P (h)u(h, xh) ∀u ∈ U ⇔
rP (h)[u(h, xh)− u(h, xh)] ≥ (1− r)P (k)[u(k, xk)− u(k, xk)] ∀u ∈ U.
(6.15)
Similarly, the right-hand side of (6.14) is equivalent to
rQ(h)[u(h, xh)− u(h, xh)] ≥ (1− r)Q(k)[u(k, xk)− u(k, xk)] ∀u ∈ U.
(6.16)
Now, define r˜ = inf{r ∈ [0, 1] | (6.15) holds}. Such an infimum must exist,
since the set {r ∈ [0, 1] | (6.15) holds} is nonempty and bounded. Suppose
r˜ = 0. Then {a1/n} and {b1/n} would be two sequences with a1/n  b1/n
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for all n ∈ N; hence Sequence-Continuity would imply that a0  b0, which
(given that P is positive) contradicts our assumptions about xk and xk. So
r˜ > 0. Similarly, suppose r˜ = 1. Then
sup
{
u(k, xk)− u(k, xk)
u(h, xh)− u(h, xh)
| u ∈ U
}
=∞. (6.17)
Since U ∈ U*, 1 ≥ u(k, xk)− u(k, xk) for all u in U . Hence
inf{u(h, xh)− u(h, xh) | u ∈ U} = 0, (6.18)
which contradicts our assumptions about xh and xh. So 1 > r˜.
Moreover, given Sequence-Continuity we have ar˜  br˜. However, since
P (h) > Q(h) and P (k) < Q(k), we know that (6.16), and the right-hand
side of (6.14), cannot hold for r = r˜. So (i) cannot be true for Q.1 
The Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem for Incompleteness
By the same reasoning as in the derivation of the Expected Value Theorem
for Incompleteness, the Subjectivist Expected Value Theorem for Incom-
pleteness follows immediately from Theorem 5.2. 
1A similar proof is given by Karni and Schmeidler (1980, 12f.) for the uniqueness of the
probability distribution in Karni and Schmeidler’s Theorem 2. Since they are concerned
with complete relations, their proof features simple utility functions instead of sets. Apart
from that, the above proof mirrors theirs.
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